

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: [BLW Taskings: SPW-SectorCommandStaff](#)
Cc: [OPS WEST SECTORS](#)
Subject: FW: Events Abroad and OS/ IICC/ Incident Management Disposition (FYSA)
Date: Monday, January 6, 2020 11:29:13 AM
Attachments: [cisa_security_of_st-cp_resource_guide_april_2019.pdf](#)
(b) (7)(E)
[\(Update\) DHS CAR for Middle East for Security \(NOC 0849-19-003\) 0500 ET 6 Jan 2020.pdf](#)
[NTAS BULLETIN JAN 4 2020-FINAL 1540hrs.pdf](#)
[image003.png](#)

Chiefs,

FYSA.

Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
United States Border Patrol
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (iPhone)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 12:10 PM
To: OPS EAST SECTOR (b) (7)(E); OPS WEST SECTORS
(b) (7)(E); OPS CENTRAL SECTORS (b) (7)(E)
Cc: OPS FOREIGN OPS (b) (7)(E); USBPEM (b) (7)(E); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Events Abroad and OS/ IICC/ Incident Management Disposition (FYSA)

USBP EMERGENCY MANAGERS & CORRIDORS – FOR AWARENESS

Please ensure relevant leadership personnel are aware of current posture.

Will provide any informational updates as they are made available to this office.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), **MEP | Assistant Chief | Emergency Manager | Special Operations**
Headquarters | U.S. Border Patrol | Washington D.C.
Desk | (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Cell | (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 12:02 PM

To: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFAMpreparedness

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E); [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ATC-EPB [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E);

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Incident-Management [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] OPS SPECIAL OPERATIONS

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] OVERACKER, THOMAS F

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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SAHAKIAN, DIANE V [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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CBPHQPREPAREDNESS [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- The CBP Commissioner’s Situation Room remains operational and engaged 24/7.
- The OS Situation Management System (SMS) Program team can facilitate any operator/ administrator training or access needs
 - A WebEOC incident will be created and will include pertinent reference material and will be utilized as events dictate; please consult with WebEOC Program Manager as appropriate
 - Template ENS alerts have been created and are ready to utilize if needed; please consult with ENS Program Manager as appropriate
- The CBP HQ EOC (RRB 4.2A) is in a ‘warm standby’ mode; currently with a modest personnel footprint
- All EPCs, Continuity personnel, and Continuity sites should remain engaged; reviewing and updating office plans and procedures as needed
 - Note that the DHS Continuity Mission Assurance Cell (CMAC) has been activated during business hours (8am- 4pm ET)
 - Please consult with CBP Continuity and Devolution Program Managers as appropriate
- In collaboration with CBP field personnel, upcoming near term special events (to include but not limited to **Consumer Electronics Show, State of the Union Address, and Super Bowl 54**) will be planned and executed with additional vigilance and contingencies.
- Attached are recent DHS and Stakeholder products for your appropriate reference and review

Additional information will be forthcoming. Thank you for your attention and engagement.

Be safe and stay vigilant.

VR,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), MPH, CAAMA
Senior Preparedness Planner
Operations Support

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



DHS Component Actions Report
DHS Component Security Posture – Middle East (NOC 0849-19)
As of 0500 ET, 6 January 2020 (Update)

Updates in Blue
Reported Once in Black
Old Information in Red

(b) (7) (E)

DHS Component Responses:

Revision to ICE reporting and updating of overall personnel numbers.

Personnel: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED].

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)


- (b) (7) (E)

- All personnel are accounted for

- (b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

-  (b) (7)(E)
- Embassy Muscat, Oman has removed the movement/shelter in place restrictions
- All employees are in on-duty status. All employees and family members are safe/accounted for.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

(b) (7)(E)

- All TSA personnel and dependents have been accounted for
- Maintaining continuous personnel accountability; staff in their respective AOR are following Regional Security Office and Embassy guidance.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

(b) (7)(E)

- Pursuant to decision made in 2019 related to efficiency of use of USCIS resources, the USCIS office in Amman is scheduled to close permanently on 1/17/20. The Field Office Director will depart post permanently on 1/15/20 and the International Adjudications Officer will depart post permanently on 1/17/20. A USCIS IT specialist is scheduled for a detail to Amman 1/11-1/14 to assist with the IT shutdown. USCIS is monitoring the situation and will determine whether to delay the detail. USCIS also continues to monitor

the situation to determine whether to continue with plans to send staff on refugee processing details to Amman, Turkey, the UAE and/or Egypt.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

(b) (7) (E)

- USCG reports 100 percent accountability; all members are safe.
- Embassy Muscatt, Oman has removed the movement/shelter in place restrictions

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

- FEMA has no personnel in the Middle East
- Maintains heightened security posture in the U.S. including U.S. Territories and holdings
- No increase in posture anticipated at this time
- Updated our Nation-threat Annex with DHS, issued a WARNORD to N-IMAT C, rostered enhanced watch and can roster ROC if things escalate, and Emergency Support Functions Leadership Group (ESFLG) support is standing by if a meeting is needed.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

DISTRIBUTION: DHS HQ Leadership, DHS Component Leadership, and DHS Component Operations Centers.

(b) (7)(E)

The next DHS Component Actions Report will be published on or about 1700 ET 6 Jan 2020.

The DHS Component Action Report is an internal DHS report that is to DHS HQ Leadership, DHS Component Leadership, and DHS Component Operations Centers.



CISA
CYBER+INFRASTRUCTURE



Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places—Resource Guide

April 2019

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Letter from the Assistant Director

The cornerstone of our democracy is a free and open society where citizens can enjoy a wide range of activities without fear of harm. People across the U.S. should expect that they will be safe and secure as they cheer on a favorite team at a sporting event, shop at a mall, attend a house of worship, go to school, dine out with family and friends, or go to a concert.

The Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works closely with public and private sector stakeholders to mitigate risk to our infrastructure. This mission includes working to secure soft targets and crowded places in partnership with our stakeholders.



Soft targets and crowded places—a term more recently used—are typically defined as locations or environments that are easily accessible, attract large numbers of people on a predictable or semi-predictable basis, and may be vulnerable to attacks using simple tactics and readily available weapons. CISA works with stakeholders to increase security and reduce the risk of a successful attack-or, for those that do occur, limit the impacts to life and property.

The "Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places - Resource Guide" is a key tool to our efforts to raise awareness of the capabilities that are available to support risk mitigation. The Guide provides an easy to use method to quickly find information on a wide range of free capabilities that can be incorporated into the security practices of organizations of all sizes. I strongly encourage you to consider these capabilities as part of your risk mitigation strategy.

As CISA's Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security, I assure you that we continue to work diligently to identify innovative means through which we can collectively mitigate the risks we face as a nation generally, and those posed by terrorists and other violent extremist actors to soft targets and crowded places specifically. Thank you for your partnership and commitment to securing our nation.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Brian Harrell".

Brian Harrell
Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security



Table of Contents


1	Resource Matrix	7
	For Everyone.....	7
	For Businesses.....	8
	For Government.....	10
	For First Responders.....	10
2	Resource Descriptions & Links	11
	Understand the Basics.....	11
	Identify Suspicious Behavior.....	13
	Protect, Screen, and Allow Access to Facilities.....	14
	Protect Against Unmanned Aircraft Systems.....	16
	Prepare and Respond to Active Assailants.....	17
	Prevent and Respond to Bombings.....	19
	Connect with CISA.....	21
3	Contacts	23

















1 Resource Matrix

Segments of our society are inherently open to the general public, and by nature of their purpose do not incorporate strict security measures. Given the increased emphasis by terrorists and other extremist actors to leverage less sophisticated methods to inflict harm in public areas, it is vital that the public and private sectors collaborate to enhance security of locations such as transportation centers, parks, restaurants, shopping centers, special event venues, and similar facilities. Securing these locations is essential to preserving our way of life and sustaining the engine of our economy. The Infrastructure Security Division (ISD), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is committed to improving the security and resilience of soft targets by providing relevant tools, training, and programs to both the public and private sectors, and the general public. This guide is a catalog of ISD soft target resources, many of which were created in collaboration with our partners to ensure they are useful and reflective of the dynamic environment we live in.


Legend: Type of Resource



For Everyone

CATEGORY	RESOURCE	TYPE
Understand the Basics	Tools and Resources to Help Businesses Plan, Prepare, and Protect from an Attack	
	"If You See Something, Say Something" Campaign® Informational Video and Radio PSA	
	"If You See Something, Say Something" Campaign® Informational Print Materials PSA	
Identify Suspicious Behavior	Insider Threat Video	
	Pathway to Violence Action Guide	
	Pathway to Violence Video	
	What's in Store: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Events Video	
	Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Critical Infrastructure Drone Pocket Card	
Protect Against Unmanned Aircraft Systems	Indicators of Suspicious Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)	
	UAS Frequently Asked Questions	
	Action Guide – Active Shooter Attacks: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places	
Prepare and Respond to Active Assailants	Action Guide – Chemical Attacks: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places	
	Action Guide – Vehicle Ramming: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places	
	Action Guide – Fire as a Weapon: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places	

Legend: Type of Resource




CATEGORY	RESOURCE	TYPE
Prepare and Respond to Active Assailants, continued	Action Guide – Mass Gatherings: Take Charge of Your Personal Safety	
	Active Shooter Booklet	
	Active Shooter Preparedness Program Website	
	Active Shooter Event Quick Reference Guide	
	Active Shooter Poster	
	Active Shooter Pocket Card	
	Options for Consideration Active Shooter Preparedness Video	
	Vehicle Ramming Attack Mitigation Video	
Prevent and Respond to Bombings	Security and Resiliency Guide for Countering-IEDs (SRG C-IED) and Annexes	

For Businesses

CATEGORY	RESOURCE	TYPE
Understand the Basics	Business Continuity Planning Suite	
	Independent Study Training Courses	
	Critical Infrastructure Tabletop Exercise Program (CITEP)	
Identify Suspicious Behavior	Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP)	
	Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative – Private Sector Security Training	
	No Reservations: Suspicious Behavior in Hotels Video	
	Suspicious Behavior Advisory Posters	
	At-A-Glance Guide for Protecting Faith-Based Venues	
	Check It! – Bag Check Video	
	Evacuation Planning Guide for Stadiums	
	Patron Screening Best Practices Guide	
	Protective Measures Guides	
	Sports Venue Bag Search Procedures Guide	
Sports Venue Credentialing Guide		

Legend: Type of Resource



CATEGORY	RESOURCE	TYPE
Identify Suspicious Behavior, continued	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Identification Guide	
	Vehicle Inspection Guide	
	Vehicle Inspection Video	
Protect Against Unmanned Aircraft Systems	Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Addressing Critical Infrastructure Security Challenges	
	Unmanned Aircraft Systems – Critical Infrastructure Video	
Prepare and Respond to Active Assailants	Active Shooter Preparedness In-Person Workshops	
	Active Shooter Emergency Action Planning Guide	
	Active Shooter Emergency Action Planning Template	
	Active Shooter Emergency Action Planning Video	
	Active Shooter Recovery Guide	
	Action Guide – Mass Gatherings: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places	
	Recovering From An Active Shooter Incident Action Guide	
Prevent and Respond to Bombings	Counter-IED and Risk Mitigation Training	
	Sports and Entertainment Venues Bombing Prevention Solutions Portfolio	
	Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire) Website	
	What to Do – Bomb Threat Website	
	Bomb Threat Procedures Checklist	
	Bombing Prevention Lanyard Cards	
	DHS-Department of Justice (DOJ) Bomb Threat Guidance	
	What You Can Do When There is a Bomb Threat Video	
Connect with CISA	Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI)	
	Regional Offices	
	Assist Visits and the Infrastructure Survey Tool	



For Government

CATEGORY	RESOURCE	TYPE
Protect, Screen, and Allow Access to Facilities	Interagency Security Committee Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes	
	Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide	
Prepare and Respond to Active Assailants	Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide	
Prevent and Respond to Bombings	Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Security Planning	
Connect with CISA	Interagency Security Committee	



For First Responders

CATEGORY	RESOURCE	TYPE
Protect, Screen, and Allow Access to Facilities	Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) Framework	
Protect Against Unmanned Aircraft Systems	Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Considerations for Law Enforcement	
Prevent and Respond to Bombings	National Counter- Improvised Explosive Device Capabilities Analysis Database (NCCAD)	

2 Resource Descriptions & Links

This section includes brief descriptions of each of the available resources and includes links to the resources or where you can find more information.

Understand the Basics

The following resources provide an introduction to facility security and can serve as a good first step for businesses. Resources include fact sheets, guidance, and online training and education courses that cover topics such as Implementing Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Programs and Workplace Security Awareness.

Tools and Resources to Help Businesses Plan, Prepare, and Protect from an Attack

Provides business owners and their employees with an overview of the Hometown Security Initiative, specifically how to apply the four steps: Connect, Plan, Train, and Report to their workplace and communities. The Hometown Security Report Series (HSRS) provides reports on community infrastructure and institutions, including commercial office buildings, commuter rail systems, hotels, hospitals, and institutes of higher education. The reports are one of the free tools and resources provided under the initiative.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Hometown-Security-Fact-Sheet-04062016-508.pdf>

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-security>

Audience   Type  

Business Continuity Planning Suite

Helps businesses create, improve, or update their business continuity plan to reduce the potential impact of a disruption to business. The suite includes business continuity planning training, business continuity and disaster recovery plan generators, and a business continuity plan validation.

Link: <https://www.ready.gov/business-continuity-planning-suite>

Audience  Type 

Independent Study Training Courses

Provide individuals, businesses, first responders, and law enforcement with the information needed to improve security at their facilities. The self-paced, online courses hosted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute cover topics such as levels of protection and design-basis threat, active shooter, insider threat, workplace security, hidden hazards in retail spaces, and suspicious activity surveillance. All courses require a FEMA student identification number. For more information on how to register, please visit: <https://cdp.dhs.gov/femasid/register>.

Link: <https://training.fema.gov/is/>

Audience    Type 

Critical Infrastructure Tabletop Exercise Program (CITEP)

Assists the critical infrastructure community in conducting their own tabletop exercises by allowing users to leverage pre-built exercise templates and tailor them to their specific needs in order to assess, develop, and update emergency action plans, programs, policies and procedures. These resources provide exercise planners with tools, scenarios, question sets, and guidance to support the development of a discussion-based exercise. There are over 30 CITEP exercise templates, including ones for outdoor events and insider threats.

Link: https://hsin.dhs.gov/ci/sites/exerciseinfo/Pages/CITEP_Learnmore.aspx

Audience  Type 



Identify Suspicious Behavior

These resources help all citizens, business owners and employees, and private sector security personnel understand what suspicious behaviors may pose a threat and what steps to take to report the behavior to authorities.

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative – Private Sector Security Training

Assists private sector security personnel in recognizing what kind of suspicious behaviors are associated with pre-incident terrorism activities, understanding how and where to report suspicious activities, and protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties when documenting information.

Link: <https://nsi.ncirc.gov/hspregistration/private-sector/>

Audience  Type 

No Reservations: Suspicious Behavior in Hotels Video

Helps hotel employees identify and report suspicious activities and threats in a timely manner by highlighting the indicators of suspicious activity. The video is also available in Spanish.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/video/no-reservations-suspicious-behavior-hotels>

Audience  Type 

Suspicious Behavior Advisory Posters

Serve as a quick-reference resource to help businesses, first responders, and local governments identify suspicious activities and behaviors and prevent the illicit sale of explosive precursor chemicals and components. The posters are available under the Suspicious Activities and Bomb Threats – What to Do section of the TRIPwire Website.


Link: <https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/jsp/loginPopup2.jsp>

Audience   Type 

“If You See Something, Say Something” Campaign®

Provides outreach materials such as posters, brochures, and Web graphics that can be provided to partners at no cost to help raise public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime. Also available are video and radio public service announcements to raise public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime. The public service announcements are available in English and Spanish, but the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is able to work with partners to address specific language needs. The topics include *Protect Your Everyday* for all citizens, *Hospitality* for travelers and owners and operators of hotels, and *Officials* focused on the major sport leagues.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/campaign-materials>

Audience  Type 

Pathway to Violence Action Guide

Explains warning signs that may lead to violence and what individuals can do to mitigate a potential incident.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs-pathway-to-violence-09-15-16-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Pathway to Violence Video

Identifies behavior indicators that assailants often demonstrate before a violent act based on expert research. The video describes the six progressive steps that may be observable by colleagues, engagement strategies, and recommended responses.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/pathway-violence-video>

Audience  Type 

What's in Store: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Events Video

Helps owners, managers, and staff at shopping centers and retail establishments identify and report suspicious activity and threats by highlighting the indicators of suspicious activity in retail settings.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/video/whats-store-ordinary-people-extraordinary-events>

Audience  Type 

Insider Threat Video

Discusses how insider threats manifest in a variety of ways including terrorism, workplace violence, and breaches of cybersecurity. The video can be found under the Insider Threat tab.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/insider-threat-mitigation>

Audience  Type 

Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP)

Serves as a source of continued information on Improvised Explosive Device (IED) materials, tactics, and Counter-IED Training. A Community Engagement Website serves as the dashboard for BMAP programs across the Nation to track, gather, and disseminate materials, successes, and lessons learned from the BMAP team's instructor-led courses and site visits.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/bmap>

Audience   Type  

Protect, Screen, and Allow Access to Facilities

Many large facilities want to screen patrons before allowing them to enter facilities, others may want employ a credentialing process. Resources in this section provide suggestions and guidance on how to put these programs in place.

At-A-Glance Guide For Protecting Faith-Based Venues

Lists the different resources available for houses of worship including security assessments, tabletop exercises, and other training.

Link: <https://www.fema.gov/faith-resources>

Audience  Type 

Patron Screening Best Practices Guide

Provides options for businesses to develop and implement patron screening procedures for major sporting events, concerts, horse races, award ceremonies, and similar gatherings.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/patron-screening-guide-03-16-508.pdf>

Audience   Type 

Check It! – Bag Check Video

Provides information facility employees need to properly search bags to protect venues and patrons.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/video/check-it-bag-check-video>

Audience  Type 

Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide

Provides important information to assist department and agency security planners as they develop and review Occupant Emergency Programs for the safety and security of employees and visitors.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide-mar-2013-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Evacuation Planning Guide for Stadiums

Assists stadium owners and operators with preparing evacuation plans and helping to determine when and how to evacuate, shelter-in-place, or relocate stadium spectators and participants. It also includes a template that can be used to create a plan that will incorporate the unique policies and procedures of state and local governments, surrounding communities, and specific stadium characteristics.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/evacuation-planning-guide-stadiums-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Protective Measures Guides

Provide businesses with an overview of threats and offer suggestions for planning, coordinating, and training activities that contribute to a safe environment for guests and employees. The guides are For Official Use Only (FOUO), but businesses can request access to them through the Commercial Facilities page of the Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI), which requires registration to access.

- Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports Leagues
- Protective Measures Guide for the U.S. Lodging Industry
- Protective Measures Guide for Mountain Resorts
- Protective Measures Guide for Outdoor Venues
- Protective Measures Guide for Commercial Real Estate

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/commercial-facilities-publications>

Audience  Type 

Sports Venue Credentialing Guide

Provides suggestions for developing and implementing credentialing procedures at public assembly venues that host professional sporting events. Venue owners, operators, and event organizers should use additional resources (e.g., law enforcement) when available to implement the procedures outlined in this guide.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/sports-venue-credentialing-guide-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Sports Venue Bag Search Procedures Guide

Provides suggestions for developing and implementing bag search procedures at venues hosting major sporting events. Venue owners, operators, and event organizers should use additional resources (e.g., consult law enforcement) to implement the procedures outlined in this guide.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/sports-venue-bag-search-guide-508.pdf>

Audience   Type 

Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Best Practices for Mail Screening and Handling Processes

Provides mail center managers, their supervisors, and agency security personnel with a framework for understanding and mitigating risks posed to an organization by the mail and packages it receives and delivers on a daily basis.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-mail-handling-screening-nonfouo-sept-2012-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) Framework

Provides voluntary guidance for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities for planning and developing an access management program. The framework provides mechanisms, tools, processes, and approaches for coordinating, approving, and enabling access during response and recovery operations.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Crisis%20Event%20Response%20and%20Recovery%20Access%20%28CERRA%29%20Framework.pdf>



Audience    Type 

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Identification and Vehicle Inspection Guidance

Assist stakeholders in identifying suspected Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device IEDs (VBIED) and provide instruction for vehicle search techniques for use by law enforcement, bomb squads, HAZMAT teams, and other emergency and professional security personnel involved with

inspection of vehicles that may pose a terrorist bomb threat. The Vehicle Inspection Guide, Vehicle Inspection Video, and VBIED Identification Guide are all available to registered users on TRIPwire.

Link: https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/appmanager/IEDPortal/IEDDesktop?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=LOGIN

Audience  

Type  

Protect Against Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

UAS, also known as drones, can be used to benefit a community by transporting supplies or assisting search and rescue, but they can also be used for malicious purposes. The resources in this section provide an overview of this threat and steps businesses, the public, and first responders can take to protect against the malicious use of drones.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Addressing Critical Infrastructure Security Challenges

Provides an overview of the threats posed by UAS and actions that owners and operators can take to protect their facilities.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/uas-ci-challenges-fact-sheet-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Critical Infrastructure Drone Pocket Card

Provides a quick reference guide for critical infrastructure security and operations officers and the general public on how to identify the different categories of UAS, how to report UAS activity including what information to share, and what actions to take to respond to a threat.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/uas-ci-drone-pocket-card-112017-508.pdf>

Audience  Type 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Frequently Asked Questions

Provides answers to common questions about the requirements and operation of UAS.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/unmanned-aircraft-systems-faq>

Audience  Type 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems – Critical Infrastructure Video

Provides information on critical infrastructure challenges associated with the UAS threat, counter-UAS security practices, actions to consider for risk mitigation, and specific preparedness efforts for facilities and organizations. The video can be found under the UAS and Critical Infrastructure – Understanding the Risk tab.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/uas-ci>

Audience  Type 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Indicators of Suspicious UAS

Provides a reference aid to increase situational awareness for those who may encounter a suspicious UAS through the Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) TRIPwire OSINT Team's Emergency Responder Note (ERN). The document can be found under the Emergency Responder Notes (ERN) section.


Link: <https://tripwire.dhs.gov>

Audience  Type 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Considerations for Law Enforcement

Provides an overview of UAS and the legal and operational considerations for law enforcement before taking action, and a list of additional resources.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/uas-law-enforcement-considerations-508.pdf>

Audience 

Type 

Prepare and Respond to Active Assailants

DHS provides a number of resources to help prepare for, and respond to, active assailant incidents, including in-person and online training, tools to prepare emergency action plans, and guidance on the actions to take during an incident.

Action Guide – Active Shooter Attacks: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

Lists potential active shooter warning signs, along with steps to take if an incident occurs. Helpful tips are included to assist in developing protective measures to mitigate future attacks.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Active%20Shooter%20Attacks%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>

Audience 

Type 

Action Guide – Mass Gatherings: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

Identifies ways that businesses can prepare for and mitigate against future attacks, including protective measures that provide some basic actions for consideration.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mass%20Gatherings%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>


Audience 

Type 

Action Guide – Chemical Attacks: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

Identifies potential scenarios and symptoms of possible chemical exposures. The guide also explains how individuals can respond to and mitigate against future attacks.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Chemical%20Attacks%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>

Audience 

Type 

Action Guide – Fire as a Weapon: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

Serves as an awareness guide to help people identify potential indicators of an attack by use of fire and provides mitigation strategies and proper response procedures.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Action-Guide-Fire-as-a-Weapon-11212018-508.pdf>

Audience 

Type 

Action Guide – Vehicle Ramming: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

Identifies warning signs that individuals planning a vehicle ramming attack may exhibit. The guide also includes suggested mitigation strategies and protective measures to consider.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Vehicle%20Ramming%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF>

Audience 

Type 

Action Guide – Mass Gatherings: Take Charge of Your Personal Safety

Provides potential indicators of an attack on a mass gathering and identifies steps that individuals can take in response.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mass%20Gatherings%20-%20Take%20Charge%20of%20Your%20Personal%20Safety.pdf>


Audience 

Type 

Active Shooter Preparedness In-Person Workshops

Features scenario-based workshops with facilitated discussions to engage private sector professionals and law enforcement representatives from federal, state, and local agencies to learn how to prepare for, and respond to, an active shooter situation. Through the course of the exercises, participants evaluate current response concepts, plans, and capabilities for coordinated responses to active shooter incidents.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-workshop-participant>


Audience 

Type 

Active Shooter Emergency Action Planning

Describes the fundamental concepts of developing an Emergency Action Planning (EAP) for an active shooter scenario, including important consideration of EAP development.

- **Video:** guides viewers through important considerations of EAP development through the first-hand perspectives of active shooter survivors, first responder personnel, and other subject matter experts who share their unique insight.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-emergency-action-plan-video>
- **Guide:** provides the information needed to develop an Emergency Action Plan.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-emergency-action-plan-112017-508v2.pdf>
- **Template:** provides the framework for businesses to create their own Emergency Action Plan.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-emergency-action-plan-template-112017-508.pdf>

Audience 

Type   

Vehicle Ramming Attack Mitigation Video

Provides information to assist in mitigating the threat of vehicle ramming attacks with technical analysis from public and private sector subject matter experts. The video leverages real-world events, and provides recommendations aimed at protecting organizations as well as individuals against a potential vehicle ramming incident.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/private-citizen>

Audience 

Type 

Active Shooter Preparedness Resource Materials

Assist businesses, government offices, and schools in preparing for, and responding to, an active shooter. These resources are also available in the following languages: Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Punjabi, Russian, Somali, Spanish, and Urdu.

- **Active Shooter Booklet:** provides information on how to respond to an active shooter in your vicinity, how to react when law enforcement arrives, and how to train staff and prepare for an active shooter situation, including roles and responsibilities.
Link: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active-shooter_booklet.pdf
- **Active Shooter Event Quick Reference Guide:** provides key information in a shorter, easy-to-read format.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-pamphlet-2017-508.pdf>
- **Active Shooter Poster:** highlights key information for how to respond when an active shooter is in your vicinity.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-poster-2017-508.pdf>
- **Active Shooter Pocket Card:** contains all the information needed to respond to an active shooter in an accessible format.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-pocket-card-508.pdf>
- **Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide:** includes helpful information and best practices for federal agencies that can be applied more broadly by anyone who may be involved in an active shooter situation.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov-2015-508.pdf>
- **Options for Consideration Active Shooter Preparedness Video:** demonstrates possible actions to take if confronted with an active shooter scenario. The video also shows how to assist authorities once law enforcement enters the scene.
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/options-consideration-active-shooter-preparedness-video>

Audience 

Type   

Active Shooter Recovery Materials

Help organizations proactively put in place policies and procedures to help effectively recover from an active shooter incident while providing a support structure for all involved.


- **Active Shooter Recovery Guide:** outlines what to do in the short-term and long-term to aid in recovery.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-recovery-guide-08-08-2017-508.pdf>

- **Recovering From An Active Shooter Incident Action Guide:** provides information on how to establish a recovery process and breaks down necessary actions for short-term and long-term

recovery following an active shooter incident.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/recovering-from-an-active-shooter-incident-fact-sheet-08-08-2017-508.pdf>

Audience 

Type  

Active Shooter Preparedness Program Website

Provides access to a number of DHS products, tools, and resources to help everyone prepare for and respond to an active shooter incident.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>

Audience 

Type 

Prevent and Respond to Bombings

The resources in this section are designed to increase the capabilities of everyone—the public, business owners and staff, government employees, law enforcement, and first responders—to prevent, protect against, and respond to bombing incidents. The resources include an easy-to-use checklist, planning assistance, in-person and online training, materials and videos that provide guidance, and an online network to access additional resources and share information.

Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire) Website

Serves as a 24/7 online, collaborative information-sharing network for bomb squads, first responders, military personnel, government officials, intelligence analysts, and security professionals. Developed and maintained by the Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP), TRIPwire combines expert analyses and reports with relevant documents, images, and videos gathered directly from terrorist source materials to help users anticipate, identify, and prevent IED incidents. TRIPwire requires registration to access information, or partners can log-in using their HSIN account. To login, please visit: <https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/appmanager/IEDPortal/IEDDesktop?nfpb=true&pageLabel=LOGIN>

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/obp-tripwire-fact-sheet-2016-508.pdf>

Overview Video: <https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/jsp/tripwireVideo.jsp>

Audience    Type   

Sports and Entertainment Venues Bombing Prevention Solutions Portfolio

Provides information on and direct access to the trainings, products, and resources that support sports and entertainment organizations and venues with building counter-IED capabilities. The interactive product connects leadership within these organizations to the counter-IED resources that meet their needs, and empowers all venue personnel to play a role in security.

Link: <https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/docs/Sports%20Entertainment%20Venue%20Bombing%20Prevention%20Solutions%20Portfolio.pdf>

Audience   Type     

What to Do – Bomb Threat Website

Provides guidance and resources including in-depth procedures for responding to bomb threats or encounters with suspicious items or behaviors and provides information to help prepare and react appropriately during these events. The Website also provides information regarding other planning and preparedness resources.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/what-to-do-bomb-threat>

- **DHS-DOJ Bomb Threat Guidance:** provides detailed information on how to assess and react to a threat.
Link: https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/docs/OBP_DHS_DOJ_Bomb_Threat_Guidance.pdf
- **Bomb Threat Procedures Checklist:** provides basic procedural guidelines and a checklist to document important information if a bomb threat is received.
Link: <https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/docs/DHS%20Bomb%20Threat%20Checklist.pdf>
- **What You Can Do When There is a Bomb Threat Video:** demonstrates how to specifically respond to a phoned in bomb threat and was developed in partnership with the University of Central Florida and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).
Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/what-to-do-bomb-threat>
- **Bombing Prevention Lanyard Cards:** provide quick-reference information and key reminders to empower action, both on the job every day and in the event of an incident.
Link: [https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/docs/Bombing%20Prevention%20Lanyard%20Cards%20\(Lined%20Version\).pdf](https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/docs/Bombing%20Prevention%20Lanyard%20Cards%20(Lined%20Version).pdf)

Audience    Type   

Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning (MJIEDSP) Program

Assists communities with collectively identifying roles, responsibilities, and capability gaps; and optimizing limited resources within a multi-jurisdictional planning area. The MJIEDSP process includes coordination with stakeholders in an area to conduct familiarization briefs and training, data collection activities, and facilitated scenario-based workshops.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/mjiedsp>

Audience    Type 

Counter-IED and Risk Mitigation Training

Provides participants—including municipal officials and emergency managers, state and local law enforcement and other emergency services, critical infrastructure owners and operators,

and professional security personnel—with general information and strategies to prevent, protect against, respond to, and mitigate bombing incidents.

To request direct delivery trainings, please contact your local Protective Security Advisor (PSA) or email OBP@hq.dhs.gov for additional information. For more information, or for a full list of Counter-IED and Risk Mitigation trainings, visit the Counter-IED Training Courses Website or the Counter-IED & Risk Mitigation Training Factsheet.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/bombing-prevention-training-courses>

Fact sheet: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/obp-training-fact-sheet-2017-508.pdf>

Audience   Type   

National Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Capabilities Analysis Database (NCCAD)

Provides an assessment program managed by the Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) that uses a consistent and repeatable methodology to assess and analyze the capabilities of units with a counter-IED mission throughout the United States. NCCAD assessments measure the capabilities of and identify gaps in Personnel, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercises (POETE) required for effective prevention, protection, and response to IED threats.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/nccad>

Audience   Type 

Security and Resiliency Guide for Countering-IEDs (SRG C-IED) and Annexes

Provide individuals, businesses, first responders, and law enforcement with guidance to enhance their preparedness for potential IED incidents in their communities. The guide includes IED risk information, a framework of 10 common C-IED preparedness goals, planning considerations, and available federal resources. The guide is complemented by four annexes with additional information relevant to venues at high risk of IED-related incidents: lodging, outdoor events, public assembly, and sports leagues and venues.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/security-and-resiliency-guide-and-annexes>

Audience  Type 

Connect with CISA

This section lists ways that businesses; first responders; and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments can access not only the resources listed in this guide, but additional resources available through CISA. These resources can help identify the tools, resources, and training that are right for each facility and its risks.

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC)

Serves as the dedicated 24/7 coordination and information sharing operations center that maintains situational awareness of the Nation's critical infrastructure. For more information, please email NICC@hq.dhs.gov.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/national-infrastructure-coordinating-center>

Audience   Type  

Regional Offices

Engage with state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government partners, businesses, and critical infrastructure owners and operators in their regions to provide access to steady-state DHS risk-mitigation tools, products, and services, such as training and voluntary vulnerability assessment programs.

The 10 Regional Offices also support National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) events; support response to all-hazard incidents through field-level coordination and information sharing; and provide expertise on reconstituting affected critical infrastructure.

- Regional Office Fact Sheet: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/IP-Regional-Enhancement-Fact-Sheet-508-F.pdf>
- Regional Office Website: <https://www.dhs.gov/node/29611>
- Protective Security Advisor (PSA) Program Fact Sheet: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PSA-Program-Fact-Sheet-05-15-508.pdf>

Audience    Type   

Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI)

Serves as the primary information-sharing platform between the critical infrastructure sector stakeholders and government. HSIN-CI enables federal, state, local, and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators to communicate, coordinate, and share sensitive and sector-relevant information to protect their critical assets, systems, functions, and networks at no charge to sector stakeholders. To request access to HSIN-CI, please contact hsinci@hq.dhs.gov.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/hsin-critical-infrastructure>

Audience   Type 

Interagency Security Committee (ISC)

Develops policies, standards, and recommendations related to the security of nonmilitary federal facilities across the Nation. The ISC does this by, with, and through its members.

Link: <https://www.dhs.gov/about-interagency-security-committee>

Audience  Type 

Assist Visits and the Infrastructure Survey Tool

Informs critical infrastructure owners and operators of the importance of their facilities, how they fit into the broader critical infrastructure sector, and provides an overview of the CISA resources available to help enhance security and resilience. The visits, conducted by PSAs with critical infrastructure facility representatives, help build relationships and increase communications. One of the CISA resources available to facility owners and operators is the Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST).

Assist visits: <https://www.dhs.gov/assist-visits>
Infrastructure Survey Tool: <https://www.dhs.gov/infrastructure-survey-tool>

Audience  Type  



3 Contacts

KEY CONTACTS			
AGENCY/DIVISION/PROGRAM	PHONE/EMAIL	WEBSITE	INFORMATION PROVIDED
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center	NICC@hq.dhs.gov	https://dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-coordinating-center	For more information about the NICC
Regional Offices	Please see Website for contact information	https://www.dhs.gov/node/29611	For more information on the Regional Offices, including locations, services, and contact information for each region

ADDITIONAL CONTACTS			
AGENCY/DIVISION/PROGRAM	PHONE/EMAIL	WEBSITE	INFORMATION PROVIDED
Active Shooter Preparedness Program	ASworkshop@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness	For information on Active Shooter Preparedness workshops and materials
Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Agency	CFSteam@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/commercial-facilities-sector	For more information on available DHS resources
Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Infrastructure	hsinci@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/hsin-critical-infrastructure	To request access to HSIN-CI include the following information: name, company, official email address, supervisor's name and phone number, and critical infrastructure sector
Insider Threat Mitigation Program	InTMitigation@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/insider-threat-mitigation/	For information on Insider Threat Mitigation
Interagency Security Committee	isc.dhs.gov@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/interagency-security-committee	For more information on policies, standards, and best practices that can be applied
National Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Capabilities Analysis Database	nccad@hq.dhs.gov	www.dhs.gov/nccad	For more resources on NCCAD program.
Office for Bombing Prevention	OBP@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/obp	For more information on resources or to request training
Soft Target Security	Softtargetsecurity@hq.dhs.gov	https://www.dhs.gov/securing-soft-targets-and-crowded-spaces	For more information on soft target security resources
TRIPwire Help Desk	1-866-987-9473; TRIPwirehelp@dhs.gov	https://tripwire.dhs.gov	TRIPwire is available at no cost to registered subscribers and now also features a public-access homepage with valuable preparedness information for the whole community



U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Washington, D.C. 20528



SUMMARY OF TERRORISM THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

- The United States designated Iran a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” in 1984 and since then, Iran has actively engaged in or directed an array of violent and deadly acts against the United States and its citizens globally. The United States designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 15, 2019 for its direct involvement in terrorist plotting.
- On January 2, 2020, the United States carried out a lethal strike in Iraq killing Iranian IRGC-Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani while Soleimani was in Iraq.
- Iranian leadership and several affiliated violent extremist organizations publicly stated they intend to retaliate against the United States.
- At this time we have no information indicating a specific, credible threat to the Homeland. Iran and its partners, such as Hizballah, have demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct operations in the United States.
- Previous homeland-based plots have included, among other things, scouting and planning against infrastructure targets and cyber enabled attacks against a range of U.S.-based targets.
- Iran maintains a robust cyber program and can execute cyber attacks against the United States. Iran is capable, at a minimum, of carrying out attacks with temporary disruptive effects against critical infrastructure in the United States.
- Iran likely views terrorist activities as an option to deter or retaliate against its perceived adversaries. In many instances, Iran has targeted United States interests through its partners such as Hizballah.
- Homegrown Violent Extremists could capitalize on the heightened tensions to launch individual attacks.
- An attack in the homeland may come with little or no warning.
- The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with our federal, state, local, and private sector partners to detect and defend against threats to the Homeland, and will enhance security measures as necessary.

DURATION

This Bulletin will expire on or before **January 18, 2020** at 1:00 PM EST

TYPES OF ADVISORIES

Bulletin

Describes current developments or general trends regarding threats of terrorism.

Elevated Alert

Warns of a credible terrorism threat against the United States.

Imminent Alert

Warns of a credible, specific and impending terrorism threat against the United States.

HOW YOU CAN HELP

- Report suspicious activity to local law enforcement who are best to offer specific details on terroristic indicators.
- Report suspicious activity or information about a threat, including online activity, to fusion centers and the FBI’s Field Offices – part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.
- Learn [how to recognize signs of pre-operational planning](#) associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.

BE PREPARED

- Be prepared for cyber disruptions, suspicious emails, and network delays.
- Be responsible for your personal safety. Know where emergency exits and security personnel are located. Carry emergency contact and special needs information with you.
- Implement basic cyber hygiene practices such as effecting data backups and employing multi-factor authentication. For more information visit [CISA.gov](#).
- [Connect](#), [Plan](#), [Train](#), and [Report](#) to prepare businesses & employees. Security tools/resources can be accessed through the DHS’s [Hometown Security Campaign](#).

STAY INFORMED

- The U.S. Government will provide additional information about any emerging threat as additional information is identified. The public is encouraged to listen to local law enforcement and public safety officials.
- We urge Americans to continue to travel, attend public events, and freely associate with others but remain vigilant and aware of surroundings.
- The Department of State issues [international travel alerts and warnings](#).
- For additional information visit [Ready](#).

If You See Something, Say SomethingSM. Report suspicious activity to local law enforcement or call 911.

The National Terrorism Advisory System provides information on homeland security issues and threats. It is distributed by the Department of Homeland Security. More information is available at: [www.dhs.gov/advisories](#). To receive mobile updates: [www.twitter.com/dhsgov](#)



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

(b) (7)(E) HQ

(b) (7)(E)

INTELLIGENCE ALERT

Product Title: Officer Safety Alert: (b) (7)(E)

Product ID: (b) (7)(E)

(U) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) WARNING: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY(U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need-to-know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official.

Prepared By: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Secure (e): (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Published Date: 01/08/2020

REPORT TITLE

Officer Safety Alert: (b) (7)(E)

DATE OF INFORMATION

01/08/2020

SOURCE SUMMARY STATEMENT

Review of (b) (7)(E)

NARRATIVE

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(E) is disseminating time sensitive information (b) (7)(E) obtained from a variety of (b) (7)(E) for the purpose of providing warning and situational awareness in relation to recent events spawned by the lethal strike of General Soleimani.

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E) . All CBP personnel should be alert if encountering any individual (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Following the 01/03/2020 deaths of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, Iranian officials threatened revenge against the US and its foreign interests and allies. Subsequently, on 01/08/2020, Iran launched a series of missile strikes on two military bases utilized by US forces in Iraq.

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)




REPORTING NOTICE

(U) This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),

(b) (7)(E)

Prepared By: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Secure (e):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (7)(E)

Source Description:	Analyzed (b) (7)(E)	
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From: [SCOTT, RODNEY S](#)
To: [BP Field Chiefs; BP Field Deputies](#)
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 1:21:34 PM
Attachments: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

The attached assessment is from July but provides some context. When reading you should keep in mind the recent events.

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 11:02 AM
To: SCOTT, RODNEY S [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]

(U) The SD-LECC is providing the attached [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

(U) **Warning:** Information contained in this e-mail, including attachments, is **Unclassified // Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)** and contains sensitive information that cannot be released to the public or other personnel outside of the law enforcement community. Please contact the originating agency as appropriate regarding any questions about the information or further dissemination.

(U) To report suspected terrorism-related activities, please visit <https://sd-lecc.org/> and select "Submit a Tip or Lead." For urgent threat reporting, please contact the San Diego JTTF at [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD-LECC)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Fax: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Website: <https://sd-lecc.org/>

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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To remove yourself from this mailing list, Click [here](#)

From: [EAC Operations Support](#)
Subject: Informational Brief on Iran
Date: Friday, January 10, 2020 1:22:06 PM
Attachments: [Iran-Overview.pdf](#)

Good afternoon,

As a result of recent events, Operations Support (OS) created the attached high-level overview on Iran to provide all CBP employees (uniformed and non-uniformed) with some basic information and background on Iran, Qassem Soleimani, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and possible threats. While all of this information is available via public/unclassified sources, we thought it would be beneficial to provide all employees with a succinct, educational reference. You can expect to see similar products on different areas of interest from OS in the future.

As always, thank you for your service. I cannot emphasize enough how critical the work you do is in ensuring the safety of our country and the American people. Please remain vigilant and maintain situational awareness—today, and every day—as threats against the United States continue to evolve.

Yours in Service,

William A. Ferrara
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Operations Support
U.S. Customs and Border Protection



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Iran Overview



About Iran

- Iran (pronounced ee-rah-n) is located in the area of Southwest Asia, commonly referred to as the Middle East. The country is approximately (~) one-sixth the size of the United States with a population of ~83 million.
- Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic Republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown.
- Religion and ethnicity are different. Iran is not an Arab country; the ethnic majority is Persian/Aryan. Some people of Iranian extraction will refer to themselves as Persian to distance themselves from the political regime in Iran.
- ~90-95 percent of the population in Iran identifies as Shia Muslim; 5-10 percent identify as Sunni and less than 1 percent identify as Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian. Iran is often viewed as the most powerful Shia nation and tends to try to lead the global Shia community and serve as a counter-balance to Saudi Arabia's attempts to influence the region.

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Qassem Soleimani

- Qassem Soleimani was the Major General in charge of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the elite subset Quds Force.
- In April of 2019, the U.S. designated the IRGC and Quds Force as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The IRGC and its subsets have been responsible for a number of global kinetic and cyber attacks, including two recent cyber attacks on the Texas Department of Agriculture and Saudi Arabia.
- He was the second most powerful and influential figure in the country. Per former CIA Director David Petraeus, “This is the equivalent in U.S. terms of the CIA director, CENTCOM commander, JSOC commander, and presidential envoy for the region for Iran.”
- Soleimani was killed on January 3, 2020 along with several other high ranking officials, near the Baghdad International Airport in Iraq.

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IRGC and Quds Force

- The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is Iran's premier security institution with more than 100,000 strong.
- The IRGC has an army, navy, and air force, while controlling Iran's ballistic missile arsenal and irregular warfare operations.
- The operations and security details are executed through the IRGC's elite Quds Force and proxies, such as Hizballah.
- The IRGC is one of Iran's most influential economic players. Additionally, the IRGC often serves as an incubator for senior Iranian public officials, making them powerful in the political arena.
- While military service is required for all Iranian adult males 18 and older, service in the IRGC or Quds Force is separate, which is ultimately of concern.

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Iranian Threat

- As a result of Soleimani's death, Iran has vowed revenge against U.S. interests and announced abandoning its restrictions from the 2015 Nuclear deal.
- While no specific, credible threat exists, U.S. citizens should keep in mind that certain factors may increase the chances of an attack in the Homeland. (See Slide 7 for Pro-Iran Group logos for awareness).
- Possible threats are broad as Iran has diverse capabilities to impact U.S. interests, including: Strategic Military Threat, Counter Proliferation, Sanction Evasion, Theft of Intellectual Property, Espionage, Counter Terrorism, Outbound and Inbound.
- The nefarious and possible proxy actors, including Lebanese Hizballah (Lebanon), Kata'ib Hizballah (Iraq), and Houthis (Yemen), have the full support of the Government of Iran and may look to vulnerabilities to strike.
- Support includes access to counter intelligence, training, legitimate documents, border inspection coaching, and the use of established networks already in place.
- Homegrown Violent Extremists could capitalize on the heightened tensions to launch individual attacks.

UNCLASSIFIED | FOUO

(b) (7)(E)

Iranian Threat (continued)

- Iran maintains a robust cyber program and can execute cyber attacks against the United States. Iran is capable, at a minimum, of carrying out attacks with temporary disruptive effects against critical infrastructure in the United States.
- (b) (7)(E)
- The Iranian-American and American-Shia community are mainstream; however, the select few violent extremists or sympathizers may gain traction if anti-Iranian and anti-Shia activity begins to grow within American society. Civility and inclusion are key. Please note, if someone is of Iranian extraction or Shia Muslim, that does not mean they are pro-regime or pro-IRGC.
- If international pro-Iranian regime Shia influencers, including media outlets, and charismatic voices from within and abroad begin to churn the propaganda, the risk may escalate.
- (b) (7)(E)

UNCLASSIFIED | FOUO

Pro-Iran Groups



Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)
IRAQ



Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
IRAQ



Saraya al-Khurasani (SAK)
IRAQ



Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS)
IRAQ



Lebanese Hizballah
LEBANON



Houthis
YEMEN



Saraya Al-Salam (Former Mahdi/Sadr Army)
IRAQ

UNCLASSIFIED | FOUO

From: [Office of the Secretary](#)
Subject: Message from Acting Secretary Chad F. Wolf
Date: Saturday, January 4, 2020 4:23:53 PM
Attachments: [NTAS BULLETIN JAN 4 2020-FINAL 1540hrs.pdf](#)



**Homeland
Security**

January 4, 2020

Message from Acting Secretary Chad F. Wolf

Due to the recent air strike in Iraq, the Department is operating with an enhanced posture. Attached you will find the most recent bulletin from the National Threat Advisory System that outlines information and protective and preparedness measures.

Thank you,

Chad F. Wolf
Acting Secretary

With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.

From: [SCOTT, RODNEY S](#)
To: [BP Field Chiefs](#); [BP Field Deputies](#)
Subject: Call follow up
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 5:11:15 PM

Just want to foot stomp the comments made toward the end of the call: Iran already has a capability within the U.S.

While all operations are important, please ensure that personnel working checkpoint, trans-check and taskforce operations are fully cognizant of the evolving threat and remain extremely vigilant.

Also please advise all BORSTAR and BORTAC personnel to keep an eye on current events and be prepared for the potential of no notice call outs.

Any BP specific follow up questions?

Rodney Scott
Acting Deputy Chief
US Border Patrol
US Customs and Border Protection

From: [PORVAZNIK, ANTHONY J](#)
To: [SCOTT, RODNEY S](#); [BP Field Chiefs](#); [BP Field Deputies](#)
Subject: RE: Call follow up
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 5:21:15 PM

Chief,

There was mention of additional classified information on the call; however, we are not always aware of that information across the organization. To the extent that the information is subject to the field leadership's need to know, classified briefings would be beneficial and critical to our preparedness and to inform our operational decisions and to have a more holistic understanding of the threat.

v/r,
Tony

Anthony J. Porvaznik
Chief Patrol Agent
USBP/Yuma Sector
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (desk)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: SCOTT, RODNEY S (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 4:11 PM
To: BP Field Chiefs (b) (7)(E); BP Field Deputies
(b) (7)(E)
Subject: Call follow up

Just want to foot stomp the comments made toward the end of the call: Iran already has a capability within the U.S.

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Any BP specific follow up questions?

Rodney Scott
Acting Deputy Chief
US Border Patrol
US Customs and Border Protection

From: [SCOTT, RODNEY S](#)
To: [PORVAZNIK, ANTHONY J](#)
Cc: [BP Field Chiefs](#); [BP Field Deputies](#)
Subject: Re: Call follow up
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 5:26:03 PM

Understood. I don't have that either at this point. Once we see it, if we believe it adds any value we will find a way to get it out to CPAs.

RSS

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 3, 2020, at 3:21 PM, PORVAZNIK, ANTHONY J
[REDACTED] wrote:

Chief,

There was mention of additional classified information on the call; however, we are not always aware of that information across the organization. To the extent that the information is subject to the field leadership's need to know, classified briefings would be beneficial and critical to our preparedness and to inform our operational decisions and to have a more holistic understanding of the threat.

v/r,
Tony

Anthony J. Porvaznik
Chief Patrol Agent
USBP/Yuma Sector
[REDACTED] (desk)
[REDACTED] (cell)

From: SCOTT, RODNEY S [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 4:11 PM
To: BP Field Chiefs [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E); BP Field Deputies
[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Subject: Call follow up

Just want to foot stomp the comments made toward the end of the call: Iran already has a capability within the U.S.
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Any BP specific follow up questions?

Rodney Scott

Acting Deputy Chief

US Border Patrol

US Customs and Border Protection

From: [SCOTT, RODNEY S](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: [BP Field Chiefs](#); [BP Field Deputies](#)
Subject: Re: Call follow up
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 5:26:40 PM

Thank you.

RSS

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 3, 2020, at 3:18 PM, SULLIVAN, TIMOTHY P
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Chief,

All SOG units are advising/preparing personnel for immediate, hasty nationwide deployment anytime during the next 7 days. I will have rosters tonight. SOG command will regroup and reassess on Monday.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

CHIEF PATROL AGENT

U.S. BORDER PATROL | SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP

OFFICE: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | CELL: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: SCOTT, RODNEY S (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 4:11 PM
To: BP Field Chiefs (b) (7)(E); BP Field Deputies
(b) (7)(E)
Subject: Call follow up

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
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Any BP specific follow up questions?

Rodney Scott
Acting Deputy Chief

US Border Patrol
US Customs and Border Protection

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of [WATCH CBP INTEL](#)
To: [WATCH CBP INTEL](#)
Cc: [OI-CETD-Leadership](#)
Subject: (U//FOUO) Intelligence Alert -- Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 6:26:26 PM
Attachments: [CBP Intel Alert Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response.pdf](#)
[image005.png](#)
[image006.png](#)
[image007.png](#)



03 January 2019

(U) Reporting Notice: This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Intelligence. It was coordinated with CBP's Office of International Affairs.

(b) (7)(E) Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response

(b) (7)(E) *Iran has publically stated that it will respond to the U.S. military strike on 2 January that killed Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani at Baghdad International Airport. Many consider Suleimani to be the second most influential individual in Iran, second only to the Ayatollah, highlighting his importance to the regime.*

- **(b) (7)(E)** In the strike, the United States also reportedly killed the head of the pro-Iran militia Kataib Hizballah (KH), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and several other senior pro-Iran figures in Iraq. KH was responsible for numerous attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces, often at Iran's behest.
- **(b) (7)(E)** General Suleimani was the head of Iran's Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and key to nearly every significant operation by Iranian intelligence and military forces over the past two decades to include training Iran's proxies in the region. Suleimani had influence over Shia militia groups operating in Iraq and had support of proxies in the region, including Houthis in Yemen, KH, and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), demonstrating his broad influence throughout the region.
- **(b) (7)(E)** The IRGC, with the Quds Force (QF) in the lead, is the key Iranian liaison with LH, the strongest paramilitary organization in Lebanon, and an entity that has attacked Israeli and U.S. interests at Iran's behest. The QF also works with Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, among other organizations. The QF provides training, weapons, organizational guidance, and other support to a range of pro-Iran groups.

(b) (7)(E) *While Suleimani's death removes a critical leader, the significant experience of his replacement—Brigadier General Esmail Ghani—likely will help stabilize QF. Iranian leaders have vowed for revenge against the United States, which will likely increase geopolitical*

escalation and conflict between the U.S. and Iran, likely further destabilizing the region.

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- (b) (7)(E) Ghani joined the IRGC in 1980, served in the 1980-88 war with Iraq, and joined QF after the war. The Ayatollah has described Ghani as one of the “most decorated commanders” during the Iran-Iraq war. As Deputy Commander of the IRGC-QF, Ghani previously managed financial disbursements to IRGC-QF elements for weapons and personnel, including various terrorist groups.
- (b) (7)(E) The strike on 2 January was the latest escalation between the U.S. and Iran after a rocket attack on an Iraqi military base attributed to an Iran-backed militia, killing an American contractor in late December. Recent U.S. retaliation included airstrikes on an Iranian-backed militia that killed 24 and prompted outrage among some who saw that attack as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
- (b) (7)(E) Due to heightened tensions, the U.S. State Department has urged American citizens to leave Iraq immediately. With a vast network of proxies, Iran has the capability to strike against U.S. assets, personnel and allies in the region.

(b) (7)(E) We urge CBP officials to remain vigilant against threats related to Iran, as our agency is well-positioned to contribute against Iranian aggression. (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

— (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted]

— (b) (7)(E)
[Redacted] s.

— (U//FOUO) A DHS review of 63 disrupted terrorist operations or attacks from 2012-2018 across 26 countries linked to Iran in open source reporting highlighted the broad reach of Iranian actions, but also the observable actions that preceded these incidents. Numerous encounters by CBP also have highlighted excellent sources of information on organizational structures, recruiting, and training.

(U) Feedback: For general comments or questions related to the dissemination of this document, please e-mail the CBP National Intelligence Watch inbox at: **(b) (7)(E)** or call **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

INTELLIGENCE ALERT

INA-NIW-20-2190924

03 January 2019

(U) Reporting Notice: This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Intelligence. It was coordinated with CBP's Office of International Affairs.

(b) (7)(E) Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response

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CBP000060


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From: [WATCH.CBP.INTEL](#)
To: [OI-CETD-Leadership](#); [CETD-Dissemination](#)
Subject: (U//FOUO) Iranian Threat Assessment
Date: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:43:20 AM
Attachments: [Iranian Threat Assessment.pdf](#)
[image003.emz](#)
[image005.png](#)
[image009.emz](#)
[image016.png](#)
[image020.png](#)



(U) Reporting Notice: This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Intelligence.

(U) Background

(U//FOUO) On 2 January, the U.S. military confirmed that it conducted a strike on Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani at the Baghdad airport. In the strike, the United States also killed the head of the Iraqi state-sponsored Popular Mobilization Front (PMF), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and several other senior pro-Iran figures in Iraq. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that a “harsh retaliation is waiting for the criminals whose filthy hands spilled his blood” while Iran’s President also vowed revenge.

(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) Tensions between the Government of Iran and the United States have been escalating since 2018 when the United States re-imposed economic sanctions against the Government of Iran for violations of their nuclear agreement and the April 2019 designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard as a foreign terrorist organization. Tensions continued to increase with Iran suspected of targeting oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and with the 20 June 2019 Iranian shoot-down of a U.S. surveillance drone.^[i] These tensions recently escalated into violence.^[ii] Iran likely played a pivotal role in the strikes against Saudi Arabian oil fields in 2019 as well as a 27 December rocket attack in Kirkuk that killed an American contractor, despite Iranian-backed proxies claiming credit.^[iii] The 2 January drone strike at Baghdad airport removed a key Iranian military leader and has been the catalyst for Iranian government threats of an immediate and intense response.

(U) Timeline of Events

(U//FOUO) On 27 December 2019, the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hizballah (KH) reportedly conducted a rocket attack near the Iraqi city of Kirkuk, killing an American contractor and wounding several American and Iraqi personnel. In response, the United States conducted air strikes on three sites in Iraq and two in Syria linked to KH, reportedly killing 25 members of the group. Following the strikes, on 31 December, Iranian-backed Iraqi KH supporters stormed the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The violence escalated with members attempting to enter the embassy, starting fires and damaging the outside and a reception area of the embassy. On 2 January, the United States responded with a strike on a convoy outside Baghdad airport, killing Major General Qassim Suleimani, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and several other senior pro-Iran figures in Iraq. [\[iv\]](#) [\[v\]](#)

(U//FOUO) Following the death of Suleimani, Iran announced that Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, who has served as Suleimani's deputy commander since 1997, was named the new overall commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) Quds Force. Qaani joined the IRGC-QF in 1980 and served in the 1980-88 war with Iraq. Qaani has been described by Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as one of the "most decorated commanders" of the Guards during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. [\[vi\]](#) [\[vii\]](#)

(U//FOUO) On 5 January, Iraqi lawmakers approved a resolution asking the Iraqi government to end the agreement under which Washington sent forces more than four years ago to help fight the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). The bill is nonbinding and subject to approval by the Iraqi government; however, the resolution has the backing of the outgoing prime minister. Additionally, on 5 January, Iran said it would fully withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In a government statement, Iran noted that its nuclear program will have no limitations on its uranium enrichment, production and research.. [\[viii\]](#) [\[ix\]](#)

Key Findings

- (U//FOUO) The Government of Iran likely has the capability to conduct near term cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure as well as against U.S interests in the Middle East

personally identifiable information.

- **(b) (7)(E)** The Government of Iran, both directly and through its proxies, likely has the ability to conduct surveillance against U.S. based targets; however, their operational capability in the homeland remains difficult to measure.

(U) Iranian Threats to U.S. Interests

(U//FOUO) Iranian leaders have vowed revenge against the United States for the death of Suleimani, which will likely increase geopolitical escalation and conflict between the U.S. and Iran, likely further destabilizing the region. In April 2019, IRGC-QF was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) making it the first time the U.S. Department of State has labeled a state institution as a FTO. Iran has promised “harsh revenge” and threatened to respond on American soil, with an Iranian Member of Parliament stating that Iran could attack the White House directly. [\[x\]](#)

(U) During an open session of parliament in Tehran, on 5 January, Iranian Parliament Member Abolfazl Abutorabi stated that the killing of Suleimani is a “declaration of war” and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations stated that the response for a military action is military action. Potential targets for Iran would likely come from rocket attacks against U.S. bases or allies in the region or sabotaging oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, it could embark on a sustained campaign of cyber-warfare or target American citizens and troops abroad near embassies and consulates. [\[xi\]](#)

(U) As of 5 January, the Department of Homeland Security stated that there were no specific, credible threats against the homeland; however, Iran and its proxies, including Hizballah, have shown an intent and capability to conduct attacks in the homeland. DHS has stated that Iran has a robust cyber program and is able to execute cyber-attacks against the United States, to include temporarily disrupting critical infrastructure. [\[xii\]](#), [\[xiii\]](#), [\[xiv\]](#), [\[xv\]](#), [\[xvi\]](#)

(U) Iranian-Backed Proxies

(b) (7)(E) The IRGC-QF maintains influence throughout the Middle East by working with allied groups that allow the group that ability to present an asymmetrical threat to traditional military capabilities utilized by the U.S. and its regional allies. Those partners include Shia militias operating in the region such as the Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and the Houthi rebels in

[\[xvii\]](#)

[\[xviii\]](#)

and shipping lanes. In September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for a major attack on Saudi oil facilities and KH have reportedly carried out a string of rocket attacks against **[REDACTED]** military bases where U.S. troops are located as well U.S. embassies in Iraq. Additionally, Iranian-backed KH has warned Iraqi security forces to stay away from US bases in Iraq starting on 5 January. [\[xix\]](#), [\[xx\]](#), [\[xxi\]](#)

(U//FOUO) LH, Iran's most significant non-state partner, has expanded its influence in Latin America, networking with organized crime and other violent groups. Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and financial support to LH for facilitating activities abroad. Iran remains intent on using and expanding its global reach by utilizing its proxy forces to potentially conduct attacks and create a destabilizing effect on Western interests. A DHS review of 63 disrupted terrorist operations or attacks from 2012-2018 across 26 countries highlights the broad reach of Iranian efforts, to include efforts within the United States. [\[xxii\]](#), [\[xxiii\]](#), [\[xxiv\]](#)

- (U) On 9 July 2019, a New Jersey based individual who authorities believe was working on behalf of LH's Islamic Jihad Organization was arrested on terrorism charges and is suspected of conducting surveillance of landmarks including the Statue of Liberty, the United Nations, the White House, and Boston's Fenway Park. [\[xxv\]](#)
- (U) In May 2019, a U.S. Federal Court convicted Ali Mohamad Kourani^{USPER} of covertly providing material support for Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). Kourani, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was recruited, trained, and deployed by IJO to procure weapons and gather intelligence on potential U.S. targets for future Hizballah terrorist attacks. Kourani surveilled JFK Airport and law enforcement facilities in New York City. [\[xxvii\]](#)
- (U) In 2017, two men were arrested in New York and Michigan on charges related to their alleged activities on behalf of Hizballah. Their activities included receiving military style training, conducting surveillance on potential targets in America, and assessing vulnerabilities of the Panama Canal and ships in the canal. [\[xxvii\]](#)



(U) Iranian Proxy Encounters at POEs

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and financial support to LH and the IRGC Qods Force—Iran’s primary arm for facilitating terrorist activities abroad. Since the United States designated IRGC as a terrorist organization in April 2019, the Iranian regime has looked for ways to exploit vulnerabilities and undermine U.S. interests not only abroad but also along the U.S. borders. As of December 2019, CBP recorded 325 encounters with watchlisted individuals, with birth countries of Iran or Lebanon, attempting to travel to the U.S. via air, land, or sea. Although the true intentions of Iranian proxy-associated travelers to the U.S. is not always clear, many of the U.S. Citizens (USC) who have returned from Lebanon have provided information pertaining to individuals who are actively fighting, financing, recruiting, and sympathizing with LH-affiliated groups in Lebanon and Syria.

(b) (7)(E)



Suspicious Activity Reporting Indicators and Behaviors

Tools for
Analysts and
Investigators

Behaviors Descriptions

Defined Criminal Activity and Potential Terrorism Nexus Activity

Breach/Attempted Intrusion	Unauthorized personnel attempting to enter or actually entering a restricted area, secured/protected site, or nonpublic area. Impersonation of authorized personnel (e.g., police/security officers, janitor, or other personnel).
Misrepresentation	Presenting false information or misusing insignia, documents, and/or identification to misrepresent one's affiliation as a means of concealing possible illegal activity.
Theft/Loss/Diversion	Stealing or diverting something associated with a facility/infrastructure or secured/protected site (e.g., badges, uniforms, identification, emergency vehicles, technology, or documents (classified or unclassified)), which are proprietary to the facility/infrastructure or secured/protected site.
Sabotage/Tampering/Vandalism	Diminishing, manipulating, defacing, or destroying part of a facility/infrastructure or secured/protected site.
Cyberattack	Compromising or attempting to compromise or disrupt an organization's information technology infrastructure.
Expressed or Implied Threat	Communicating a spoken or written threat to commit a crime that will result in death or bodily injury to another person or persons or to damage or compromise a facility/infrastructure or secured/protected site.
Aviation Activity	Learning to operate, or operating an aircraft, or interfering with the operation of an aircraft in a manner that poses a threat of harm to people or property and that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Such activity may or may not be a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations.

Potential Criminal or Non-Criminal Activities Requiring Additional Information During Vetting

Note: When the behavior describes activities that are not inherently criminal and may be constitutionally protected, the vetting agency should carefully assess the information and gather as much additional information as necessary to document facts and circumstances that clearly support documenting the information as an ISE-SAR.

Eliciting Information	Questioning individuals or otherwise soliciting information at a level beyond mere curiosity about a public or private event or particular facets of a facility's or building's purpose, operations, security procedures, etc., in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Testing or Probing of Security	Deliberate interactions with, or challenges to, installations, personnel, or systems that reveal physical, personnel, or cybersecurity capabilities in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Recruiting/Financing	Providing direct financial support to operations teams and contacts or building operations teams and contacts; compiling personnel data, banking data, or travel data in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Photography	Taking pictures or video of persons, facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in an unusual or surreptitious manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include taking pictures or video of infrequently used access points, the superstructure of a bridge, personnel performing security functions (e.g., patrols, badge/vehicle checking), security-related equipment (e.g., perimeter fencing, security cameras), etc.
Observation/Surveillance	Demonstrating unusual or prolonged interest in facilities, buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual (e.g., tourists) or professional (e.g., engineers) interest and in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include observation through binoculars, taking notes, attempting to mark off or measure distances, etc.
Materials Acquisition/Storage	Acquisition and/or storage of unusual quantities of materials such as cell phones, pagers, radio control toy servos or controllers, fuel, chemicals, or toxic materials, and timers or other triggering devices, in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Acquisition of Expertise	Attempts to obtain or conduct training or otherwise obtain knowledge or skills in security concepts, military weapons or tactics, or other unusual capabilities in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Weapons Collection/Discovery	Collection or discovery of unusual amounts or types of weapons, including explosives, chemicals, and other destructive materials, or evidence, detonations or other residue, wounds, or chemical burns, that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Sector-Specific Incident	Actions associated with a characteristic of unique concern to specific sectors (e.g., the public health sector), with regard to their personnel, facilities, systems, or functions in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.



^[i] ABC | 3 January 2020 | (U) World Braces for ‘dramatic escalation’ in tensions after key Iranian general killed (U) | (U) | <https://abcnews.go.com/International/world-braces-dramatic-escalation-tensions-key-iranian-general/story?id=68051827>

^[ii] USA Today | 3 January 2020 | (U) Timeline: How tensions escalated with Iran since Trump withdrew US from nuclear deal | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2020/01/03/us-iran-conflict-since-nuclear-deal/2803223001/>

^[iii] ABC | 3 January 2020 | (U) World Braces for ‘dramatic escalation’ in tensions after key Iranian general killed (U) | (U) | <https://abcnews.go.com/International/world-braces-dramatic-escalation-tensions-key-iranian-general/story?id=68051827>

^[iv] NPR | 4 January 2020 | (U) Timeline: How the U.S. Came to Strike and Kill a Top Iranian General | (U) | (U) | <https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793364307/timeline-how-the-u-s-came-to-strike-and-kill-a-top-iranian-general>

^[v] [Evening Standard | 4 January 2020 | (U) Qasem Soleimani: Timeline of Events Leading to US Killing of Iranian General | (U) | (U) | <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/qasem-soleimani-airstrike-timeline-iran-iraq-a4326311.html>

^[vi] [FOX | 3 January 2020 | (U) Replacement Named for Gen. Qassem Soleimani | (U) | (U) | <https://www.foxnews.com/world/irans-supreme-leader-qassem-soleimani-replacement>

^[vii] [Haaretz | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iran Has Already Replaced Soleimani, Here is Everything we Know About Esmail Ghaani | (U) | (U) | <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-has-already-replaced-soleimani-here-is-everything-we-know-about-esmail-ghaani-1.8353694>

^[viii] [The New York Times | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iraq Calls for Expulsion of US Troops over Deadly Airstrike | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/ap-ml-iraq-us.html>

^[ix] [Newsweek | 5 January 2019 | (U) Iran Fully Withdraws from Nuclear Deal and Criticizes European Response to Soleimani’s Killing | (U) | (U) | <https://www.newsweek.com/iran-fully-withdraws-nuclear-deal-criticizes-european-response-soleimanis-killing-1480475>

^[x] The Epoch Times | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iran to Target US ‘Military Sites’, White Following General’s Death: Officials | (U) | (U) | https://www.theepochtimes.com/top-iranian-general-issues-stark-warning-to-us-trump-america-started-the-war_3194185.html

^[xi] [USA TODAY | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Official on Soleimani Killing: ‘The Response for Military Action is Military Action’ | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/01/04/iran-iraq-united-states-qasem-soleimani-trump/2804237001/>

^[xii] [White House | 8 April 2019 | (U) Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization | (U) | (U) | <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/>

^[xiii] DHS | 4 January 2020 | (U) National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin | (U) | (U) |

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/20_0104_ntas_bulletin.pdf

[xiv] [FOX | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iranian MP Threatens to 'Attack the White House' | (U) | (U) |

<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/iranian-mp-threatens-to-attack-the-white-house-report> [REDACTED]

[xv] [USA Today | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Official on Soleimani Killing: 'The Response for a Military Action is Military Action' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/01/04/iran-iraq-united-states-qasem-soleimani-trump/2804237001/>]

[xvi] [The New York Times | 3 January 2020 | (U) Homeland Security Sees 'No Specific, Credible Threat' From Iran, but Warns of Cyberattacks | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/us/politics/homeland-security-iran-threat.html>]

[xvii] The Washington Institute | 17 April 2018 | (U) Examining Iran's Global Terrorism Network | (U) | (U) | <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/examining-irans-global-terrorism-network>

[xviii] [Washington Post | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran has Vowed Revenge Against the U.S. But it Seems to be in No Hurry | (U) | (U) | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-vowed-revenge-against-the-us-but-it-seems-to-be-in-no-hurry/2020/01/04/150283e8-2e62-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html

[xix] Yahoo | 18 November 2019 | (U) Saudi-led coalition says Yemeni rebels hijacked vessel | (U) | (U) | <https://news.yahoo.com/saudi-led-coalition-says-yemeni-163021117.html>

[xx] The United States Institute of Peace | 16 September 2019 | (U) Timeline of Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia | (U) | (U) | <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/16/timeline-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia>

[xxi] The Guardian | 14 September 2019 | (U) Major Saudi Arabia oil facilities hit by Houthi drone strikes | (U) | (U) | <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/14/major-saudi-arabia-oil-facilities-hit-by-drone-strikes>

[xxii] [The Washington Post | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Has Vowed Revenge Against the U.S. but it Seems to be in No Hurry | (U) | (U) | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-vowed-revenge-against-the-us-but-it-seems-to-be-in-no-hurry/2020/01/04/150283e8-2e62-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html]

[xxiii] [The Washington Post | (U) Iran has Invested in Allies and Proxies Across the Middle East. Here's Where they Stand After Soleimani's Death | (U) | (U) | <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/>]

[xxiv] [PBS | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran General Steps out of Soleimani's Shadow to Lead Proxies | (U) | (U) | <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-general-steps-out-of-soleimanis-shadow-to-lead-proxies>]

[xxv] NBC | 19 September 2019 | (U) Hezbollah plot terror attacks on U.S. landmarks | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-jersey-man-charged-helping-hezbollah-plot-terror-attacks-u-n1056716>

[xxvi] [REDACTED] | (U) | DOJ | 19-157 | 16 May 2019 | Ali Kourani Convicted In Manhattan Federal Court For Covert Terrorist Activities On Behalf

Of Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization | Extracted information is U | Overall document classification is U

[xxvii] DOJ | 8 June 2017 | (U) Two Men Arrested for Terrorist Activities on Behalf of Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization | (U) | (U) | <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-arrested-terrorist-activities-behalf-hizballahs-islamic-jihad-organization>

(b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of [WATCH CBP INTEL](#)

To: [WATCH CBP INTEL](#)

Subject: (b) (7)(E)

Date: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 5:14:32 PM

Attachments: (b) (7)(E)

FROM: CBP-OI-CETD-NIW

SUBJECT: For Your Situational Awareness - (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of [WATCH CBP INTEL](#)
To: [WATCH CBP INTEL](#)
Subject: (U//FOUO) OFFICER SAFETY ALERT: (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)
Date: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 7:21:52 PM
Attachments: (b) (7)(E)
[image002.png](#)

(U//FOUO) OFFICER SAFETY ALERT: (b) (7)(E)

(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E), according to the (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E). All CBP personnel should be alert if
encountering any individual (b) (7)(E).

(b) (7) (E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: [BLW-LOOKOUT](#)
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) OFFICER SAFETY ALERT: (b) (7)(E) | (b) (7)(E)
Date: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 6:23:13 PM
Attachments: (b) (7)(E).pdf
[image001.png](#)

FYSA

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Enforcement Analysis Specialist
US Border Patrol | Blaine Sector Intelligence Unit
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Border Security Coordinators and TAUs,

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E) is disseminating time sensitive information (b) (7)(E) obtained from a variety of (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) for the purpose of providing warning and situational awareness in relation to recent events spawned by the lethal strike of General Soleimani.

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E) All CBP personnel should be alert when encountering any individual (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of [SITROOM](#)
To: [CBP SITROOM CBP LEADERSHIP](#); [CBP SITROOM- REPORTS - CBP MORNING REPORT](#)
Cc: [SITROOM](#)
Subject: Commissioner's Significant Incident Report for January 6, 2020
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 8:20:58 PM

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
For Official Use Only
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER'S SITUATION ROOM DAILY REPORT

This is the report for 1/6/2020

(b) (7)(E)

Date of Incident: 1/4/2020

(b) (7)(E)

Location: (b) (7)(E)

Type of Incident: (b) (7)(E)

On January 4, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the (b) (7)(E) POE encountered a citizen of both Iran and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E). A full (b) (7)(E) inspection was initiated in coordination with (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)

The subject was allowed to withdraw his admission and was returned to Canada. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: BP Field Chiefs; BP Field Deputies; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Daily Correspondence (10Jan20)
Date: Friday, January 10, 2020 3:14:06 PM
Attachments: [Iran-Overview.pdf](#)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Chiefs and Directors,
The memo and attachments are in response to DHS direction requiring all CBP activities to brief their personnel on the temporary disapproval of travel and suspension of collaboration with Iran and Iraq.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Chief of Staff
U.S. Border Patrol
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: [BP Field Chiefs](#); [BP Field Deputies](#)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: CBP Statement
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 4:28:50 PM

Greetings Chiefs,

You may be aware of the misinformation being shared throughout social media about our current operational posture. Below please find what CBP has cleared and is using on social media to dispel rumors and correct misinformation.

Respectfully requesting you amplify this message by liking and retweeting CBP corporate and regional account messaging efforts.

Should you have any questions please advise and thank you in advance.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Strategic Communications
United States Border Patrol Headquarters
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 4:55 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); QUINN, TIMOTHY; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: CBP Statement

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

The below statement is approved for immediate distribution.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

STATEMENT

Social media posts that CBP is detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false.

ON BACKGROUND

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat posture.

At the Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Current wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

From: [SCOTT, RODNEY S](#)
To: [BP Field Chiefs](#); [BP Field Deputies](#)
Subject: Important
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 1:06:28 PM

Chiefs

Please ensure that you and your team are monitoring the evolving situation with Iran. While this increased threat is general in nature, please remind all personnel to remain extremely vigilant on and off duty for anything suspicious. As always, the current threat stream should be factored into daily operations and operational planning. Physical security of BP facilities should also be reviewed. Please touch base with your local JTTF or FBI counter parts for area specific assessments.

Additionally, please touch base with the DFOs in your AOR and review coordinated operational/contingency plans as appropriate.

If you have any questions or concerns please let me know.

Rodney Scott
Acting Deputy Chief
US Border Patrol
US Customs and Border Protection

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of [SITROOM](#)
To: [CBP SITROOM CBP LEADERSHIP](#); [CBP SITROOM- REPORTS - CBP MORNING REPORT](#)
Cc: [SITROOM](#)
Subject: RE: Commissioner's Significant Incident Report for January 5, 2020
Date: Saturday, January 4, 2020 8:16:44 PM

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
For Official Use Only
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER'S SITUATION ROOM DAILY REPORT

This is the report for 1/5/2020

(b) (7)(E)

Date of Incident: 1/3/2020

(b) (7)(E)

Location: (b) (7)(E)

Type of Incident: (b) (7)(E)

On January 3, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the (b) (7)(E) POE encountered a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) national, born in Iran, (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)
The subject was refused admission and escorted back to Canada. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Date of Incident: 1/4/2020

(b) (7)(E)

Location: (b) (7)(E)

Type of Incident: (b) (7)(E) - Other connection to Iran

On January 4, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the (b) (7)(E) POE encountered a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) national, born in Iran, who arrived in a Quebec plated commercial vehicle. The vehicle was referred to secondary based on officer experience. In secondary, the subject stated that he served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) The subject was found inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA, and was returned to Canada via the commercial conveyance.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Date of Incident: 1/3/2020

(b) (7)(E)

Location: (b) (7)(E)

Type of Incident: (b) (7)(E)

On January 3, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the (b) (7)(E) encountered a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) citizen, born in Iran, who applied for admission before boarding a flight to San Diego, California. (b) (7)(E) A (b) (7)(E) exam was conducted and officers discovered a photo of an identification card indicating the subject was a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The subject admitted to being a member of the IRGC from 1990 to 1992 as an engineer. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) the subject was found inadmissible and allowed to withdraw his application for admission. The subject was turned over to Canada Border Services Agency and escorted out of the CBP area.

(b) (7)(E)

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Commissioner's Situation Room.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Detention of Iranians in Blaine
Date: Monday, January 6, 2020 11:58:45 AM

Partners,

I wanted to cue you in on the messaging that I am providing the local congressional offices regarding the media attention CBP OFO is receiving on the detention of Iranian Nationals at the Port of Blaine.

Due to the level of inquiries and national media interest, CBP Office of Field Operations Seattle is working in concert with OFO HQ and the CBP Office of Congressional Affairs in this matter. Inquiries should be directed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Area Port Director

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

9901 Pacific Highway

Blaine, WA 98230

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Detention of Iranians in Blaine
Date: Monday, January 6, 2020 12:30:37 PM

Good Morning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Let me know when you are free for a call.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 9:59 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Detention of Iranians in Blaine

Partners,

I wanted to cue you in on the messaging that I am providing the local congressional offices regarding the media attention CBP OFO is receiving on the detention of Iranian Nationals at the Port of Blaine.

Due to the level of inquiries and national media interest, CBP Office of Field Operations Seattle is working in concert with OFO HQ and the CBP Office of Congressional Affairs in this matter. Inquiries should be directed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Area Port Director

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

9901 Pacific Highway

Blaine, WA 98230

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 3:51:17 PM

Hi (b) (6) and (b) (6), (b) (6)

I'm trying to get ahead of questions on the below. Can we connect ASAP? My cell number is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I'm around all day.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

(SEATTLE, WA, 1/5/20) – The Washington state chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-WA) is assisting more than 60 Iranians and Iranian-Americans of all ages who were detained at length and questioned at the Peace Arch Border Crossing in Blaine, Wash.

Many more were reportedly refused entry to the United States due to a lack of capacity for Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to detain them.

Other Iranian-Americans are about to cross the Peace Arch Border as they return back to their homes in the United States from an Iranian pop concert that was taking place on Saturday in Vancouver, Canada.

Those detained reported that their passports were confiscated and they were questioned about their political views and allegiances. CBP officials contacted at the Blaine Port of Entry provided no comment or reasons for the detentions.

[NOTE: CAIR published “Know Your Rights” materials online in English, Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Farsi, Bengali, and Bosnian. The multi-language civil rights materials may be printed out for personal use or for distribution at local events. **GO**

TO: <https://www.cair.com/KnowYourRights>]

Crystal, a 24-year-old American citizen and medical student was allegedly detained and interrogated for more than 10 hours with her family at the Peace Arch Border Crossing before being released early this morning. “The vast majority of people being held last night were American citizens,” said Crystal. “We kept asking why we were being detained and asked questions that had nothing to do with our reason for traveling and was told ‘I’m sorry this is just the wrong time for you guys.’”

A source at CBP reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued a national order to CBP to “report” and detain anyone with Iranian heritage entering the country who is deemed potentially suspicious or “adversarial,” regardless of citizenship status. CBP at the Peace Arch Border Crossing did not confirm or deny this report.

“These reports are extremely troubling and potentially constitute illegal detentions of United States citizens,” said **Masih Fouladi, executive director of CAIR-WA**. “We are working to verify reports of a broad nationwide directive to detain Iranian-Americans at ports of entry so that we can provide community members with accurate travel guidance. We will continue to update the community and other civil rights organizations as we obtain more information.”

CAIR is America's largest Muslim civil liberties and advocacy organization. Its mission is to enhance understanding of Islam, protect civil rights, promote justice, and empower American Muslims.

La misión de CAIR es proteger las libertades civiles, mejorar la comprensión del Islam, promover la justicia, y empoderar a los musulmanes en los Estados Unidos.

END

https://www.cair.com/breaking_cair_wa_assisting_iranian_americans_detained_u_s_border

(b) (6)
Legislative Director
Rep Rick Larsen, WA-02

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: [BLW PAIC](#); [BLW DPAIC](#)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Increased security at POEs
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 1:34:34 PM
Attachments: (b) (7)(E)

All,

Please be aware that CBP is heightening security at the POEs for a period of time in response to Iranian threats of retaliation for recent US military strikes in Iraq. The Lynden POE will be staffing a security detail at the port on the midnight shift during the hours when the port is closed. Bellingham Station has been requested to assist the POE by supplying one additional agent for Friday and Saturday night to start so that the port will have one BPA and one OFO officer there while the port is closed. In the event this heightened security posture extends beyond a few days, BLH may need assistance with zone coverage on midnight shift so that they can continue to support the POE.

Also please put out reminders at musters for agents to be extra vigilant for suspicious activity over the weekend. In FY 19 Blaine sector apprehended 12 southbound EWI Iranian citizens which was the highest number in the nation.

Please see the attached BLW SIU collection order for additional collections of subjects encountered from Iran. Also be aware that (b) (7)(E) (Blaine Sector Intel is required to respond for follow up interviews). Additionally, though a crossborder encounter with a subject from Iran wouldn't automatically spur an SIR unless we had identified an actual tie to terrorism, be mindful that an ESR may be requested to head off additional questions.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Acting Division Chief
Blaine Sector Headquarters
2410 Natures Path Way
Blaine, WA 98230
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); [BLW PAIC](#); [BLW DPAIC](#); [BLW SOS](#)
Subject: Intelligence Briefing 1.8.2020
Date: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 5:15:25 PM
Attachments: [01-08-20 Intelligence Briefing.pdf](#)
[image001.png](#)
Importance: High

Good Afternoon,

Tomorrow's intelligence briefing is attached.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Acting Special Operations Supervisor
Blaine Sector Intelligence Unit
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ofc)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (G-cell)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Fax)



For Intelligence related inquiries, requests for information or intelligence related products, please use (b) (7)(E)

No man in the wrong can stand up against a fellow that's in the right and keeps on a-comin'. -
Bill McDonald (Texas Ranger)

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Blaine Sector Intelligence Brief

Jan 8, 2020

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



CBP000090

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)




POE Entry Refusal



BLUF: Iranian-born citizen of Canada linked to IRGC denied entry at Peace Arch POE

- On 01/04/2020, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) applied for entry at Pacific Highway POE.
- In Secondary, subject stated he served in the Iranian military for his two year compulsory service and was assigned to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a typist.
- (b) (7)(E) found no derog, but recommended subject (b) (7)(E).
- A seven point vehicle inspection and system queries were negative for derogatory information.
- An electronic media exam on subject's phone was also negative for derogatory information.
- Subject immigrated to Canada in June 2014 and naturalized in March 2019, has no previous adverse actions or inadmissibility.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DOB: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

COB: Iran

COC: Canada

U//FOUO/LES






National News Activity



BLUF: Social media post on Iranian-Americans being detained at Blaine POE picked up by national news

- Original post claimed over 60 Iranian born USC's, Visa holders, and Iranian-Canadians, some Microsoft employees, were detained at the "Border Patrol station in Blaine."
- Initial report was published by the Washington State Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-WA).
 - Claimed dozens were detained and had their passports seized and many more were refused entry at the Peace Arch POE.
- CBP responded that the social media posts and CAIR's report are false, however, the national news continues to run stories citing both.
- Washington State's Lt. Governor Habib was quoted in Newsweek today saying, "it is hard to call it anything other than racial profiling."



U//FOUO/LES



(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

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


(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Iranian detention
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 2:06:20 PM

Gents,

I am being pinged regarding the detaining of about 60 Iranians last night at the Peace Arch and a national order “from CBP to detain all Iranians crossing the border”.

I am not going to comment on either topic but I wanted to at least have some SA on what’s occurring especially if it is going to raise tensions locally.

Can either of you provide me some SA?

Thanks

Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Iranian detention
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 2:46:46 PM

Thank you (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:35 PM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

>

> This is an OFO issue. There was a concert in Vancouver yesterday that was a large draw of Iranians in the greater Seattle area. This was very poor timing giving the events in Iraq last week. This resulted in numerous referrals to secondary that caused extensive wait times and a negative perception. We are course correcting today.

>

> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

> Area Port Director

> Blaine, WA

>

> Sent from my iPhone

>

>> On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:06 PM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

>>

>> Gents,

>>

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>>

>> I am not going to comment on either topic but I wanted to at least have some SA on what's occurring especially if it is going to raise tensions locally.

>>

>> Can either of you provide me some SA?

>>

>> Thanks

>>

>> Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Iranian detention
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 5:14:13 PM

Thanks (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Area Port Director
Blaine, WA

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 5, 2020, at 3:06 PM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

>

> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

>

> Just for additional information, I have fielded calls from Senator Cantwell and Representative Larsen offices. I have deferred them to you, but also provided them the answer from CBP that was put out on social media.

>

> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

> (A) Chief Patrol Agent

> U. S. Border Patrol

> Blaine Sector

>

>> On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:35, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > wrote:

>>

>> This is an OFO issue. There was a concert in Vancouver yesterday that was a large draw of Iranians in the greater Seattle area. This was very poor timing giving the events in Iraq last week. This resulted in numerous referrals to secondary that caused extensive wait times and a negative perception. We are course correcting today.

>>

>> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

>> Area Port Director

>> Blaine, WA

>>

>> Sent from my iPhone

>>

>>>> On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:06 PM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

>>>>

>>>> Gents,

>>>>

>>>> I am being pinged regarding the detaining of about 60 Iranians last night at the Peace Arch and a national order "from CBP to detain all Iranians crossing the border".

>>>>

>>>> I am not going to comment on either topic but I wanted to at least have some SA on what's occurring especially if it is going to raise tensions locally.

>>>>

>>>> Can either of you provide me some SA?

>>>>

>>>> Thanks

>>>>

>>>> Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 5:54:04 PM

Thanks (b) (6),

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 5:59 PM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

There is a statement out on @CBP twitter about the media reports

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(A) Chief Patrol Agent
U S Border Patrol
Blaine Sector

On Jan 5, 2020, at 13 51, (b) (6) > wrote:

Hi (b) (6) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I'm trying to get ahead of questions on the below Can we connect ASAP? My cell number is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), I'm around all day

Thanks,

(b) (6)

BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

(SEATTLE, WA, 1/5/20) – The Washington state chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-WA) is assisting more than 60 Iranians and Iranian-Americans of all ages who were detained at length and questioned at the Peace Arch Border Crossing in Blaine, Wash.

Many more were reportedly refused entry to the United States due to a lack of capacity for Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to detain them.

Other Iranian-Americans are about to cross the Peace Arch Border as they return back to their homes in the United States from an Iranian pop concert that was taking place on Saturday in Vancouver, Canada.

Those detained reported that their passports were confiscated and they were questioned about their political views and allegiances. CBP officials contacted at the Blaine Port of Entry provided no comment or reasons for the detentions.

[NOTE: CAIR published “Know Your Rights” materials online in English, Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Farsi, Bengali, and Bosnian. The multi-language civil rights materials may be printed out for personal use or for distribution at local events. **GO TO:** <https://www.cair.com/KnowYourRights>]

Crystal, a 24-year-old American citizen and medical student was allegedly detained and interrogated for more than 10 hours with her family at the Peace Arch Border Crossing before being released early this morning. “The vast majority of people being held last night were American citizens,” said Crystal. “We kept asking why we were being detained and asked questions that had nothing to do with our reason for traveling and was told ‘I’m sorry this is just the wrong time for you guys.’”

A source at CBP reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued a national order to CBP to “report” and detain anyone with Iranian heritage entering the country who is deemed potentially suspicious or “adversarial,” regardless of citizenship status. CBP at the Peace Arch Border Crossing did not confirm or deny this report.

“These reports are extremely troubling and potentially constitute illegal detentions of United States citizens,” said **Masih Fouladi, executive director of CAIR-WA**. “We are working to verify reports of a broad nationwide directive to detain

Iranian-Americans at ports of entry so that we can provide community members with accurate travel guidance. We will continue to update the community and other civil rights organizations as we obtain more information.”

CAIR is America's largest Muslim civil liberties and advocacy organization. Its mission is to enhance understanding of Islam, protect civil rights, promote justice, and empower American Muslims.

La misión de CAIR es proteger las libertades civiles, mejorar la comprensión del Islam, promover la justicia, y empoderar a los musulmanes en los Estados Unidos.

END

https://www.cair.com/breaking_cair_wa_assisting_iranian_americans_detained_u_s_border

(b) (6)
Legislative Director
Rep Rick Larsen, WA-02

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 2:41:13 PM

Thank you (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – we appreciate this quick response.

If you can't comment on specifics given this was at a Port of Entry, we will get in touch with the Port Director directly.

Best,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 3:30 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine

Good afternoon (b) (6)

I am available tomorrow at that time.

I have asked the stations about this event- it was not a Border Patrol encounter, so I won't be able to speak to any specifics.

I look forward to speaking with you tomorrow.

Thanks

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Chief Patrol Agent
U. S. Border Patrol
Blaine Sector

On Jan 5, 2020, at 11:22, (b) (6)
(b) (6) wrote:

Dear (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

I am writing to inquire about reports our office received this afternoon regarding US citizens and legal permanent residents with Iranian heritage or nationality who were detained and questioned this weekend – and who may still be detained.

Our office received reports that DHS issued a national order to CBP to report and detain anyone with Iranian heritage entering the country who is deemed potentially suspicious, regardless of citizenship status. Further, we received reports that individuals were questioned about their political beliefs, allegiances, and other questions.

We would like to speak with you tomorrow about this. I will plan to give you a call at 12:30pm Eastern / 9:30am Pacific. If that time doesn't work, we can accommodate later in the afternoon, but need to give Senator Murray an update no later than COB tomorrow. Please let us know. (b) (6), our Senior National Security Advisor (copied here), may join the call as well.

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Legislative Counsel
Office of U.S. Senator Patty Murray

Direct: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Get Updates from Senator Murray](#)

[<image001.gif>](#)

[<image002.jpg>](#)

[<image003.png>](#)

[<image004.gif>](#)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: US Citizens From Iran Were Stopped And Questioned By Customs And Border Patrol After A Concert In Canada
Date: Sunday, January 5, 2020 10:16:07 PM

<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflores/us-citizens-from-iran-were-stopped-and-questioned-at-the-us>

Sent from my iPad