SCREENING REQUIREMENTS FOR CARRIERS


ACTION: 60-Day notice and request for comments; revision of an existing collection of information.

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection will be submitting the following information collection request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). The information collection is published in the Federal Register to obtain comments from the public and affected agencies.

DATES: Comments are encouraged and must be submitted (no later than March 21, 2022) to be assured of consideration.

ADDRESSES: Written comments and/or suggestions regarding the item(s) contained in this notice must include the OMB Control Number 1651–0122 in the subject line and the agency name. Please use the following method to submit comments:

Email. Submit comments to: CBP_PRA@cbp.dhs.gov.

Due to COVID–19-related restrictions, CBP has temporarily suspended its ability to receive public comments by mail.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional PRA information should be directed to Seth Renkema, Chief, Economic Impact Analysis Branch, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Trade, Regulations and Rulings, 90 K Street NE, 10th Floor, Washington, DC 20229–1177, Telephone number 202–325–0056 or via email CBP_PRA@cbp.dhs.gov. Please note that the contact information provided here is solely for questions regarding this notice. Individuals seeking information about other CBP programs should contact the CBP National Customer Service Center at 877–227–5511, (TTY) 1–800–877–8339, or CBP website at https://www.cbp.gov/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: CBP invites the general public and other Federal agencies to comment on the proposed and/or continuing information collections pursuant to the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This process is conducted in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.8. Written comments and suggestions from the public and affected agencies should address one or more of the following four points: (1) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (3) suggestions to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) suggestions to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses. The comments that are submitted will be summarized and included in the request for approval. All comments will become a matter of public record.

Overview of This Information Collection

Title: Screening Requirements for Carriers.

OMB Number: 1651–0122.

Form Number: N/A.

Current Actions: CBP proposes to extend the expiration date and revise this information collection to allow electronic submission. There is no change to the information collected.

Type of Review: Revision.

Affected Public: Carriers.

Abstract: Section 273(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1323(e)) (the Act) authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish procedures which carriers must undertake for the proper screening of their non-immigrant passengers prior to embarkation at the port from which they are to depart for the United States, in order to become eligible for a reduction, refund, or waiver of a fine imposed under section 273(a)(1) of the Act. (This authority was transferred from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.) To be eligible to obtain such a reduction, refund, or waiver of a fine, the carrier must provide evidence to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that it screened all passengers on the conveyance in accordance with the procedures listed in 8 CFR part 273.

Some examples of the evidence the carrier may provide to CBP include: A description of the carrier’s document screening training program; the number of employees trained; information regarding
the date and number of improperly documented non-immigrants intercepted by the carrier at the port(s) of embarkation; and any other evidence to demonstrate the carrier’s efforts to properly screen passengers destined for the United States.

**Proposed Change:** Applicants may submit this information via electronic means, e.g., email.

**Type of Information Collection:** Screening Requirements for Carriers.

**Estimated Number of Respondents:** 41.

**Estimated Number of Annual Responses per Respondent:** 1.

**Estimated Number of Total Annual Responses:** 41.

**Estimated Time per Response:** 100 hours.

**Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours:** 4,100.


Seth D. Renkema,
Branch Chief,
Economic Impact Analysis Branch,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

[Published in the Federal Register, January 19, 2022 (85 FR 02888)]

19 CFR PART 177

**REVOCATION OF ONE RULING LETTER AND REVOCATION OF TREATMENT RELATING TO THE TARIFF CLASSIFICATION OF A HYDRAULIC DOCK LEVELER**

**AGENCY:** U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

**ACTION:** Notice of revocation of one ruling letter and of revocation of treatment relating to the tariff classification of a Hydraulic Dock Leveler.

**SUMMARY:** Pursuant to section 625(c), Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)), as amended by section 623 of title VI (Customs Modernization) of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057), this notice advises interested parties that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is revoking one ruling letter concerning tariff classification of certain Hydraulic Dock Levelers under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Similarly, CBP is revoking any treatment previously accorded by CBP to substantially identical transac-
tions. Notice of the proposed action was published in the *Customs Bulletin*, Vol. 55, No. 49, on December 15, 2021. No comments were received in response to that notice.

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** This action is effective for merchandise entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption on or after April 3, 2022.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Michael J. Dearden, Food, Textiles, and Marking Branch, Regulations and Rulings, Office of Trade, at (202) 325–0101.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**BACKGROUND**

Current customs law includes two key concepts: informed compliance and shared responsibility. Accordingly, the law imposes an obligation on CBP to provide the public with information concerning the trade community’s responsibilities and rights under the customs and related laws. In addition, both the public and CBP share responsibility in carrying out import requirements. For example, under section 484 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1484), the importer of record is responsible for using reasonable care to enter, classify and value imported merchandise, and to provide any other information necessary to enable CBP to properly assess duties, collect accurate statistics, and determine whether any other applicable legal requirement is met.

Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(1), a notice was published in the *Customs Bulletin*, Vol. 55, No. 49, on December 15, 2021, proposing to revoke one ruling letters pertaining to the tariff classification of Hydraulic Dock Levelers. Any party who has received an interpretive ruling or decision (i.e., a ruling letter, internal advice memorandum or decision, or protest review decision) on the merchandise subject to this notice should have advised CBP during the comment period.

Similarly, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(2), CBP is revoking any treatment previously accorded by CBP to substantially identical transactions. Any person involved in substantially identical transactions should have advised CBP during the comment period. An importer’s failure to advise CBP of substantially identical transactions or of a specific ruling not identified in this notice may raise issues of reasonable care on the part of the importer or its agents for importations of merchandise subsequent to the effective date of this notice.

In New York Ruling Letter (“NY”) NY I81157, dated May 17, 2002, CBP classified a Hydraulic Dock Leveler in heading 8428, HTSUS, specifically in subheading 8428.90.00, HTSUS, which provides for...
“Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery (for example, elevators, escalators, conveyors, teleferics): Other machinery.” CBP has reviewed NY I81157 and has determined the ruling letters to be in error. It is now CBP’s position that Hydraulic Dock Levelers are properly classified, in heading 8479, HTSUS, specifically in subheading 8479.89.94, HTSUS, which provides for “Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter; parts thereof: Other machines and mechanical appliances: Other: Other.”

Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(1), CBP is revoking NY I81157 and revoking or modifying any other ruling not specifically identified to reflect the analysis contained in Headquarters Ruling Letter (“HQ”) H321511, set forth as an attachment to this notice. Additionally, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(2), CBP is revoking any treatment previously accorded by CBP to substantially identical transactions.

In accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), this ruling will become effective 60 days after publication in the Customs Bulletin.

Dated:

GREGORY CONNOR  
for  
CRAIG T. CLARK,  
Director  
Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division

Attachment
HQ H321511

January 19, 2022

OT:RR:CTF:EMAIL H321511 MD
CATEGORY: Classification
TARIFF NO.: 8479.89.94

Ms. Sharon F. Swanson
Great Lakes Customs Brokerage, Inc.
85 River Dock Drive, Suite 202
Buffalo, New York 14207

RE: Revocation of NY I81157; Tariff Classification of a Hydraulic Dock Leveler from Canada

Dear Ms. Swanson:

On May 17, 2002, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued New York Ruling Letter (“NY”) I81157 to you on behalf of Richards-Wilcox Customs Systems. The ruling letter pertained to the tariff classification of a hydraulic dock leveler from Canada under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). In NY I81157, CBP classified the product at issue under subheading 8428.90.00, HTSUS (2002), which provided for “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery (for example, elevators, escalators, conveyors, telefrics): Other machinery.”¹ We have since reviewed NY I81157 determined it to be in error.

Pursuant to section 625(c)(1), Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(1)), as amended by section 623 of Title VI (Customs Modernization) of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057, 2186 (1993), notice of the proposed action was published on December 15, 2021, in Volume 55, Number 49, of the Customs Bulletin. No comments were received in response to this notice.

FACTS:

In NY I81157, the hydraulic dock leveler was described as follows:

A dock leveler is a tilting platform which is affixed to a pit in a truck dock. Dual hydraulic cylinders incorporated in the unit allow the platform to be tilted and a steel tip to be lifted and swung out to accommodate variations in truck trailer height. The leveler also features velocity fuses to prevent the dock from moving in the event of leaking or loosened hydraulic hose lines. The machine can withstand loads up to 27,000 pounds.

ISSUE:

Whether the Hydraulic Dock Leveler at issue is classified under heading 8428, HTSUS, as other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery or heading 8479, HTSUS, which provides for machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in Chapter 84.

¹ The relevant provision under the current version of the HTSUS is subheading 8248.90.02, HTSUS.
LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Classification under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) is determined in accordance with the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRI”). GRI 1 provides that the classification of goods shall be determined according to the terms of the headings of the tariff schedule and any relative Section or Chapter Notes. In the event that the goods cannot be classified solely on the basis of GRI 1, and if the headings and legal notes do not otherwise require, the remaining GRIs 2 through 6 may then be applied in order. GRI 6 requires that the classification of goods in the subheadings of headings shall be determined according to the terms of those subheadings, any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis, to GRIs 1 through 5.

The HTSUS provisions under review are as follows:

8428 Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery (for example, elevators, escalators, conveyors, telefrics):

8428.90 Other machinery...

8479 Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter; parts thereof:

Other machines and mechanical appliances:

8479.89 Other:

8479.89.94 Other...

In addition, the Explanatory Notes (“EN”) to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System represent the official interpretation of the tariff at the international level. While neither legally binding nor dispositive, the ENs provide a commentary on the scope of each heading of the HTSUS and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of these headings. See T.D. 89–80, 54 Fed. Reg. 35127, 35128 (Aug. 23, 1989).

The ENs to heading 8428, state, in pertinent part, the following:

With the exception of the lifting and handling machinery of headings 84.25 to 84.27, this heading covers a wide range of machinery for the mechanical handling of materials, goods, etc. (lifting, conveying, loading, unloading, etc.).

The ENs to heading 8479, in relevant part, state:

This heading is restricted to machinery having individual functions, which:

(a) Is not excluded from this Chapter by the operation of any Section or Chapter Note; and
(b) Is not covered more specifically by a heading in any other Chapter of the Nomenclature; and
(c) Cannot be classified in any other particular heading of this Chapter since:

i. No other heading covers it by reference to its method of functioning, description or type; and
ii. No other heading covers it by reference to its use or to the industry in which it is employed

[...]

7 CUSTOMS BULLETIN AND DECISIONS, VOL. 56, NO. 4, FEBRUARY 2, 2022
For this purpose the following are to be regarded as having “individual functions”:

(A) Mechanical devices, with or without motors or other driving force, whose function can be performed distinctly and independently of any other machine or appliance.

[...]

The many and varied machines covered by this heading include *inter alia*:

[...]

(III) Miscellaneous Machinery

This group includes:

[...]

(31) Passenger boarding bridges [...] They include electromechanical or hydraulic devices that are designed for moving the bridges horizontally, vertically and radially (i.e. their telescopic sections, cabin, vertical lift columns, etc.), in order to adjust the bridges to the appropriate position to the particular aircraft’s door, or to the port (entrance) of the cruise ship or ferry-boat [...] These bridges themselves do not lift, handle, load or unload anything....

As described within NY I81157, the hydraulic dock leveler at issue is “a tilting platform which is affixed to a pit in a truck dock. Dual hydraulic cylinders incorporated in the unit allow for the platform to be tilted and a steel tip to be lifted and swung out to accommodate variations in truck trailer height.” These functions allow for the hydraulic dock leveler to accomplish its intended purpose – “to assist in the loading and unloading of truck cargo.” In NY I81157, CBP ruled out classifying the hydraulic dock leveler under heading 8429, HTSUS, stating that the subject merchandise was not a “self-propelled earth leveler”, before ultimately classifying the hydraulic dock leveler under heading 8428, HTSUS.

However, classification of the subject hydraulic dock leveler under heading 8428, HTSUS, is not consistent with the proper interpretation of the heading’s scope. For instance, in HQ H108235, dated June 23, 2015, CBP found that aircraft passenger boarding bridges, which had previously been classified within heading 8428, HTSUS, were properly classified within heading 8479, HTSUS. In reaching this conclusion, CBP observed that “[t]he subject [merchandise] do[es] not actively engage in lifting, moving, or handling objects. Instead, they act as walkways that allow airline personnel and passengers to cross between the airport terminal and the aircraft.” As a result, CBP concluded that the subject merchandise was not “lifting and handling machinery” of heading 8428, HTSUS.

Similarly, in HQ H058784, dated December 15, 2009, CBP found that a tree running tool was properly classified within heading 8479, HTSUS. In HQ H058784, CBP ruled out classifying the subject merchandise under heading 8428, HTSUS, finding that “[t]he lifting and handling machines of heading 8428, HTSUS, either perform the actual function of lifting, moving or manipulating an object, or they constitute an integral part of a lifting or han-

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2 See NY D88830 (March 24, 1999); NY D85781 (January 20, 1999); NY B88222 (August 13, 1997).
dling system.” As the tree running tool merely “latches onto the [t]ree” as opposed to lifting the tree, CBP found that it was not a lifting or handling machine of heading 8428, HTSUS.

Here, like the aforementioned tree running tool and aircraft passenger boarding bridges, the hydraulic dock leveler neither handles objects via mechanical means nor operates by mechanical means to raise or lower objects. Instead, the hydraulic dock leveler merely acts to create a level bridge between the loading dock and truck trailers, which in turn enables the loading and unloading of vehicles. As the hydraulic dock leveler does not move, manipulate, or lift an object — in this case, cargo — it is not a lifting or handling machine of heading 8428, HTSUS.

Instead, also like the aforementioned tree running tool and aircraft passenger boarding bridges, the hydraulic dock leveler is properly classified under heading 8479, HTSUS, which provides for “Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter; parts thereof.” Here, the hydraulic dock leveler possesses a distinct individual function: acting as a level bridge between the loading dock and truck trailers, across which cargo can move between the two. This distinct individual function is applied to “accommodate variations in truck trailer height” so as to facilitate “the loading and unloading of truck cargo.” In this respect, we find the hydraulic dock leveler’s individual function is consistent with the individual functions of the aforementioned passenger boarding bridges at issue in HQ H108235 (i.e. providing a means by which passengers can move between an airport terminal and airplanes) and the tree running tool at issue in HQ H058784 (i.e. enabling a tree to be lifted by the drill string, cable or crane). Furthermore, the hydraulic dock leveler is not more specifically provided for elsewhere in Chapter 84, or in another chapter, and is not excluded from classification in Chapter 84. Accordingly, the hydraulic dock leveler is properly classified in heading 8479, HTSUS, and specifically in subheading 8479.89.94, HTSUS.

HOLDING:

Under the authority of GRIs 1 and 6, the hydraulic dock leveler is classified under subheading 8479.89.94, HTSUS, which provides for “Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter; parts thereof: Other machines and mechanical appliances: Other: Other...” The 2021 general, column one rate of duty is 2.5% ad valorem. Duty rates are provided for your convenience and are subject to change. The text of the most recent HTSUS and the accompanying duty rates are provided on World Wide Web at https://hts.usitc.gov/current.

EFFECT ON OTHER RULINGS:

NY I81157, dated May 17, 2002, is hereby REVOKED.

In accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), this ruling will become effective 60 days after its publication in the Customs Bulletin.

Sincerely,
CRAIG T. CLARK,
Director
Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division
POSOC, Plaintiff, NUCOR CORPORATION, Consolidated Plaintiff, ARCELORMITTAL USA LLC and SSAB ENTERPRISES LLC, Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, and SSAB ENTERPRISES LLC, NUCOR CORPORATION, ARCELORMITTAL USA LLC and POSCO, Defendant-Intervenors.

Before: Gary S. Katzmann, Judge
Consol. Court No. 17–00137

[Dated: January 13, 2022]

Brady W. Mills, Ragan W. Updegraff, Donald B. Cameron, Julie C. Mendoza, R. Will Planert, Mary S. Hodgins, Eugene Degnan, and Sarah S. Sprinkle, Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, of Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff and Defendant-Intervenor POSCO.


Kelly A. Krystyniak, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C., for Defendant United States. With her on the brief were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeannie E. Davidson, Director, and Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Rezza Karamloo, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C.

OPINION

Katzmann, Judge:

The court returns to a challenge to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) determination that Korean producers of certain carbon and alloy steel cut-to-length plate (“CTL plate”) did not receive a countervailable benefit through the provision of electricity for less than adequate remuneration (“LTAR”). Before the court is Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (Dep’t Commerce July 6, 2021), ECF No. 118 (“Second Remand Results”), which were ordered following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in POSCO v. United States, 977 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“POSCO IV”) so that Commerce could amend its CVD determination to comply with that decision. See generally, Mandate, Feb. 18, 2021, ECF No. 111. On remand, Commerce “reexamined its benefit analysis in the provision of electricity for LTAR” and concluded that (1) the Korean Electricity Corporation (“KEPCO”) did not provide electricity for LTAR, and (2) the electricity prices established by the Korean Power Exchange (“KPX”) do not constitute a countervailable benefit. Consolidated Plaintiff
Nucor Corporation (“Nucor”) challenges Commerce’s *Second Remand Results* on the basis that they do not comply with *POSCO IV*’s holdings that (1) a preferential-rate analysis is not a legally permissible method for the assessment of LTAR, and (2) Commerce’s failure to investigate KPX’s influence on KEPCO’s pricing constituted a failure to support its final determination with substantial evidence. Nucor’s Cmts. in Opp. to Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand, Aug. 6, 2021, ECF No. 121 (“Nucor’s Br.”). Defendant the United States (“Government”) requests that the court sustain Commerce’s *Second Remand Results*. Def.’s Resp. to Cmts. on Final Results of Redetermination, Sept. 7, 2021, ECF No. 123 (“Def.’s Br.”). Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the court now sustains Commerce’s *Second Remand Results*.

**BACKGROUND**


¹ In CVD investigations or administrative reviews, Commerce may select mandatory respondents pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(e)(2), which provides:

If the administering authority determines that it is not practicable to determine individual countervailable subsidy rates under paragraph (1) because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or review, the administering authority may—

(A) determine individual countervailable subsidy rates for a reasonable number of exporters or producers by limiting its examination to—

(i) a sample of exporters or producers that the administering authority determines is statistically valid based on the information available to the administering authority at the time of selection, or

(ii) exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the exporting country that the administering authority determines can be reasonably examined; or

(B) determine a single country-wide subsidy rate to be applied to all exporters and producers.

The individual countervailable subsidy rates determined under subparagraph (A) shall be used to determine the all-others rate under section 1671d(c)(5) of this title.

POSCO challenged several aspects of Commerce’s Final Determination, including the countervailability of research and development grants received by POSCO M-Tech and Commerce’s application of adverse facts available (“AFA”) to POSCO Chemtech and to Hyundai. *POSCO III*, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1235–36. Nucor also challenged Commerce’s determination, arguing that Commerce wrongly determined that POSCO did not benefit from subsidized electricity. *POSCO I*, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1363.

In *POSCO I*, the court upheld Commerce’s application of AFA to POSCO M-Tech’s unreported additional government subsidies, but remanded for reconsideration the question of whether POSCO M-Tech’s research and development grants constituted a countervailable subsidy. *Id.* at 1374–76, 1383. POSCO then moved for the court to reconsider its affirmation of (1) Commerce’s application of a 1.05% AFA rate to POSCO M-Tech for unreported government subsidies received by Ricco Metal and Nine-Digit, both companies acquired by POSCO M-Tech; and (2) Commerce’s application of a 1.05% AFA rate to Hyundai and attribution of this rate to POSCO. Mot. of Pl. POSCO for Reh’g. and Recons. at 2–3, Dec. 21, 2018, ECF No. 82. In *POSCO II*, responding to the motion for reconsideration, the court concluded that “Commerce did not provide any additional explanation of how it determined that there was no identical program [to the research & development grants] before moving to the second step of its AFA methodology -- using the rate in another investigation -- and thus did not make the requisite factual findings to address POSCO’s contention that the [Industrial Technology Innovation Promotion Act] grant was an identical program in the proceeding.” *POSCO II*, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 1349. The court accordingly further remanded to Commerce the issue of whether, under the first step of the AFA methodology, a program identical to the assistance received by Ricco Metal and Nine-Digit existed. *Id.* The court declined to reconsider Commerce’s application of AFA to Hyundai and the attribution of that rate to POSCO. *Id.* at 1346.

Commerce filed its first redetermination results with the court in July of 2019. *Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court
Remand (Dep’t Commerce July 1, 2019), ECF No. 97 (“First Remand Results”). In the First Remand Results, Commerce concluded that (1) POSCO M-Tech’s research and development grants (as received by Ricco Metal and Nine-Digit) were countervailable; (2) the use of the highest AFA rate was appropriate in light of POSCO’s failure to cooperate; (3) the initial 1.64% AFA rate assigned to Chemtech should be reduced to 1.05%; and (4) no program identical to the research & development grants existed. The court, after consideration of the First Remand Results and comments by the parties, sustained Commerce’s determination on remand. POSCO III, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.

On January 7, 2020, Nucor appealed the court’s decision in POSCO III to the Federal Circuit. The appeal was subsequently stayed pending resolution of a related appeal, POSCO v. United States No. 19–1213. Order Granting Mot. to Stay, POSCO v. United States, No. 20–1357 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2020), ECF No. 16. On October 15, 2020, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in the related appeal, POSCO IV, in which it determined that the application of a preferential-rate standard is insufficient to establish adequacy of remuneration (and is thus contrary to law), and that Commerce’s failure to address “the role of KPX in the Korean electricity market” in the investigation on appeal rendered its final determination unsupported by substantial evidence. POSCO IV, 977 F.3d at 1378. This court’s decision in POSCO III was accordingly vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Order Granting Mot. to Terminate Appeal, POSCO v. United States, No. 20–1357 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2021), ECF No. 19.


JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). The standard of review in this action is set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i): “[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

**DISCUSSION**

In *POSCO IV*, the Federal Circuit addressed two challenges by Nucor: “first, whether Commerce’s reliance on a preferential-rate standard to determine whether a conferred benefit is a countervailable subsidy is contrary to law and, second, whether Commerce’s determination that the Government of Korea did not confer a benefit to Korean producers of cold-rolled steel flat products for less than adequate remuneration is contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence.” 977 F.3d at 1371. The court concluded that the application of a preferential-rate standard is contrary to law, and that Commerce’s failure to analyze KPX’s costs, as well as KEPCO’s costs, rendered its final determination that electricity was not provided for LTAR unsupported by substantial evidence. *Id.* at 1376, 1378. Nucor now contends that Commerce failed to comply with the court’s holding in *POSCO IV*, arguing that the *Second Remand Results* do not apply the statutorily required adequate remuneration standard and that Commerce has again neglected to adequately consider KPX’s generation costs in its LTAR analysis.2 *Nucor’s Br.* at 6, 9. Nucor further argues that Commerce erred by failing to consider KEPCO’s cost data for the POI, and instead relying on pre-POI data. *Id.* at 17. The court rejects Nucor’s arguments and sustains the Second Remand Results.

**I. Commerce’s LTAR Analysis on Remand is in Accordance with Law**

With respect to Commerce’s determination that electricity was not provided to POSCO for LTAR, the Federal Circuit concluded in

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2 POSCO does not challenge Commerce’s *Second Remand Results*. 
that the appeal of Commerce’s investigation of CTL plate from Korea involves “essentially the same issues” as considered by the court in *Nucor Corporation v. United States*, 927 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2019). More specifically, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[a]s in *Nucor*, Commerce’s use of the pre-[Uruguay Round] preferential-rates standard . . . is inconsistent with the adequate-remuneration standard under [19 U.S.C.] § 1677(5)(E)(iv). Commerce cannot rely on price discrimination to the exclusion of a thorough evaluation of fair-market principles to determine whether a recipient is receiving an unlawful benefit.” *POSCO IV*, 977 F.3d at 1376 (citing *Nucor*, 927 F.3d at 1251). In other words, Commerce must determine whether a benefit exists under the statute without “depend[ing] on [a] finding that the producer is being discriminatorily favored compared to others in the exporting country.” *Nucor*, 927 F.3d at 1251.

In the *Second Remand Results*, Commerce first argues that “the passage referenced by the [court] in finding that Commerce relied on a preferential rate standard was, in fact, not the basis for Commerce’s adequacy of remuneration analysis,” and indeed that Commerce relied on “the fact that KEPCO fully covered its costs in the industrial rates charged to the respondent steel companies” in determining that electricity was not provided for LTAR. *Second Remand Results* at 10. Commerce states that it did not consider “the price charged to other customers in Korea,” as it would when conducting a preferential-rate analysis, but rather “whether the price charged to the respondents was consistent with market principles and prevailing market conditions in Korea.” *Id.* at 13.

Commerce goes on to state that, on remand, it “continue[s] to find that KEPCO did not provide electricity for LTAR under [19 U.S.C. § 771(5)(E)(iv)].” *Id.* at 16. To determine that electricity was not provided for LTAR, Commerce explains, it assessed KEPCO’s “industrial tariff classifications,” which are themselves calculated by reference to “demand[, . . .] voltage,” “electricity load level, the usage pattern of electricity, and the volume of electricity consumed” as well as “the number of consumers.” *Id.* at 14. As prevailing market conditions are themselves defined by “price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv), Commerce assessed whether electricity was provided for LTAR under the prevailing market conditions by determining whether the “respondent steel companies [were] charged the appropriate tariff rate” under KEPCO’s industrial tariff classifications. *Id.*

Thus, on remand, Commerce adopts the conclusions reached in its *Final Determination* and *First Remand Results* with respect to the provision of electricity for LTAR, but offers additional explanation of
how its tariff classification analysis was consistent with the statutory LTAR analysis required under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv) and by the Federal Circuit in *Nucor* and *POSCO IV*. *Id.* at 15–16.

*Nucor* argues that, contrary to Commerce’s assertions, the *Second Remand Results* “articulate, but do not properly apply, a standard that would comply with the statutory adequate remuneration standard.” *Nucor*’s Br. at 4. Rather, *Nucor* claims, Commerce applies the rule from *Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada*, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,946, 30,954 (Dep’t Commerce July 13, 1992), where Commerce determined the existence of preferential rates based exclusively on whether “similarly situated users [of electricity] pa[id] the same rate,” rather than by conducting the required LTAR analysis. *Id.* at 6. *Nucor* argues that Commerce applied a preferentiality analysis in its *Final Determination*, and continues to do so on remand by failing to “examine the prices actually paid by the respondents at all.” *Id.* at 9. Accordingly, *Nucor* concludes that Commerce failed to comply with the Federal Circuit’s holdings in *POSCO IV*. *Id.*

*Nucor* mischaracterizes Commerce’s analysis. As the Government explains in its reply comments, “KEPCO’s standard pricing mechanism, which serves as the basis for its tariff schedule and classifications, is based on KEPCO’s costs.” Def.’s Br. at 7 (citing *Second Remand Results* at 12). Rather than simply analyzing whether KEPCO’s tariff rates were consistently applied, Commerce in its analysis first “examined whether the tariff charged . . . covers ‘cost of production’ plus a ‘profitable return on the investment’” for KEPCO; and then examined “whether the tariff actually charged . . . is in accordance with the tariff established.” *Id.* (citing *Second Remand Results* at 13–15; 30–31). In other words, Commerce determined on remand first that KEPCO’s tariff classifications “were developed in accordance with market principles as described in [19 U.S.C.] § 1677(5)(E)(iv),” and then that the prices charged to industrial consumers, including respondents, were “in accordance with the tariff classifications . . . as established by KEPCO.” *Id.* at 9. By arguing that Commerce relied on a preferentiality standard, *Nucor* fails to account for the first half of Commerce’s analysis, wherein Commerce determined that “the electricity tariffs . . . cover[] cost plus a return,” and addresses only Commerce’s conclusion that “the respondent [was] treated no differently” than comparable consumers. *Second Remand Results* at 30.

The court agrees with *Nucor* that, if Commerce had based its analysis exclusively on the consistent application of KEPCO’s standard pricing mechanism, Commerce’s determination on remand would fail to comply with *POSCO IV* and *Nucor*. However, neither
POSCO IV nor Nucor requires that Commerce never consider the presence or absence of preferential pricing. Rather, Nucor notes that “discrimination in the price-lowering direction might be some evidence that a rate fails to be adequately remunerative,” even though “the absence of discrimination . . . logically does not itself establish that the government authority is receiving an adequately remunerative price.” 927 F.3d at 1252. It is simply that “Commerce cannot rely on price discrimination to the exclusion of a thorough evaluation of fair-market principles to determine whether a recipient is receiving an unlawful benefit.” POSCO IV, 977 F.3d at 1376 (citing Nucor, 927 F.3d at 1251) (emphasis added).

Here, Commerce did not rely only on the presence of absence of discrimination to conclude that KEPCO did not provide electricity to respondents for LTAR. Rather, it analyzed both the relationship between KEPCO’s standard pricing mechanism and its costs of production of electricity, IDM at 32–33 (citations omitted), and the presence or absence of preferential pricing, IDM at 29–30. In so doing, Commerce ultimately assessed whether “the tariff charged to the respondent” failed to “cover ‘cost of production’ plus ‘a profitable return on the investment’” as set forth in KEPCO’s detailed pricing methodology, which itself incorporated the fair-market factors enumerated in 19 U.S.C. § (5)(E)(iv). Second Remand Results at 30. Accordingly, Commerce’s analysis did not violate the requirements of Nucor and POSCO IV by failing to incorporate an analysis of “fair-market principles” and thus of the adequacy of remuneration. See POSCO IV, 877 F.3d at 1376.

Because Commerce’s Second Remand Results comply with the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(iv), Nucor, and POSCO IV, the court concludes that Commerce’s LTAR analysis was in accordance with law. The court next considers whether the LTAR analysis is supported by substantial evidence on the record.

II. Commerce’s Cost Recovery Analysis is Supported by Substantial Evidence and In Accordance with Law.

Nucor makes two arguments with respect to Commerce’s cost recovery analysis: first, that the analysis impermissibly relies on data from outside the POI, and second, that Commerce fails to comply with the Federal Circuit’s mandate to consider not only KEPCO’s costs but also “KPX’s impact on the Korean electricity market.” POSCO IV, 977 F.3d at 1376. The court addresses these contentions in turn.
A. Commerce Reasonably Relied on Cost Recovery Data Outside the POI

In both the *Final Determination* and the *Second Remand Results*, Commerce relied upon KEPCO’s 2014 cost data and 2015 overall electricity cost data to establish that the industrial classification yielded both cost recovery and a rate of return. *Second Remand Results* at 33–34. Commerce acknowledged on remand that KEPCO’s 2014 cost data was not included in the record, but explained that it ultimately relied on a combination of the 2014 cost data, KEPCO’s U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 20-F for the POI, and the 2014 overall electricity cost data to assess KEPCO’s cost recovery during the POI. Using the available data, Commerce concluded that KEPCO’s industrial tariff classifications “would have recovered costs and [yielded] a rate of return during the period of investigation.” Def.’s Br. at 12 (citing *Second Remand Results* at 35–36).

Nucor argues that Commerce’s determination, based on the 2014 KEPCO cost data and Form 20-F, was arbitrary. Nucor’s Br. at 16 (quoting IDM at 35–36). Specifically, Nucor contends that Commerce has repeatedly rejected “arguments based on information in a pre-POI Korean government analysis of industrial electricity rates” and notes that in the instant investigation, Commerce has also rejected record information because “it concerned data outside the period of investigation” which “alone negated its usability.” *Id.* at 17 (citing Def.’s Resp. Br. to Mot. for J. on Agency Record, Mar. 23, 2018, ECF No. 52). Because Commerce fails to consistently reject as “fatally flawed” information predating the POI, Nucor concludes that Commerce’s *Second Remand Results* are not supported by substantial evidence. *Id.* at 18.

Nucor again mischaracterizes Commerce’s analysis. First, as the Government notes, the investigations cited by Nucor did not involve a decision by Commerce to reject non-POI data where POI data was similarly unavailable on the record. Def.’s Br. at 13; see also Issues and Decision Mem. accompanying *Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products from the Republic of Korea*, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,310 (Dep’t Commerce Jun 2, 2016) at 24 (“[O]ur analysis was based upon KEPCO’s industrial tariffs that were in effect during [the POI]”) (“Corrosion-Resistant Steel IDM”); Issues and Decision Mem. accompanying *Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea*, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,943 (Dep’t Commerce July 29, 2016) at 50–51 (same) (“Cold-Rolled Steel IDM”); Issues and Decision Mem. accompanying *Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea*, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,439 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 12, 2016) at 50

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Second, in both the instant case and the prior investigations cited by Nucor, the data rejected by Commerce as “outside the period of investigation” and thus unusable was a National Assembly Report which was issued in 2012 and does not reflect the three KEPCO tariff increases which occurred between 2012 and 2014. IDM at 33; Corrosion-Resistant Steel IDM at 24; Cold-Rolled Steel IDM at 51; Hot-Rolled Steel IDM at 50. It is therefore not the date of the rejected data that rendered it unusable, but rather the fact that the date necessarily indicated that it would not accurately reflect KEPCO cost recovery data during the POI.

With respect to Commerce’s reliance on the 2014 KEPCO cost data, the 2015 overall cost data, and KEPCO’s Form 20-F for the POI, the court concludes that Commerce’s cost recovery analysis was supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229. Furthermore, while the explanation Commerce provides for its conclusion need not “be perfect, the path of Commerce’s decision must be reasonably discernable to a reviewing court.” NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, Commerce has satisfied both standards by providing ample explanation for its reliance on the 2014 KEPCO cost data in combination with the record data reflecting the POI: “[t]he record information establishes that no changes were made to [GOK’s] methodology as it would be applied to calculate the 2015 cost data,” and that “no factors [arose] that would impact the industrial [tariff] classification[s].” Second Remand Results at 35–36; see generally id. at 33–36 (detailing Commerce’s use of the Form 20-F data and 2015 overall cost data to confirm and assess the 2014 KEPCO cost data). Nor does Nucor identify any record evidence “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder” could accept Commerce’s analysis. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483–84. The court concludes that Commerce’s reliance on data from outside the POI was reasonable, and that its cost recovery analysis was supported by substantial evidence.

B. Commerce Adequately Considered the Role of KPX on Remand

In POSCO IV, the Federal Circuit held that Commerce’s cost-recovery analysis “does not support its conclusion that electricity prices paid to KEPCO by respondents are consistent with prevailing market conditions because Commerce failed to evaluate KPX’s impact on the Korean electricity market.” 977 F.3d at 1376. The court noted that “evidence in the record suggests that KPX has a significant impact on KEPCO’s pricing,” and that Commerce’s failure to “ad-
equately investigate” KPX’s influence, including its failure to “request information regarding KPX’s cost of electricity generation,” constituted a failure to satisfy its “affirmative duty to investigate any appearance of subsidies related to the investigation that are discovered during an investigation.” *Id.* at 1377–78. Finally, the court held that “Commerce’s failure to treat KPX as an authority -- or, at a minimum, investigate whether it is an authority -- constitutes error as a matter of law.” *Id.* at 1378.

On remand, Commerce clarifies first that it “explicitly requested information” on KPX in its initial questionnaire to the GOK. Second Remand Results at 5–6, 16. The questions Commerce posed to GOK addressed both pricing and generation cost, and required GOK to provide specific quantities with respect to the percentage of generation costs not covered (if any) and the adjusted coefficient reflected in KPX’s electricity pricing during the POI. *Id.* at 16–17. Commerce explains that this information was requested to “confirm that electricity generation costs paid by KEPCO reflected the full cost to KPX of generating electricity, including an amount of investment return,” *id.* at 17, and details in the remand results its analysis of KPX’s cost recovery with respect to its listed unit price, *id.* at 42–43. Commerce further notes that its assessment that the electricity prices established by KPX are consistent with prevailing market conditions” and therefore do not constitute a countervailable benefit is in line with its prior determinations in the 2017 administrative reviews of cold- and hot-rolled steel from Korea. Issues and Decision Mem. accompanying Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2017, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,361 (June 26, 2020) at Cmt. 1 (“Cold-Rolled Steel AR IDM”); Issues and Decision Mem. accompanying Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2017, 85 Fed. Reg. 64,122 (Oct. 9, 2020) at Cmt. 1.

Nucor argues that Commerce’s analysis of KPX’s electricity pricing and cost recovery on remand fails to comply with the court’s ruling in *POSCO IV*. First, Nucor claims that “the [Second Remand Results] include no additional information or analysis confirming whether the KPX pricing mechanism requests the actual costs of generating and supplying electricity” and thus Commerce again fails to “adequately investigate[] Korea’s prevailing market condition for electricity.” Nucor’s Br. at 14. Nucor next argues that Commerce again fails to examine KPX’s “role in [KEPCO’s] price-setting process,” and any attempt to do so in the *Second Remand Results* conflates an investigation of KPX’s pricing of electricity with upstream subsidy investi-
gations. *Id.* at 16. Accordingly, Nucor contends, Commerce fails to treat KPX as part of the relevant authority under investigation as required by *POSCO IV*. *Id.* at 14.

The court concludes Commerce’s *Second Remand Results* adequately address the Federal Circuit’s decision in *POSCO IV*. In response to the Federal Circuit’s finding of “error as a matter of law” with respect to Commerce’s “failure to treat KPX as an authority . . . or, at a minimum, investigate whether it is an authority” 977 F.3d at 1378, Commerce acknowledges on remand that “the record evidence demonstrate[s] that KPX would be defined as an authority under [19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)],” *Second Remand Results* at 7. Commerce explains that while KPX does constitute an authority, the “information on the record . . . demonstrate[s] that there was no benefit in the pricing of electricity between KPX and KEPCO” and Commerce therefore declined to consider the purchase of electricity from KPX a discovered subsidy within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677d and § 1677(5)(B). In other words, Commerce determined that while Commerce is “an authority” as provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) — encompassing “a government of a country or any public entity within the territory of the country” — and was treated as such, it nevertheless fails to confer “a benefit” such that it constitutes a subsidy under that section.

Commerce further directly addresses the Federal Circuit’s holding that it failed to “adequately investigate” KPX’s influence, and to “request information regarding KPX’s cost of electricity generation.” *POSCO IV*, 977 F.3d at 1377–78. As noted above, the *Second Remand Results* explain that Commerce weighed the Won/kWh unit price of KPX’s electricity sales against the Won/kWh cost of generation, and concluded that the “unit price more than covered the full costs.” *Second Remand Results* at 42–43. KPX’s own revenue, pursuant to its financial statements, “more than cover[s] its operating expenses,” yielding both cost recovery and a return on investment. *Id.* at 43. Commerce further notes that its profitability analysis in this case aligns with its prior “investigations of the pricing of electricity between KPX and KEPCO” in the 2017 administrative reviews of cold- and hot-rolled steel from Korea. *Id.* at 44.

The court concludes that Commerce was not obligated to investigate KPX’s underlying generation costs beyond the analysis set out in

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3 Commerce reasonably rejects Nucor’s allegation that KPX and KEPCO are the same authority, noting that “merging KEPCO and KPX as the identical ‘authority’ would make for an unusal subsidy allegation because, in essence, the allegation would be that the authority defined within [19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)] is subsidizing itself, since KPX is wholly owned by KEPCO.” *Second Remand Results* at 42 n.161.
the Second Remand Results because the information it received in response to its initial questions reasonably indicated that KPX’s pricing of generated electricity could not have constituted a subsidy under the statute. As Commerce notes, “Nucor did not include KPX as part of its LTAR allegation,” and therefore “cannot circumvent the statutory requirement to properly allege a countervailable subsidy” by requesting that Commerce further investigate a program which it has determined, after review of the record, does not constitute a countervailable subsidy. Id. at 45–46. The “affirmative duty to investigate any appearance of subsidies . . . discovered during an investigation” identified by the Federal Circuit does not oblige Commerce to likewise investigate in detail even programs for which it determines there is no evidence of subsidization. POSCO IV, 977 F.3d at 1378. To suggest otherwise is to discount the role of the expert factfinder, and risks asking the court “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974).

As to Nucor’s argument that Commerce conflates a potential upstream subsidy analysis with the investigation of KPX’s generation costs, the court concludes that the argument lacks merit. As the Government explains in its reply comments, “Commerce referenced [the 2017 administrative review of cold-rolled steel] because, in the review of the same countervailing duty that resulted in the affirmative final determination [here], Commerce had ‘investigated and verified the pricing structure between KPX and KEPCO’ including KPX’s methodology used to forecast demand, KPX’s methodology to set the system marginal price, the electricity generator’s reporting requirements to establish variable and fixed costs, and the underlying methodology to determine the electricity generator’s rates of return and the adjusted coefficient.” Def.’s Br. at 16 (citing Second Remand Results at 45, n.175); Cold-Rolled Steel AR IDM at 19. This analysis clearly constitutes an investigation of KPX’s underlying pricing structure and generation costs in response to allegations that “KPX’s price setting mechanism is not consistent with market principles,” and does not conflate Commerce’s upstream subsidy analysis in the 2017 review. Id., cf. id. at 17–18.

Accordingly, upon review of the Second Remand Results, the court concludes that Commerce’s investigation of KPX on remand complies with the Federal Circuit’s decision in POSCO IV and is supported by substantial evidence.4

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4 Nucor also argues in its comments on the Second Remand Results that Commerce’s analysis only considers the costs of generation and supply “with respect to KEPCO in the aggregate” rather than with respect to KPX specifically. Nucor’s Br. at 18. As the Government explains, the data assessed by Commerce set out “both KEPCO’s and KPX’s
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the court sustains Commerce’s Second Remand Results. Judgment will enter accordingly in favor of Defendant. Dated: January 13, 2022
New York, New York

/s/ Gary S. Katzmann
JUDGE
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