NOTIFICATION OF TEMPORARY TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPLICABLE TO LAND PORTS OF ENTRY AND FERRIES SERVICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA; CORRECTION


ACTION: Notification of continuation of temporary travel restrictions; correction.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephanie Watson, Office of Field Operations Coronavirus Coordination Cell, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at 202–325–0840.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Correction

In the Federal Register of December 22, 2020, in FR Doc. 2020–28381—

- On page 83432, in the first column, correct the words “January 21, 2020.” to read, “January 21, 2021.”; and
- On page 83433, in the second column, correct the words “January 21, 2020.” to read, “January 21, 2021.”

CHRISTINA E. MCDONALD,
Associate General Counsel for Regulatory Affairs.

[Published in the Federal Register, January 19, 2021 (85 FR 4967)]
NOTIFICATION OF TEMPORARY TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPLICABLE TO LAND PORTS OF ENTRY AND FERRIES SERVICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO; CORRECTION


ACTION: Notification of continuation of temporary travel restrictions; correction.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephanie Watson, Office of Field Operations Coronavirus Coordination Cell, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at 202–325–0840.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Correction

In the Federal Register of December 22, 2020, in FR Doc. 2020–28375—

- On page 83433, in the third column, correct the words “January 21, 2020.” to read, “January 21, 2021.”; and
- On page 83434, in the third column, correct the words “January 21, 2020.” to read, “January 21, 2021.”

CHRISTINA E. MC DONALD,
Associate General Counsel
for Regulatory Affairs,

[Published in the Federal Register, January 19, 2021 (85 FR 4967)]
NOTIFICATION OF TEMPORARY TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPLICABLE TO LAND PORTS OF ENTRY AND FERRIES SERVICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA


ACTION: Notification of continuation of temporary travel restrictions.

SUMMARY: This document announces the decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) to continue to temporarily limit the travel of individuals from Canada into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Canada border. Such travel will be limited to “essential travel,” as further defined in this document.

DATES: These restrictions go into effect at 12 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on January 22, 2021 and will remain in effect until 11:59 p.m. EST on February 21, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephanie Watson, Office of Field Operations Coronavirus Coordination Cell, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at 202–325–0840.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On March 24, 2020, DHS published notice of the Secretary’s decision to temporarily limit the travel of individuals from Canada into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Canada border to “essential travel,” as further defined in that document.1 The document described the developing circumstances regarding the COVID–19 pandemic and stated that, given the outbreak and continued transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 within the United States and globally, the Secretary had determined that the risk of continued transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 between the United States and Canada posed a “specific threat to human life or national interests.”

1 85 FR 16548 (Mar. 24, 2020). That same day, DHS also published notice of the Secretary’s decision to temporarily limit the travel of individuals from Mexico into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to “essential travel,” as further defined in that document. 85 FR 16547 (Mar. 24, 2020).
The Secretary later published a series of notifications continuing such limitations on travel until 11:59 p.m. EST on January 21, 2021.2

The Secretary has continued to monitor and respond to the COVID–19 pandemic. As of the week of January 4, there have been over 83.3 million confirmed cases globally, with over 1.8 million confirmed deaths.3 There have been over 20.7 million confirmed and probable cases within the United States,4 over 587,000 confirmed cases in Canada,5 and over 1.4 million confirmed cases in Mexico.6

Notice of Action

Given the outbreak and continued transmission and spread of COVID–19 within the United States and globally, the Secretary has determined that the risk of continued transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 between the United States and Canada poses an ongoing “specific threat to human life or national interests.”

U.S. and Canadian officials have mutually determined that non-essential travel between the United States and Canada poses additional risk of transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 and places the populace of both nations at increased risk of contracting the virus associated with COVID–19. Moreover, given the sustained human-to-human transmission of the virus, returning to previous levels of travel between the two nations places the personnel staffing land ports of entry between the United States and Canada, as well as the individuals traveling through these ports of entry, at increased risk of exposure to the virus associated with COVID–19. Accordingly, and consistent with the authority granted in

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2 See 85 FR 83432 (Dec. 22, 2020); 85 FR 74603 (Nov. 23, 2020); 85 FR 67276 (Oct. 22, 2020); 85 FR 59670 (Sept. 23, 2020); 85 FR 51634 (Aug. 21, 2020); 85 FR 44185 (July 22, 2020); 85 FR 37744 (June 24, 2020); 85 FR 31050 (May 22, 2020); 85 FR 22352 (Apr. 22, 2020). DHS also published parallel notifications of the Secretary's decisions to continue temporarily limiting the travel of individuals from Mexico into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to “essential travel.” See 85 FR 83433 (Dec. 22, 2020); 85 FR 74604 (Nov. 23, 2020); 85 FR 67275 (Oct. 22, 2020); 85 FR 59669 (Sept. 23, 2020); 85 FR 51633 (Aug. 21, 2020); 85 FR 44183 (July 22, 2020); 85 FR 37745 (June 24, 2020); 85 FR 31057 (May 22, 2020); 85 FR 22353 (Apr. 22, 2020). Both December notices contained typos with respect to the end date of the extension; as of December 23, 2020, correction notices were pending publication in the Federal Register.


6 Id.
19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2), I have determined that land ports of entry along the U.S.-Canada border will continue to suspend normal operations and will only allow processing for entry into the United States of those travelers engaged in “essential travel,” as defined below. Given the definition of “essential travel” below, this temporary alteration in land ports of entry operations should not interrupt legitimate trade between the two nations or disrupt critical supply chains that ensure food, fuel, medicine, and other critical materials reach individuals on both sides of the border.

For purposes of the temporary alteration in certain designated ports of entry operations authorized under 19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2), travel through the land ports of entry and ferry terminals along the United States-Canada border shall be limited to “essential travel,” which includes, but is not limited to—

- U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents returning to the United States;
- Individuals traveling for medical purposes (e.g., to receive medical treatment in the United States);
- Individuals traveling to attend educational institutions;
- Individuals traveling to work in the United States (e.g., individuals working in the farming or agriculture industry who must travel between the United States and Canada in furtherance of such work);
- Individuals traveling for emergency response and public health purposes (e.g., government officials or emergency responders entering the United States to support federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial government efforts to respond to COVID–19 or other emergencies);
- Individuals engaged in lawful cross-border trade (e.g., truck drivers supporting the movement of cargo between the United States and Canada);

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1 19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(1)(C) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury, when necessary to respond to a national emergency declared under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) or to a specific threat to human life or national interests,” is authorized to “[t]ake any . . . action that may be necessary to respond directly to the national emergency or specific threat.” On March 1, 2003, certain functions of the Secretary of the Treasury were transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. 202(2), 203(1). Under 6 U.S.C. 212(a)(1), authorities “related to Customs revenue functions” were reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury. To the extent that any authority under section 1318(b)(1) was reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury, it has been delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Treas. Dep’t Order No. 100–16 (May 15, 2003), 68 FR 28322 (May 23, 2003). Additionally, 19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(2) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, when necessary to respond to a specific threat to human life or national interests, is authorized to close temporarily any Customs office or port of entry or take any other lesser action that may be necessary to respond to the specific threat.” Congress has vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security the “functions of all officers, employees, and organizational units of the Department,” including the Commissioner of CBP. 6 U.S.C. 112(a)(3).
• Individuals engaged in official government travel or diplomatic travel;
• Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and the spouses and children of members of the U.S. Armed Forces, returning to the United States; and
• Individuals engaged in military-related travel or operations.

The following travel does not fall within the definition of “essential travel” for purposes of this Notification—
• Individuals traveling for tourism purposes (e.g., sightseeing, recreation, gambling, or attending cultural events).

At this time, this Notification does not apply to air, freight rail, or sea travel between the United States and Canada, but does apply to passenger rail, passenger ferry travel, and pleasure boat travel between the United States and Canada. These restrictions are temporary in nature and shall remain in effect until 11:59 p.m. EST on February 21, 2021. This Notification may be amended or rescinded prior to that time, based on circumstances associated with the specific threat.8

The Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is hereby directed to prepare and distribute appropriate guidance to CBP personnel on the continued implementation of the temporary measures set forth in this Notification. The CBP Commissioner may determine that other forms of travel, such as travel in furtherance of economic stability or social order, constitute “essential travel” under this Notification. Further, the CBP Commissioner may, on an individualized basis and for humanitarian reasons or for other purposes in the national interest, permit the processing of travelers to the United States not engaged in “essential travel.”

PETER T. GAYNOR
Acting Secretary,

[Published in the Federal Register, January 19, 2021 (85 FR 4969)]

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8 DHS is working closely with counterparts in Mexico and Canada to identify appropriate public health conditions to safely ease restrictions in the future and support U.S. border communities.
NOTIFICATION OF TEMPORARY TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPLICABLE TO LAND PORTS OF ENTRY AND FERRIES SERVICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO


ACTION: Notification of continuation of temporary travel restrictions.

SUMMARY: This document announces the decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) to continue to temporarily limit the travel of individuals from Mexico into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border. Such travel will be limited to “essential travel,” as further defined in this document.

DATES: These restrictions go into effect at 12 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on January 22, 2021 and will remain in effect until 11:59 p.m. EST on February 21, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephanie Watson, Office of Field Operations Coronavirus Coordination Cell, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at 202–325–0840.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On March 24, 2020, DHS published notice of the Secretary’s decision to temporarily limit the travel of individuals from Mexico into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to “essential travel,” as further defined in that document. 1 The document described the developing circumstances regarding the COVID–19 pandemic and stated that, given the outbreak and continued transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 within the United States and globally, the Secretary had determined that the risk of continued transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 between the United States and Mexico posed a “specific threat to human life or national interests.”

1 85 FR 16547 (Mar. 24, 2020). That same day, DHS also published notice of the Secretary’s decision to temporarily limit the travel of individuals from Canada into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Canada border to “essential travel,” as further defined in that document. 85 FR 16548 (Mar. 24, 2020).
The Secretary later published a series of notifications continuing such limitations on travel until 11:59 p.m. EST on January 21, 2021.2

The Secretary has continued to monitor and respond to the COVID–19 pandemic. As of the week of January 4, there have been over 83.3 million confirmed cases globally, with over 1.8 million confirmed deaths.3 There have been over 20.7 million confirmed and probable cases within the United States,4 over 587,000 confirmed cases in Canada,5 and over 1.4 million confirmed cases in Mexico.6

Notice of Action

Given the outbreak and continued transmission and spread of COVID–19 within the United States and globally, the Secretary has determined that the risk of continued transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 between the United States and Mexico poses an ongoing “specific threat to human life or national interests.”

U.S. and Mexican officials have mutually determined that non-essential travel between the United States and Mexico poses additional risk of transmission and spread of the virus associated with COVID–19 and places the populace of both nations at increased risk of contracting the virus associated with COVID–19. Moreover, given the sustained human-to-human transmission of the virus, returning to previous levels of travel between the two nations places the personnel staffing land ports of entry between the United States and Mexico, as well as the individuals traveling through these ports of entry, at increased risk of exposure to the virus associated with COVID–19. Accordingly, and consistent with the authority granted in

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2 See 85 FR 83433 (Dec. 22, 2020); 85 FR 74604 (Nov. 23, 2020); 85 FR 67275 (Oct. 22, 2020); 85 FR 59669 (Sept. 23, 2020); 85 FR 51633 (Aug. 21, 2020); 85 FR 44183 (July 22, 2020); 85 FR 37745 (June 24, 2020); 85 FR 31057 (May 22, 2020); 85 FR 22353 (Apr. 22, 2020). DHS also published parallel notifications of the Secretary’s decisions to continue temporarily limiting the travel of individuals from Canada into the United States at land ports of entry along the United States-Canada border to “essential travel.” See 85 FR 83432 (Dec. 22, 2020); 85 FR 74603 (Nov. 23, 2020); 85 FR 67276 (Oct. 22, 2020); 85 FR 59670 (Sept. 23, 2020); 85 FR 51634 (Aug. 21, 2020); 85 FR 44185 (July 22, 2020); 85 FR 37744 (June 24, 2020); 85 FR 31050 (May 22, 2020); 85 FR 22352 (Apr. 22, 2020). Both December notices contained typos with respect to the end date of the extension; as of December 23, 2020, correction notices were pending publication in the Federal Register.


6 Id.
19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2), I have determined that land ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border will continue to suspend normal operations and will only allow processing for entry into the United States of those travelers engaged in “essential travel,” as defined below. Given the definition of “essential travel” below, this temporary alteration in land ports of entry operations should not interrupt legitimate trade between the two nations or disrupt critical supply chains that ensure food, fuel, medicine, and other critical materials reach individuals on both sides of the border.

For purposes of the temporary alteration in certain designated ports of entry operations authorized under 19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2), travel through the land ports of entry and ferry terminals along the United States-Mexico border shall be limited to “essential travel,” which includes, but is not limited to—

- U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents returning to the United States;
- Individuals traveling for medical purposes (e.g., to receive medical treatment in the United States);
- Individuals traveling to attend educational institutions;
- Individuals traveling to work in the United States (e.g., individuals working in the farming or agriculture industry who must travel between the United States and Mexico in furtherance of such work);
- Individuals traveling for emergency response and public health purposes (e.g., government officials or emergency responders entering the United States to support federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial government efforts to respond to COVID–19 or other emergencies);
- Individuals engaged in lawful cross-border trade (e.g., truck drivers supporting the movement of cargo between the United States and Mexico);

7 19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(1)(C) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury, when necessary to respond to a national emergency declared under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) or to a specific threat to human life or national interests,” is authorized to “[t]ake any . . . action that may be necessary to respond directly to the national emergency or specific threat.” On March 1, 2003, certain functions of the Secretary of the Treasury were transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. 202(2), 203(1). Under 6 U.S.C. 212(a)(1), authorities “related to Customs revenue functions” were reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury. To the extent that any authority under section 1318(b)(1) was reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury, it has been delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Treas. Dep’t Order No. 100–16 (May 15, 2003), 68 FR 28322 (May 23, 2003). Additionally, 19 U.S.C. 1318(b)(2) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, when necessary to respond to a specific threat to human life or national interests, is authorized to close temporarily any Customs office or port of entry or take any other lesser action that may be necessary to respond to the specific threat.” Congress has vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security the “functions of all officers, employees, and organizational units of the Department,” including the Commissioner of CBP. 6 U.S.C. 112(a)(3).
• Individuals engaged in official government travel or diplomatic travel;
• Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and the spouses and children of members of the U.S. Armed Forces, returning to the United States; and
• Individuals engaged in military-related travel or operations.

The following travel does not fall within the definition of “essential travel” for purposes of this Notification—
• Individuals traveling for tourism purposes (e.g., sightseeing, recreation, gambling, or attending cultural events).

At this time, this Notification does not apply to air, freight rail, or sea travel between the United States and Mexico, but does apply to passenger rail, passenger ferry travel, and pleasure boat travel between the United States and Mexico. These restrictions are temporary in nature and shall remain in effect until 11:59 p.m. EST on February 21, 2021. This Notification may be amended or rescinded prior to that time, based on circumstances associated with the specific threat.8

The Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is hereby directed to prepare and distribute appropriate guidance to CBP personnel on the continued implementation of the temporary measures set forth in this Notification. The CBP Commissioner may determine that other forms of travel, such as travel in furtherance of economic stability or social order, constitute “essential travel” under this Notification. Further, the CBP Commissioner may, on an individualized basis and for humanitarian reasons or for other purposes in the national interest, permit the processing of travelers to the United States not engaged in “essential travel.”

Peter T. Gaynor,
Acting Secretary,

[Published in the Federal Register, January 19, 2021 (85 FR 4967)]

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8 DHS is working closely with counterparts in Mexico and Canada to identify appropriate public health conditions to safely ease restrictions in the future and support U.S. border communities.
Before the court is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) remand redetermination pursuant to the court’s order in Prime Time Commerce LLC v. United States, 43 CIT __, __, 396 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1334 (2019) (“Prime Time I”). See also Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand Order in [Prime Time I] Confidential Version, Oct. 7, 2019, ECF No. 39–1 (“Remand Results”). In Prime Time I, the court remanded in part Commerce’s final determination in the 2015–2016 administrative review of the antidumping duty (“ADD”) order covering certain cased pencils from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1334. The court ruled that Commerce’s decision rejecting Prime Time’s factual submissions was contrary to law. See id. at 1326–29, 1334. The court instructed Commerce to place Prime Time’s submission on the record, review it, and determine whether the information would allow Commerce to calculate an importer-specific rate. See id. at 1326–29. Further, the court ruled that Commerce’s refusal to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate was unsupported by substantial evidence. See id. 1329–32. On remand, Commerce reconsiders its rejection of Prime Time’s factual submission, but nonetheless concludes that it cannot calculate an importer-
specific assessment rate for Prime Time. See *Remand Results* at 3–16. For the following reasons, the court sustains Commerce’s remand redetermination.

**BACKGROUND**


Since Commerce considers the PRC to be a non-market economy (“NME”), unless a respondent demonstrates otherwise, Commerce presumes that all companies within the PRC are subject to government-control and should be assigned a single “country-wide” rate. See, e.g., Import Admin., [Commerce], Separate-Rates Practice and Application of Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations involving [NME] Countries, Policy Bulletin 05.1 at 1 (Apr. 5, 2005) (“Policy Bulletin 05.1”) (citations omitted), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/policy/bull05–1.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2021). Although Homey initially sought to demonstrate its independence from the country-wide entity by timely submitting a separate rate application, it later stopped cooperating with Commerce’s requests for information. See *Certain Cased Pencils From the [PRC]*, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,329, 43,330 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 15, 2017) (preliminary results of [ADD] admin. review, prelim. determination of no shipments, & rescission of review, in part; 2015–2016) (“Prelim. Results”)

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1 Commerce received requests for review of six companies, but after Orient International Holding Shanghai Foreign Trade Co., Ltd. timely withdrew its request, Homey was the only company left with entries during the period of review. See Resp’t Selection Memo at 1.

2 On March 26, 2018, Defendant submitted indices to the public and confidential administrative records underlying Commerce’s final determination. These indices are located on the docket at ECF Nos. 12–2–3. On October 18, 2019, Defendant filed indices to the public and confidential administrative records underlying Commerce’s remand redetermination. These indices are located on the docket at ECF Nos. 41–2–3. All references to documents from the initial administrative record are identified by the numbers assigned by Commerce in the March 26th indices, see ECF No. 12, and preceded by “PD” or “CD” to denote the public or confidential documents. All references to the administrative record for the remand determination are identified by the numbers assigned in the October 18th indices, see ECF No. 41, and preceded by “PRR” or “CRR” to denote remand public or confidential documents.


On July 19, 2019, the court remanded aspects of Commerce’s final determination for further explanation or reconsideration. See Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1326–34. Prime Time I held that, to the extent that Prime Time’s submission was offered as factual information not elsewhere defined pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 301.301(c)(5) (2017),⁴ Commerce acted contrary to law by removing Prime Time’s submission and accompanying narrative of admissibil-

³ Prime Time explained that it submitted the questionnaire responses so that Commerce could construct an ADD rate for Homey. See Reply Br. of [Prime Time] Supp. R. 56.2 Mot. for J. on Agency Record at 1, 18–19, Jan. 11, 2019, ECF No. 25. At oral argument, Prime Time re-iterated that its objective in filing questionnaire responses on behalf of Homey was to give Commerce the information it needed to construct an exporter-specific rate for Homey, rather than a country-wide rate that resulted from Homey’s failure to meet the prerequisites for separate rate eligibility. Oral Arg. at 11:30:32, Nov. 6, 2019, ECF No. 42 (“Oral Arg.”). With the questionnaire responses Prime Time filed on behalf of Homey, Prime Time believed that Commerce could have used facts available, plus gap-filling information, to construct Homey’s rate. Id. at 11:32:05. If Commerce constructed an exporter-specific rate for Homey, then Commerce could have assigned an importer-specific rate to Prime Time—a rate that Prime Time believed would be more favorable to it than the PRC-wide rate. Id.

⁴ Further citations to Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2017 edition.
ity from the record because Commerce’s regulations establish that only unsolicited questionnaire responses and untimely information will be removed from the record. See Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1326–29, 1334; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.104(a)(2)(iii).5 The court also held that Commerce’s attempt to justify its refusal to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate based on agency practice was unsupported by substantial evidence, because Commerce did not explain why its practice is reasonable in light of its own regulation directing the calculation of such a rate. See Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1329–32.

On remand, Commerce accepts Prime Time’s submission and evaluates it in light of Prime Time’s request that Commerce calculate an importer-specific rate. See Remand Results at 1–16. However, Commerce continues to determine that it cannot calculate an importer-specific assessment rate for Prime Time. See id. Commerce instead explains why its practice of calculating an importer-specific assessment rate only when it calculates a margin for an individually-examined exporter is reasonable, even in light of its regulation directing the calculation of an importer-specific rate. See id. at 5–8. Moreover, Commerce explains why it can neither calculate an exporter rate for Homey using Prime Time’s factual submission, see Final Decision Memo at 4–5, nor can it calculate an assessment rate for Prime Time using the PRC-wide entity rate or Prime Time’s factual submission. See Remand Results at 5–8.

Commerce received no comments on the draft results of its remand analysis. See id. at 2. Only after Commerce’s final remand redetermination did Prime Time submit comments before this court challenging Commerce’s continued refusal to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate. See Pl. [Prime Time]’s Cmts. on Remand Redetermination Confidential Version, Nov. 6, 2019, ECF No. 42 (“Prime Time’s Br.”). On December 6, 2019, briefing on Commerce’s remand redetermination concluded. See Def.’s Reply to Cmts. on Remand Results, Dec. 6, 2019, ECF No. 44 (“Def.’s Reply Br.”). On November 5, 2020, the court heard oral argument. See Oral Arg., Nov. 5, 2020, ECF No. 55 (“Oral Arg.”).

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW


5 Moreover, because Commerce removed Prime Time’s narrative of admissibility from the record, the court held that Commerce’s rejection of the factual submission was unsupported by substantial evidence, as the very basis for that decision was not made available to the court for review. See Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1329.
which grant the court authority to review actions contesting the final determination in an administrative review of an ADD order. The court will uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “The results of a redetermination pursuant to court remand are also reviewed ‘for compliance with the court’s remand order.’” Xinjiamei Furniture (Zhangzhou) Co. v. United States, 38 CIT __, __, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259 (2014) (quoting Nakornthai Strip Mill Public Co. v. United States, 32 CIT 1272, 1274, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1306 (2008)).

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion

Prime Time argues that Commerce ignored remand instructions to use Prime Time’s questionnaire responses, along with gap-filling information, to calculate a rate for Prime Time; and, that Commerce’s explanation regarding its practice of calculating an importer-specific rate only when Commerce calculates a margin for an individually-examined exporter, was insufficient and unreasonable. See Prime Time’s Br. at 5–9. In response, Defendant argues that Prime Time misstates the remand instructions and that the court should not consider Prime Time’s submissions with respect to Commerce’s refusal to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate because Prime Time did not exhaust its administrative remedies. See Def.’s Reply Br. at 3–8. Prime Time submits that the exhaustion requirement does not preclude the court from considering arguments, where the issue before the court is a pure question of law, and where doing so would have otherwise been futile. See Prime Time’s Br. at 9–11.

“[T]he Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d). Parties are required to exhaust administrative remedies before the agency by raising all issues in their initial case briefs before Commerce. See Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing to 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(c)(2), (d)(2); Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); ABB, Inc. v. United States, 920 F.3d 811, 818 (Fed. Cir. 2019). However, courts have recognized several exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See Itochu Bldg. Prods. v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140,

6 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition.
7 Further citations to Title 28 of the U.S. Code are to the 2012 edition.
1146 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("Itochu") ("Requiring exhaustion may also be inappropriate where the issue for the court is a ‘pure question of law’ that can be addressed without further factual development or further agency exercise of discretion.” (quoting Agro Dutch Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see id. ("[A] party often is permitted to bypass an available avenue of administrative challenge if pursuing that route would clearly be futile, i.e., where it is clear that additional filings with the agency would be ineffectual.” (citing Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

Prime Time’s arguments are barred because they were not raised before Commerce. After issuing the draft results of redetermination, Commerce invited parties to comment, but none did. See Remand Results at 2. Prime Time claims that raising its arguments before Commerce would have been futile, explaining that it “has repeated its request that Commerce place gap-filling information on the record on five prior occasions.” Prime Time’s Br. at 10. Prime Time conflates Commerce’s refusal to place gap-filling information on the record prior to having Prime Time’s questionnaire responses, with Commerce’s refusal to place gap-filling information on the record after having Prime Time’s questionnaire responses. Prime Time cannot argue that prior attempts to have Commerce obtain and consider gap-filling information, or its questionnaire responses, render its efforts to have Commerce obtain and consider the gap-filling information now, under different circumstances, futile.

Prime Time cites a number of cases which do not support its position. See Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that plaintiff was precluded from introducing an invoice for the first time in its challenge before the CIT to the remand determination, where the underlying issue existed throughout the entirety of the proceedings); Hontex Enters. v. United States, 28 CIT 1000, 1004–06, 342 F. Supp. 2d. 1225, 1229–30 (2004) (confronting identical issue upon which the plaintiff had already commented); Holmes Prods. Corp. v. United States, 16 CIT 1101, 1103–04 (1992) (finding that plaintiff was precluded from challenging an agency decision, even though agency was aware of the issue, because no party objected); Valley Fresh Seafood, Inc. v. United States, 31 CIT 1989, 1994–96 (2007) (not requiring exhaustion where agency considered the issue and the plaintiff lacked “meaningful opportunity” to challenge agency’s position).

Additionally, at oral argument, Defendant invoked Itochu, Oral Arg. at 11:24:22, in which a domestic nail manufacturer notified
Commerce “that it no longer had an interest in receiving [ADD] relief from imports” of certain nails, and requested partial revocation of a standing ADD order. See Itochu, 733 F.3d at 1142–43. Itochu Building Products (“Itochu”), in support of that request, “submitted comments, and met with department officials” to advocate a proposed date for the revocation to become effective. See id. at 1143. Commerce preliminarily declined Itochu’s requested date in favor of setting a date in accordance with Commerce’s standard practice. See id. at 1143–44. Commerce invited interested parties to submit comments on its preliminary determination, however it stated that the receipt of comments would impact the publication date for the final results (up to 270 days if it received comments or up to 45 if it did not). See id. at 1144. Since submitting comments would have delayed the publication of Commerce’s final results, and because Itochu did not have any new or different reasons supporting its proposed effective date, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that Itochu was excused from the normal exhaustion requirement because it would have been futile and indeed harmful for Itochu to have to exhaust remedies. See id. at 1146–47.

In Itochu, Commerce summarily rejected the domestic producers challenge to Commerce’s choice of an effective date because of an established practice. See id. at 1146–47. Here, although Commerce has a practice to calculate importer-specific assessment rates only when Commerce calculates a margin for each individually-examined exporter, see Remand Results at 5, the court remanded to Commerce to consider Prime Time’s submission “in the context of calculating an importer-specific assessment rate.” See Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1323. Commerce therefore had to apply and justify its practice as reasonable in light of Prime Time’s submission. Although Prime Time called upon Commerce to use gap-filling information it might have from other reviews, Commerce found that obtaining and utilizing gap-filling information in this case would not be appropriate given the amount and character of information missing from the record. Specifically, Commerce lacked necessary factors of production and consumption data for Homey, as well as any expenses paid in connection with possible market economy purchases. See Remand Results at 9–14. Without this information, Commerce explained, it could not calculate an accurate margin for Homey. See id. Commerce concluded that too many inaccuracies and distortions “would likely result from seeking to construct a proxy for Ningbo Homey’s production process.” Id. at 14. Prime Time now challenges Commerce’s determination and argues that Commerce should use
gap-filing information to calculate an importer specific rate. *See* Prime Time's Br. at 5–11. Yet, Commerce was not given an opportunity to respond to Prime Time's arguments in its remand redetermination; thus, the court cannot now assess Commerce's analysis in light of submissions advanced by Prime Time after the fact. The question of whether Commerce could reasonably obtain gap filling information and construct a proxy for Homey's production process prior to inclusion of Prime Time's questionnaire responses is distinct from the question of whether Commerce could do so after inclusion and consideration of Prime Time's responses.

Prime Time's argument that it was not required to exhaust remedies before Commerce because the issue presented is a pure question of law is also misplaced. Prime Time argues that Commerce failed to comply with the remand order—an issue which Prime Time states is a pure question of law, for which exhaustion is not required. *See* Prime Time's Br. at 9–10. The court reviews Commerce's remand determination for compliance with the court's order below, however, Prime Time's argument misstates the court's remand order. Prime Time suggests that this court ordered Commerce to put the gap-filling information on the record. *See* id. at 5–7; Oral Arg. at 11:06:22. The remand order directed Commerce to consider the information Prime Time had previously submitted, determine whether it could use the information to calculate an importer-specific rate, and if not, explain why. *See* Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1334. Commerce did consider whether it could use Prime Time's information to calculate such a rate, and it explained why it could not. *See* Remand Results at 2, 5–16. Given that Prime Time disagreed with Commerce's conclusion, it could, and should, have submitted comments on Commerce's draft results.

The question resolved in *Prime Time I* was whether Commerce reasonably determined that it could not consider the information Prime Time submitted to it. *See* Prime Time I, 43 CIT at __, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1326–31. In the remand order, the court instructed Commerce to consider whether, with Prime Time's information, it could calculate an importer-specific rate. *See* id. at 1334. Commerce concluded that it could not supplement the record with information from other sources to calculate a reliable importer-specific rate, even with Prime Time's information on the record. *See* Remand Results at 13–14. Prime Time failed to exhaust administrative remedies, thus the court will not consider its arguments contesting Commerce's decision not to place gap-filling information on the record to calculate an importer-specific rate.
II. Calculation of an Importer-Specific Assessment Rate

The court remanded for further explanation, Commerce’s determination that it could not calculate an importer-specific assessment rate in light of Prime Time’s submission. Commerce’s explanation that it only calculates an importer-specific rate when it can calculate an exporter-specific rate, and that due to the amount of information missing from Prime Time’s submissions, it would be unduly difficult, and in any event unreliable, to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate, is reasonable.

Commerce must calculate a dumping margin for each entry of subject merchandise under review. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A). Further, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1), Commerce “normally will calculate an assessment rate for each importer of subject merchandise covered by the review . . . by dividing the dumping margin found on the subject merchandise examined by the entered value of such merchandise for normal customs duty purposes.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1).

Commerce explains that, where it does not calculate a dumping margin for an examined exporter, its practice is to not calculate an assessment rate for a given importer of the subject merchandise because Commerce’s calculation of that importer’s assessment rate is contingent on data provided by the exporter during the course of a review. See Remand Results at 5–8. According to Commerce, the term “dumping margin” used in 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1) refers to an exporter’s “extended margin.” Id. at 6. When Commerce determines the importer-specific assessment rate, it is determining what portion of an exporter’s extended margin is attributable to entries of the subject merchandise made by each importer. See id. Commerce thus explains that calculating an exporter’s “extended margin” is a prerequisite for calculating an importer-specific assessment rate. Id. at 6–7.

Elaborating on its methodology, Commerce explains that the extended margin is calculated by multiplying a figure Commerce refers to as the “potential uncollected dumping duties” (“PUDD”) of an exporter’s U.S. sales by the total quantity of the exporter’s U.S. sales. Id. at 6. The PUDD represents the difference between ex-factory prices of a mandatory respondent’s U.S. sales and the normal value of those sales. See id. & n.18 (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1572, 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). By multiplying the PUDD by the total quantity of the exporter’s U.S. sales, Commerce derives the extended margin, which represents the universe of potentially uncollected dumping duties stemming from the respondent’s sales of sub-
ject merchandise into the United States. See id. That extended margin serves as the basis for calculating the importer-specific assessment rate. See id. at 6–8. Namely, Commerce apportions the pool of potentially uncollected dumping duties arising out of a respondent’s sales of subject merchandise into the U.S. amongst various importers by dividing that amount by the total value of the importer’s entries of subject merchandise from that respondent-exporter. See id. The resulting figure, i.e., the importer-specific assessment rate, represents the amount of potentially unpaid duties relating to a specific importer’s entries. See id. at 7.

As such, Commerce submits that its practice of declining to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate is reasonable, even though its regulation directs that normally one will be calculated, because the extended margin is necessarily unique to the exporter being examined. See id. at 7–8; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1). Commerce adds that, although it could theoretically extract a PUDD from the PRC-wide rate, since a PUDD extracted from the PRC-wide rate would “in no way relate to the importer-specific entered value[,]” Commerce concludes that this approach would be “no more representative than using the [PRC]-wide rate for assessment purposes.” Id. at 8 & n.8.

Moreover, Commerce explains that although Prime Time submitted some questionnaire information, it did not—because it could not—submit certain information that is unique to Homey. See Remand Results at 9–14. In the Final Results, Commerce explained that it would be unduly difficult for Commerce to obtain gap-filling information to supplement Prime Time’s submission and construct a proxy rate for Homey because Prime Time’s submission was too incomplete. See Final Decision Memo at 4–5; Remand Results at 9–16 & n.44. On remand, Commerce further explains that it cannot reliably fill in this missing information. See id. In Prime Time’s Section C submission, the “complete universe of sales” that Homey made was missing, and without this information, Commerce cannot properly conduct a differential pricing analysis which looks at all of the exporters sales and determines if there is “pattern of sales for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods in order to determine whether a pattern of prices differ significantly.”

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8 Prime Time argues that Commerce failed to comply with 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e)(3) which states that it should not refuse to consider information that is “not so incomplete that it cannot serve as a reliable basis for reaching the applicable determination[].” However, Commerce has specifically stated that Prime Time’s submission is insufficient to calculate either an exporter rate for Homey or an importer rate for Prime Time. See Remand Results at 9–16.
See id. at 10–11. In Prime Time’s Section D submission, information about the production and manufacturing process is missing, but is needed in order for Commerce to calculate Homey’s normal values. See id. at 12–14.

Commerce’s practice, and consequent decision not to calculate an importer-specific assessment rate here, is reasonable. Commerce explains its practice that it only calculates an importer-specific rate when it has calculated a rate for the corresponding exporter under review and further explains why it chose not to obtain gap-filling information to create a proxy for Homey’s production process. See Remand Results at 5–14. It is the burden of interested parties to populate the record; a burden which was not met in this case. See BMW of N. Am. LLC v. United States, 926 F.3d 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1386–87 (Fed. Cir. 2014); QVD Food Co., Ltd. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Commerce’s Remand Results are supported by substantial evidence and comply with the court’s order in Prime Time I, and are therefore sustained. Judgment will enter accordingly.

Dated: January 19, 2021
New York, New York

/s/ Claire R. Kelly
CLAIRE R. KELLY, JUDGE

Slip Op. 21–06

PRIME SOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

Before: Timothy C. Stanceu, Chief Judge
Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
M. Miller Baker, Judge
Court No. 20–00032

OMAN FASTENERS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

Consol. Court No. 20–00037

ASTROTECH STEELS PRIVATE LTD., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

Court No. 20–00046
TRINITY STEEL PRIVATE LTD., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al.,
Defendants.

Court No. 20–00047

NEW SUPPLIES CO., INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, et al.,
Defendants.

Court No. 20–00048

ASLANBAS NAIL and WIRE CO., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, et
al., Defendants.

Court No. 20–00049

J. CONRAD LTD, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

Court No. 20–00052

METROPOLITAN STAPLE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al.,
Defendants.

Court No. 20–00053

SOUTHERN CARLSON, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, et al.,
Defendants.

Court No. 20–00056

TEMPO GLOBAL RESOURCES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al.,
Defendants.

Court No. 20–00066

FARRIER PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al.,
Defendants.

Court No. 20–00098

GEEKAY WIRES, LTD., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

Court No. 20–00118

[The American Steel Nail Coalition’s motions to intervene in twelve pending actions
are denied, both as to the Coalition itself and as to its member companies. Judge Baker
concurs in a separate opinion.]

Dated: January 20, 2021

Adam H. Gordon, Jennifer M. Smith, Lauren N. Fraid, and Ping Gong, The Bristol
Law Group PLLC of Washington, D.C., for Proposed Defendant-Intervenor.
Jeffrey S. Grimson, Kristin H. Mowry, Jill A. Cramer, Sarah M. Wyss, James C.
Beaty, and Bryan P. Cenko, Mowry & Grimson, PLLC of Washington, D.C., for Prime-
Source Building Products, Inc.
Michael P. House, Jon B. Jacobs, Andrew Caridas, and Shuaqi Yuan, Perkins Coie
LLP of Washington, D.C., for Oman Fasteners, LLC; Huttig Building Products, Inc.;
and Huttig, Inc.
OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are motions submitted by the American Steel Nail Coalition (the “Coalition”) to intervene as a party defendant in each of these twelve actions, in which plaintiffs challenge the legality of a presidential proclamation (“Proclamation 9980” or the “Proclamation”) that imposed 25% duties on imports of certain articles made of steel, including steel nails. Six plaintiffs oppose the Coalition’s motions to intervene, while others consented, deferred to the discretion of the Court, or did not respond to the Coalition’s motions. Ruling that the individual members of the Coalition fail to qualify for intervention as of right or for permissive intervention, the court denies these motions, both as to the Coalition and as to its member companies.

I. BACKGROUND

Proclamation 9980, issued by President Trump on January 24, 2020 with an effective date of February 8, 2020, imposed duties of 25% ad valorem on imports of what it identified as “derivatives” of aluminum articles and of steel articles, including steel nails. See Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States, 85 Fed. Reg. 5,281 (Exec. Office of the President Jan. 29, 2020) (“Proclamation 9980”). As authority for this action, the Proclamation cited section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (“Section 232”), under which the President, upon a report of the Secretary of Commerce and subject to certain procedures and conditions, may adjust the imports of an article that is “being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c).
The plaintiffs in these twelve actions, which were brought during the period of February 4 to June 4, 2020, variously challenge the issuance of the Proclamation on multiple grounds, including that the President did not comply with statutory procedures and thereby exceeded his delegated authority, that the Secretary of Commerce, in taking actions under Section 232, failed to comply with requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq., that Section 232 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, that the issuance of the Proclamation resulted in a denial of due process, and that the issuance of the Proclamation resulted in a denial of equal protection. See, e.g., Am. Compl. (Ct. No. 20–00032) 19–24 (Feb. 11, 2020), ECF Nos. 21 (conf.) & 22 (pub.); Compl. (Consol. Ct. No. 20–00037) 23–31 (Feb. 7, 2020), ECF No. 2. The Coalition filed motions to intervene as a party defendant in each of the twelve cases during the period of February 27 to June 15, 2020. See, e.g., Mot. to Intervene as Def.-Intervenor (Ct. No. 20–00032) (Feb. 27, 2020), ECF No. 47 (“Coalition’s Mot.”).

The Coalition describes itself as a group of domestic manufacturers of steel nails.\(^1\) With respect to the twelve pending actions, the Coalition claims an interest in defending Proclamation 9980 from judicial challenge. The Coalition has filed proposed answers to the complaints, proposed motions for judgment on the pleadings, and various briefs in the twelve cases.\(^2\) It also has filed answers to the court’s inquiries relating to its status. Some plaintiffs have opposed the Coalition’s intervention.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) In its motion to intervene in Court No 20–00032, filed on February 27, 2020, the American Steel Nail Coalition (the “Coalition”) described itself as having six members: Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc.; Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools, Inc.; Tree Island Wire (USA), Inc.; Specialty Nail Company; Legacy Fasteners, LLC; and American Fasteners Co., Ltd. Mot. to Intervene as Def.-Intervenor (Ct. No. 20–00032) 1 n.1 (Feb. 27, 2020), ECF No. 47. As of its Motion to Intervene in Geckay Wires v. United States, Court No. 20–00118, the Coalition appears to have expanded to include four more members: Mar-Mac Industries, Inc.; Maze Nails; Pneu Fast Company; and Anvil Acquisition Co., Ltd. See Mot. to Intervene as of Right, or, in the Alternative, via Permissive Intervention (Ct. No. 20–00118) 1 n.1 (June 15, 2020), ECF No. 8.


\(^3\) The plaintiffs opposing the Coalition’s intervention are: PrimeSource Building Products, Inc.; Oman Fasteners, LLC; Huttig Building Products, Inc.; Astrotech Steels Private Ltd.; New Supplies Co., Inc.; and Trinity Steel Private, Ltd. See Resp. in Opp’n to Am. Steel Nail Coal.’s Mot. to Intervene (Ct. No. 20–00032) (Mar. 19, 2020), ECF No. 59; Opp’n to Mot. to Intervene (Consol. Ct. No. 20–00037) (Mar. 18, 2020), ECF No. 55; Pl.’s Opp’n to Am. Steel Nail Coal.’s Mot. to Intervene (Ct. No. 20–00046) (Mar. 17, 2020), ECF No. 28; Pl.’s Opp’n to Am. Steel Nail Coal.’s Mot. To Intervene (Ct. No. 20–00047) (March 17, 2020), ECF No. 24; Pl.’s Opp’n to Am. Steel Nail Coal.’s Mot. to Intervene (Ct. No. 20–00048) (Mar. 20, 2020), ECF No. 23.
II. DISCUSSION

As it applies here, section 2631(j)(1) of Title 28, United States Code, provides that “[a]ny person who would be adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision in a civil action pending in the Court of International Trade may, by leave of court, intervene in such action,” with certain exceptions not here pertinent. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1). The statute further provides that “[i]n those civil actions in which intervention is by leave of court, the Court of International Trade shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” Id. § 2631(j)(2).

The Coalition moves to intervene as of right under USCIT Rule 24(a) and, in the alternative, moves for permissive intervention under USCIT Rule 24(b).

A. The Coalition Does Not Meet the Requirements for Intervention As of Right

As pertinent to the pending motions, USCIT Rule 24(a) provides that “the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the . . . transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” USCIT R. 24(a)(2).

The Coalition claims an economic interest in maintaining the 25% tariffs on imports of the steel nails subject to Proclamation 9980 on the ground that its members produce steel nail products in the United States that compete with those imports. But neither the Coalition nor any of its individual members have demonstrated that defendant United States will not adequately represent any interest the Coalition or its member companies have, or could have, in the tariffs imposed upon the import transactions that are the subject of the twelve cases for which intervention is sought. The President imposed the 25% tariffs on the subject steel nails based on the President’s finding that such action is required so that these imports do not threaten to impair the national security. See Proclamation 9980 ¶ 9, 85 Fed. Reg. at 5,283 (“Based on the Secretary’s assessments, I have concluded that it is necessary and appropriate in light of our national security interests to adjust the tariffs imposed by previous proclamations to apply to the derivatives of aluminum articles and steel articles described in Annex I and Annex II to this proclamation.”). Because the government has but one interest in this litigation—maintaining Proclamation 9980—it reasonably can be expected to act vigorously to defend that interest, which Proclamation 9980 has
stated to be grounded in removing a threatened impairment of the national security of the United States.

The Coalition argues that its interests, being private and commercial, are not coincident with the government’s public and enforcement-oriented interests. Coalition’s Mot. 5 (quoting *Vivitar Corp. v. United States*, 7 C.I.T. 165, 168–69, 585 F. Supp. 1415, 1418–19 (1984)). The respective motivations may be different, but the Coalition’s overall interest in seeking to intervene is in defending Proclamation 9980 from judicial challenge, and in that critical respect its interest is aligned with that of defendants. The Coalition argues that “evidence exists that the interests of the Coalition may not be adequately represented in this action,” Coalition’s Mot. 5, pointing out that in two of the cases, the government has consented to a preliminary injunction against the collection of duties, actions that, it argues, “directly undermine the intended effects of the Proclamation, including the economic benefits members of the Coalition are intended to receive,” id., at 6 (citing the entry of a consented preliminary injunction order in Ct. No. 20–00032, ECF Nos. 39 (conf.) & 40 (pub.); Ct. No. 20–00037, ECF Nos. 28 (conf.) & 29 (pub.)). The Coalition also points to a third case in which the government consented to an order that enjoins liquidation of affected entries while litigation is pending but does not prevent the collection of estimated duties. Coalition Mot. 6 (citing the entry of a consented-to order in Ct. No. 20–00048, ECF No. 18). The Coalition’s argument is not persuasive. The orders to which the Coalition objects enjoined the collection of cash deposits based on required bonding that the United States deemed sufficient to protect its interests for the period of time the cases are being adjudicated on the merits. In summation, the interest of the United States in litigating these cases is at least as compelling as that claimed by the would-be intervenors.

Nor have the members of the Coalition shown that they will be in a position to make arguments other than those the government has made, or will make, in the litigation of the twelve cases. The claims of the various plaintiffs raise various questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation. Similarly, the Coalition’s own proposed submissions indicate that its arguments would raise questions of law should it be permitted to intervene. See, e.g., Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (Ct. No. 20–00032) (Mar. 20, 2020), ECF No. 61; Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings (Consol. Ct. No. 20–00037) (Mar. 20, 2020), ECF No. 56. To the extent any questions of fact will be material to a resolution of these actions, they necessarily would pertain to
matters of record pertaining to the issuance of Proclamation 9980 rather than to factual issues the Coalition would be in a position to address through its participation.

B. The Court Denies Permissive Intervention Because Intervention Will Unduly Delay or Prejudice the Adjudication of the Rights of the Parties

USCIT Rule 24(b)(1) provides that “the court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” For the purpose of ruling on permissive intervention, we assume, without deciding, that the individual members of the Coalition are given a conditional right to intervene by the Customs Courts Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j), or have a defense that shares questions of law concerning the legal validity of the Proclamation that would be in common with questions of law relating to the defense of the Proclamation the government can be expected to assert.

As directed by statute and the Court’s rules, the court considers “whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(2); see USCIT R. 24(b). We note, in this regard, that six plaintiffs have expressed opposition to the Coalition’s intervention. In exercising its discretion under § 2631(j)(2) and Rule 24(b), the court concludes that adding the Coalition as intervenors will burden the plaintiffs in all twelve actions with the need to respond to additional submissions and, unavoidably, also cause delays. These burdens and delays are not justified by broadening this litigation to allow the intervention that is sought here. In summary, allowing the intervention would not promote the principle expressed in USCIT Rule 1 that this Court’s rules be “construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”

C. None of the Member Companies Has Qualified Individually for Intervention

In his concurring opinion, Judge Baker raises certain complex issues that pertain generally to the legal status and capacity of the Coalition and whether the Coalition permissibly may represent the interests of its member companies as a defendant-intervenor. We hold today that neither the Coalition nor any of its individual member companies have demonstrated that they should be permitted to intervene in any of these twelve actions. Because none of the member companies may intervene individually, it necessarily follows that the
Coalition may not be a defendant-intervenor on behalf of those member companies, regardless of its capacity or status. Therefore, we do not reach, and leave for another day, the issues pertaining to the legal status and capacity of the Coalition, and its authority to represent its members, that Judge Baker addresses in his concurring opinion.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Upon consideration of the Coalition’s motions to intervene in these twelve actions, and all papers and proceedings had herein, and upon due deliberation, it is hereby

ORDERED that any stays in effect in any of the twelve actions are hereby lifted solely for the purpose of the court’s ruling on the Coalition’s motions to intervene in those cases; and it is further

ORDERED that the motions to intervene in each of these twelve actions be, and hereby are, denied both as to the Coalition and as to each of its individual member companies; and it is further

ORDERED that all other motions filed by the Coalition be, and hereby are, denied as moot.

Dated: January 20, 2021
New York, New York

/s/ Timothy C. Stanceu
TIMOTHY C. STANCEU, CHIEF JUDGE

/s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves
JENNIFER CHOE-GROVES, JUDGE

Baker, Judge, concurring:

“The American system of civil litigation draws important differences between the parties to a case and everyone else.” Caleb Nelson, Intervention, 106 Va. L. Rev. 271, 273 (2020). If outsiders parachute into a case in federal district court or our Court via intervention, they “can conduct discovery, participate fully at trial, and pursue an appeal in the event of a judgment.” Id. at 274. And they might “block[] settlement” agreed to by the original parties. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.).

Because intervention can “impose substantial costs on the parties and the judiciary,” id., it behooves the “federal courts to . . . th[ink] hard about who is eligible to become a party.” Nelson, 106 Va. L. Rev. at 273. This is especially true given that the law governing intervention “is a mess.” Id.

These twelve actions, which involve challenges by importers to tariffs on steel nails imposed by the President for national security reasons, are an opportunity for us to think hard not only about who
is eligible to become a party in federal court, but also about what is eligible to become a party. Before us are the identical motions of the American Steel Nail Coalition, which describes itself as an unincorporated association of domestic steel nail producers, to intervene as a party defendant in each case in this sprawling litigation. It seeks to defend tariffs imposed by the President on the Coalition’s competitors, importers of steel nails (including the plaintiffs in these cases).

I concur with my colleagues in denying the motions to intervene. I write separately to take this opportunity to think hard about the intervention questions that the parties originally briefed and the additional questions that we asked the parties to address, including the Coalition’s nature (is it an entity or an ad hoc group?), associational standing, and capacity to be sued as a party defendant.

As explained below, although the Constitution does not require the Coalition to demonstrate standing here—a question that the Supreme Court only resolved while these intervention motions were pending—the Coalition’s motions to intervene are legal nullities because it lacks any legal existence. Moreover, even if the Coalition has legal existence or the lack of such existence is not fatal to its motions, its lack of capacity to sue or be sued in any federal court is.

Either one of those reasons standing alone is enough to deny the Coalition’s intervention motions. But even if the Coalition’s motions are not legal nullities and it has the capacity to sue or be sued, the Coalition is flatly ineligible for either intervention as of right or permissive intervention.

Although my colleagues do not decide the question, in my view the Coalition is ineligible for intervention as of right because it has no protectable legal interest in the tariffs it seeks to defend. Moreover, even if the Coalition has a legally protected interest in the tariffs, I agree with my colleagues that the Coalition is still ineligible for intervention as of right because its notional interest in these suits is adequately represented by the government.

The Coalition is also disqualified from permissive intervention under either of the applicable pathways for such intervention—questions my colleagues do not reach. The Coalition is ineligible under the first such pathway, a statute granting outsiders with standing a conditional right to intervene, because the Coalition lacks associational standing to represent its members.

Likewise, the Coalition is ineligible under the second such pathway, a provision in our rules allowing for intervention when the intervenor shares a defense with the defendant, because Plaintiffs have no claim against the Coalition. A fortiori, the Coalition shares no defense with the government.
Finally, even if the Coalition is otherwise eligible for permissive intervention, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such intervention, I concur with my colleagues’ discretionary denial of leave to intervene because of the resulting prejudice to the parties and burdens on the Court.

That all said, I appreciate that the Coalition’s members would at least like to have their views heard in this litigation. But there is another, far less costly—and, as here, too often overlooked—mechanism for having outsider views heard that creates no prejudice for the parties and imposes far fewer burdens on the Court than the comparatively drastic step of intervention. Interested outsiders that wish their views heard can move to participate as *amici curiae*, and in my view, we should freely grant such leave when sought.

**Statutory and Factual Background**

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, authorizes the President to take certain actions to reduce imports of goods to “[s]afeguard[] national security.” 19 U.S.C. § 1862. Specifically, upon a report of the Secretary of Commerce and subject to certain procedures and conditions, the statute authorizes the President to adjust the imports of an article that is “being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” *Id.* § 1862(c)(1)(A).

In 2017, the Secretary undertook a Section 232 investigation of the effects of imported steel on national security. After public hearings and receiving comments from various quarters, including both importers and domestic producers, the Secretary issued a report finding that steel imports threatened national security. Based on this report, in 2018 the President issued Proclamation 9705, which imposed duties on imported raw steel. *See* Proclamation No. 9705 of March 8, 2018, *Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States*, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 15, 2018).

In 2020, the President issued the proclamation challenged in these suits, Proclamation 9980, which extended Proclamation 9705’s duties to certain steel *derivative* products, including steel nails, not previously addressed by the Secretary’s earlier investigation and report (or any report). *See* Proclamation No. 9980, *Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles into the United States*, 85 Fed. Reg. 5281 (Jan. 29, 2020). The President explained that the purpose of extending the tariffs to steel derivative products

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was to prevent the “erosion of the customer base for U.S. producers of . . . steel” and circumvention of Proclamation 9705’s duties caused by imports of such products. *Id.* at 5282.

Unlike Proclamation 9705, Proclamation 9980 was not preceded by an investigation by the Secretary, administrative hearings, and the opportunity for public comments by anyone, including members of the Coalition.\(^2\) In short, Proclamation 9980’s tariffs on steel nail importers came out of the blue insofar as the Coalition is concerned. From the Coalition’s happy perspective, Proclamation 9980 represents found money.

Plaintiffs in these twelve actions,\(^3\) domestic importers of steel nails, challenge Proclamation 9980 on various Administrative Procedure Act and nonstatutory review grounds. Defendants are the United States, the President, and various other officials and agencies charged with enforcement of Proclamation 9980.

The Coalition’s Intervention Motions

The Coalition moved to intervene as a party defendant in each of these cases and tendered a proposed answer for filing in each case. *See, e.g.*, ECF 47.\(^4\) Shortly thereafter, the Coalition presumed to file dispositive motions and other merits briefs in the four active cases even though its motions for intervention were still pending.\(^5\) We ordered the parties not to respond to the Coalition’s merits filings pending further order of the Court. *See ECF 62.*

Plaintiffs in six of these suits affirmatively oppose the Coalition’s motions to intervene.\(^6\) The government takes no position, and no existing party affirmatively supports intervention.

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\(^3\) By consent of the parties, eight of these actions have been stayed. The four active cases are *PrimoSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–32; *Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United States*, Consol. Ct. No. 20–37; *J. Conrad LTD v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–52; and *Metropolitan Staple Corp. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–53.

\(^4\) Unless otherwise indicated, all record citations are to documents filed in the lead case, *PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–32. Citations to page numbers in the record refer to the pagination found in the ECF header at the top of each page.


Other than the bare assertion that its members comprise “the largest producers of steel nails in the United States,” ECF 47, at 4, neither the Coalition’s motions to intervene nor its proffered answers contain any allegations, much less evidentiary substantiation, concerning the Coalition’s nature, purposes, activities, associational standing, authority to represent its members, and capacity to sue or be sued. We therefore ordered the Coalition to file supplemental briefing and any supporting evidence addressing these topics. ECF 63. The Coalition responded, see ECF 69, as did the plaintiffs opposing intervention in non-stayed cases. See ECF 74; Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United States, Consol. Ct. No. 20–37, ECF 71.

The only evidentiary materials the Coalition included in its response were the declarations of executives of the nine companies then comprising the Coalition, which the Coalition’s supplemental brief asserts account “for a super-majority of the production of U.S. steel nails which were included in Annex 2 to Presidential Proclamation 9980.” ECF 69, at 8.

These executives, speaking on behalf of their respective companies—notably, not on behalf of the Coalition—state that their companies are domestic producers of steel nails that authorized the Coalition to represent their interests with respect to Proclamation 9980. See id. at 20–36. All state that their respective companies purchase steel wire rod, the raw material used to produce steel nails. See, e.g., id. at 22. Apparently only one member, however, purchases steel wire rod from exclusively domestic steel producers.

7 As of its most recent filing, the Coalition’s ten members are Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc.; KYOCERA SENCO Industrial Tools, Inc.; Tree Island Wire (USA) Inc.; Specialty Nail Company; Legacy Fasteners, LLC; American Fasteners Co., Ltd.; the Pneufast Co.; Maze Nails; MAR-MAC Industries, Inc.; and Anvil Acquisition Corp. See Geekay Wires Ltd. v. United States, Ct. No. 20–118, ECF 8, at 1 n.1 (June 15, 2020).

8 The Coalition attached a news article as an exhibit to its motion and quotes it for the proposition that one of its members, Mid Continent, “is the ‘largest producer of U.S. nails.’” ECF 47, at 4 (quoting Katie Lobosco, Largest US Nail Manufacturer Clings to Life under Steel Tariffs, CNN Business, Sept. 4, 2018 (available at https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/04/news/companies/tariffs-layoffs-mid-continent-nail/index.html)). This article, however, is inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802; see also Stollings v. Ryobi Tecks., Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding newspaper article offered to prove the truth of what was reported to be inadmissible hearsay).

9 A tenth member joined later. See supra note 7.

10 The nine declarations are substantially identical except regarding the source of steel wire rod purchased by each declarant’s company. One executive conspicuously states that his company purchases steel wire rod “from only American steel companies.” Declaration of Clifford Mentrup, ECF 69, at 22 ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Seven other declarants state that their companies purchase steel wire rod “from American steel companies.” See, e.g., Declaration of Chris M. Pratt, ECF 69, at 30. Given this careful choice of words, I infer that unlike Mr. Mentrup’s company, these seven members of the Coalition do not purchase steel from exclusively domestic producers. Indeed, the (inadmissible) CNN news article attached as an
Several executives indicate that since the Proclamation took effect, prices and demand for their respective companies’ nails have increased. See id. at 20, 24, 26, 28, 34, 38. All indicate that they anticipate demand and prices for their respective companies’ nails will drop if Proclamation 9980 is declared unlawful, see id. at 20–36, presumably because their competitors’ prices will drop.

In its supplemental brief, the Coalition asserts that it “was formed by the mutual consent of its members to achieve a common purpose—defending the lawfulness and ensuring the immediate and ongoing enforcement of Proclamation 9980,” and that it is analogous to a “trade organization.” Id. at 11. I take this statement of counsel, coupled with the Coalition’s failure to directly respond to one of our questions and to submit any affidavit or declaration by a person authorized to speak for the Coalition, as an admission that the Coalition is not a preexisting or even newly created entity of any kind but rather a one-off, ad hoc group of companies that jointly retained counsel to defend Proclamation 9980.

**Discussion**

The Coalition moves to intervene as of right under USCIT Rule 24(a) and, in the alternative, for permissive intervention under USCIT Rule 24(b). I address each of these grounds in turn, but before I do, I first address the threshold questions of the Coalition’s constitutional standing, legal existence, and capacity to be sued.

I. **Constitutional standing**

“Article III of the Constitution limits the exercise of the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017). The leading modern case explains that a justiciable Article III case or controversy requires a “party invoking federal court jurisdiction” to demonstrate, as “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” (1) that it has suf-

exhibit to the Coalition’s intervention motions quotes Mr. Pratt as stating that Proclamation 9705’s tariffs on imported steel wire rod injured his company, Mid-Continent Steel & Wire, because domestic steel suppliers could not “supply enough raw material for Mid Continent.” ECF 47, at 13. The remaining declarant confirms that his company purchases steel wire rod “from multiple sources, including American steel companies.” Declaration of Remy Stachowiak, ECF 69, at 36.

Although not relevant to the grounds upon which my colleagues and I deny the Coalition’s intervention motions, I note that protecting domestic nail manufacturers that use imported steel wire rod, as all but one of the Coalition’s members appear to do in some unknown measure, is assuredly not the purpose of Proclamation 9980, which instead seeks to protect customers of domestic steel producers. See Proclamation 9980, 85 Fed. Reg. at 5282.

11 See ECF 63, at 4 (ordering the Coalition to address, inter alia, whether “the Coalition [is] an ongoing entity with regular activities representing the interests of its members or it is an ad hoc group of companies assembled solely for purposes of intervening in this litigation”).
fered “an injury in fact,” that is, “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) “it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (cleaned up).

Defendants, as well as plaintiffs, must possess constitutional standing. *See McConnell v. FEC*, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (stating “that because the [defendant agency] has standing, . . . we need not address the standing of the intervenor-defense[, whose position here is identical to the [agency’s],” thereby implying that at least one defendant must have standing), *overruled in part on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); *Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (stating that “[s]tanding to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement” of Article III) (emphasis added); *Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc.*, 523 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same); *see also Diamond v. Charles*, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (observing that “a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute”).

The Coalition, however, argues that it need not independently demonstrate constitutional standing to defend Proclamation 9980 because it can piggyback on the government’s standing. *See ECF 69, at 12 (citing Canadian Wheat Bd. v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (CIT 2009)). In Canadian Wheat, a decision of this Court noted a circuit split over whether putative intervenors must independently demonstrate their constitutional standing. *See 637 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–42.12*

After acknowledging the Federal Circuit had reserved the question, *see 637 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (citing Landmark Land Co. v. FDIC, 256 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001)), Canadian Wheat agreed with those circuits holding that intervenors need not demonstrate independent standing, reasoning that once a “case or controversy” exists, “so long as the parties with standing remain in the case, the court’s jurisdiction continues regardless of the presence of intervenors.” *Id. at 1342.13*

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12 Compare *San Juan Cty. v. United States*, 503 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that Article III does not require putative intervenors to demonstrate constitutional standing so long as another party with constitutional standing on the same side as the intervenor remains in the case), with *Mausolf v. Babbitt*, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that putative intervenors must always demonstrate constitutional standing).

13 The persistence of this circuit split puzzles me, as *McConnell* seemingly resolved the question of whether an intervenor must demonstrate constitutional standing. In *McConnell*, one of the plaintiff-appellees challenged the constitutional standing of members of Congress who had intervened in the district court to defend the challenged statute. The
The Supreme Court seemingly resolved this circuit split in 2017 by applying McConnell's rationale, albeit without acknowledging that decision. In Town of Chester, the Court observed that under Article III, “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Id. at 1650 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)). Rather, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Id. (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 734). Under these principles, in cases with multiple plaintiffs “[a]t least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.” Id. at 1651.

Applying these principles in the context of intervention as of right, the Supreme Court held that “[f]or all relief sought, there must be a litigant with standing, whether that litigant joins as a plaintiff, a coplaintiff, or an intervenor as of right.” Id. Therefore, “at the least, an intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that which the plaintiff requests.” Id.

This holding tracks exactly with the reasoning of McConnell. See supra note 13.

Although courts agree that Town of Chester requires that an intervenor seeking different relief must demonstrate standing, some courts, judges, and commentators read it as not deciding whether (as here) an intervenor seeking the same relief sought by an existing party must also demonstrate standing. See, e.g., Kane Cty., Utah v. United States, 950 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (10th Cir. 2020) (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Old Dominion Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 892 F.3d 1223, 1232 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 794 (2019); Zachary N. Ferguson, Rule 24 Notwithstanding: Why Article III Should Not Limit Intervention of Right, 67 Duke L.J. 189, 193 (2017).

After the pending intervention motions were briefed, the Supreme Court put to rest these lingering doubts. In Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020), a group of nuns intervened in the district court to defend a challenged

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14 Although the context in Town of Chester was intervention as of right, the Supreme Court's reasoning—representing the application of constitutional standing principles—necessarily applies with equal force to permissive intervention.
exemption to agency regulations mandating the provision of contra-
ceptive benefits. The district court enjoined the agency’s enforcement 
of the regulatory exemption, and the nuns (as well as the govern-
ment) appealed to the Third Circuit, which dismissed the nuns’ ap-
peal for lack of constitutional standing and affirmed the district court 
on the merits.

Citing *Town of Chester*, the Supreme Court explained that the nuns 
did not have to demonstrate constitutional standing because they 
sought the same relief as the government. See id. at 2379 n.6 (as “both 
the Federal Government and the [nuns] asked the court to dissolve 
the injunction against the religious exemption[,] [t]he Third Circuit 
. . . erred by inquiring into the Little Sisters’ independent Article III 
standing”). In other words, *Little Sisters of the Poor* applied the 
*McConnell* principle that a defendant-intervenor seeking the same 
relief as the defendant need not demonstrate constitutional standing.

*Town of Chester*, as recently clarified by *Little Sisters of the Poor*, 
thus definitively resolved the persistent circuit split noted by the CIT 
in *Canadian Wheat*. Article III does not require a putative intervenor—whether as of right or permissive—to demonstrate inde-
pendent constitutional standing, so long as it seeks the same relief as 
one of the parties to the case.

Here, like the government, the Coalition seeks to defend Proclama-
tion 9980, and (so far) it has not opposed any step taken by the 
government.15 For that reason, Article III does not require the Coalition 
to demonstrate independent constitutional standing and, by ex-
tension, associational standing. See *Int’l Union, United Auto., Aero-
space & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock*, 477 U.S. 274, 
281–82 (1986) (explaining associational standing of organization to 
represent its members). Instead, at least insofar as Article III is 
concerned, the Coalition can ride the government’s standing coattails 
to defend Proclamation 9980.16

II. Legal existence

“One of the most fundamental precepts of Anglo-American juris-
prudence is that a right, to be enforced in a court of law, must have a ‘holder’ or ‘bearer.’” *Motta v. Samuel Weiser*, 598 F. Supp. 941, 948 (D.

15 As discussed further below, the Coalition grumbles that the government, without admit-
ting liability, consented to entry of preliminary injunctions in eight of these cases shortly 
before the Coalition sought to intervene. See ECF 47, at 5–6. The Coalition does not 
affirmatively seek vacatur of the injunctions, so I consider the issue moot for purposes of 
determining whether the relief sought by the Coalition differs from that sought by the 
government.

16 Nevertheless, as explained below, the statute under which the Coalition claims a condi-
tional right to intervene—28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)—does require the Coalition to show constitu-
tional, and hence associational, standing.
Me. 1984) (citing IV R. Pound, *Jurisprudence* 192 (1959)). A right must attach to some “legal unit.” *Id.* (quoting Pound, *supra*, at 192). Such a legal unit is either a “natural person or some other entity which has been accorded legal personality by common law or statute.” *Id.* In other words, legal existence is the *sine qua non* for the attachment of any rights or liabilities.


Examples from corporate and bankruptcy law readily illustrate the distinction between legal existence and capacity. A corporation in involuntary bankruptcy has legal existence, but it lacks the capacity to sue or be sued; it must sue or be sued in the name of the bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., *In re C.W. Mining Co.*, 636 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The only person with standing or legal capacity to represent [the corporate Debtor in involuntary bankruptcy] in any litigation, including these appeals, is its Trustee.”).

On the other hand, once a corporation has filed articles of dissolution and ceases to exist under applicable state law, it is incapable of even filing for bankruptcy and the question of capacity does not even arise. See, e.g., *In re Midpoint Dev., L.L.C.*, 466 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006) (bankruptcy filing by purported corporation was a legal nullity because the corporation no longer had legal existence after filing articles of dissolution).

Although legal existence and capacity are distinct concepts, both “are prerequisites to the suability of an entity.” *Roby*, 796 F. Supp at 110. Indeed, legal existence is an antecedent question to capacity: An entity lacking legal existence cannot sue or be sued, not because it lacks capacity, but rather because the entity simply does not exist in the eyes of the law. See *House v. Mitra QSR KNE, LLC*, No. CV GLR-17–412, 2018 WL 3353068, at *3 (D. Md. May 31, 2018) (“[L]egal existence is a prerequisite to having the capacity to sue”).

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17 This distinction is reflected in our Rule 9, which distinguishes between legal existence and capacity. Compare USCIT R. 9(a)(1)(A) (addressing “a party’s capacity to sue or be sued”) with USCIT R. 9(a)(1)(C) (addressing “the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party”).
In the absence of legal existence or specific statutory authorization, a federal court filing by a purported entity is a nullity. *Id.* ("[A] suit brought in the name of a . . . party [lacking legal existence] is a mere nullity") (cleaned up); *Youell v. Grimes*, 203 F.R.D. 503, 507–09 (D. Kan. 2001) (group of Lloyd’s of London underwriters was not an unincorporated association, lacked legal existence, and therefore could not be sued as a counterclaim defendant); *Brown v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Drug Task Force*, 255 F.3d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[A] group of persons working together for a common purpose must first be found to have legal existence” before it can sue); *In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 311 F.R.D. 152, 155–56 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (lawsuits filed in the names of plaintiffs who died prior to filing were legal nullities because the purported plaintiffs lacked any legal existence). As a result, "the question whether an entity is . . . legally cognizable is so fundamental to the effectiveness of the Court’s ultimate order that the Court must consider the issue on its own motion." *Motta*, 598 F. Supp. at 951. 19

Here, I conclude that the Coalition has no legal existence. As plaintiff Oman Fasteners argues, see ECF 71 at 1–2, the Coalition is not an unincorporated association, which "is a term of art—every group that is not a corporation or partnership is not automatically an unincorporated association." *Roby*, 796 F. Supp. at 110. The common law generally defines “unincorporated association” as “a body of persons united without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise.” *Hecht v. Malley*, 265 U.S. 144, 157 (1924).

The Coalition’s evidentiary submission demonstrates that it is an ad hoc group of domestic nail manufacturers that seeks to defend the Proclamation; on this record, the only joint action ever taken by its members appears to be the retention of counsel to represent the Coalition in this lawsuit. There is no indication that the Coalition has ever met, transacted any business, or issued any public statements. Nor is there any indication that the Coalition has a place of business, bank account, telephone number, officers, structure, or even so much as an email address or rental mailbox at the UPS Store.

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18 *Cf.* 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(9)(F), (C) (defining “interested party” for purposes of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings as including “an association, a majority of whose members is composed of . . . manufacturer[s], producer[s], or wholesaler[s] in the United States of a domestic like product”).

19 There are very practical implications if the Coalition lacks legal existence. For instance, the Coalition seeks to intervene as a defendant. If we grant intervention and ultimately rule in favor of Plaintiffs, in theory we might award attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs and enter a money judgment against the Coalition. See USCIT R. 54(d). Such a money judgment would be meaningless because the Coalition is less than merely judgment-proof; it is a juridical illusion.
The Coalition’s evidentiary submission—limited to declarations of
senior executives of its members speaking, not on the Coalition’s
behalf, but on each member’s behalf—gives the game away. If the
Coalition had some existence separate and apart from its members,
presumably some person—a president, chairperson, or chief execu-
tive officer selected by the Coalition’s members—could and would
speak for it. No one speaks for the Coalition in this case or
otherwise—other than its counsel—because it has no existence sepa-
rate from its members in any sense whatsoever. In short, the Coali-
tion is nothing more than a name appended to a court filing.

But an “association” that exists in name only is not an association
at all, as that term is defined in both common and legal vernacular.”
Motta, 598 F. Supp. at 949; see also, e.g., Cal. Clippers, Inc. v. U.S.
Soccer Football Ass’n, 314 F. Supp. 1057, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (hold-
ing that “the most informal and transitory of organizations” with “no
charter, by-laws or articles, no office or place of business, no mailing
address, no bank account, no assets or obligations, and [that] never
transacted any business” and “never met” was not an unincorporated
association); Ermer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 467, 474 (La.
1990) (“[A]n unincorporated association, as a juridical person distinct
from its members, does not come into existence or commence merely
by . . . the fact that a number of individuals have simply acted
(together; there must also be an agreement whereby two or more
persons combine certain attributes to create a separate entity for a
legitimate purpose.”); cf. Brock, 477 U.S. at 289 (for associational
standing purposes, distinguishing “suits by associations on behalf of
their members from class actions” by observing that the latter repre-
sents “an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may be linked only
by their common claims,” while an “association suing to vindicate the
interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of
expertise and capital”); Craine v. NYSARC, Inc., 931 N.Y.S.2d 143,
145 (3d Dep’t 2011) (local chapter of non-profit corporation that
elected its own officers, had its own federal employer identification
number, maintained its own bank accounts, hired its own employees,
and operated its own programs had “sufficient separate existence to
be considered an unincorporated association” for purposes of legal
existence to file suit).

Because the Coalition is not an unincorporated association, it can-
not have any legal existence, which as noted above is a prerequisite
for invoking the authority of a federal court absent statutory author-
ization. As a result, the Coalition’s motions to intervene have the
same legal effect as court filings made in the name of a deceased
person, a fictitious person, an animal, an inanimate object, or a
dissolved corporation—they are complete nullities.

III. Capacity

This Court’s Rule 17(b) governs the capacity of parties to sue or be
sued. For an individual, capacity is determined by the law of domicile,
USCIT R. 17(b)(1), and for a corporation, capacity is determined by
the law under which it was organized, USCIT R. 17(b)(2). For all
other parties, capacity is determined “by the law of the appropriate
state,” except that “a partnership or other unincorporated association
with no such capacity under that state’s law may sue or be sued in its
common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the

As it is neither an individual nor a corporation, the Coalition as-
serts that it has legal capacity under Rule 17(b)(3)(A) because it is an
unincorporated association and Plaintiffs seek to enforce substantive
rights under federal law. See ECF 69, at 10 (“Plaintiffs raise claims
pursuant to several federal statutes”).

Even assuming the Coalition is an unincorporated association for
purposes of Rule 17(b)(3)(A) as it claims, the Coalition’s capacity
theory fails because Plaintiffs do not seek “to enforce a substantive
right existing under the United States Constitution or laws” against
the Coalition. USCIT R. 17(b)(3)(A).

For an unincorporated association to have capacity to be sued as a
defendant in connection with a plaintiff’s “enforce[ment] of a substan-
tive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws,”
federal law must provide for a cause of action against the association.
Examples abound.

Here, Plaintiffs assert APA and nonstatutory review claims for
alleged constitutional and statutory violations. Plaintiffs simply have

20 The Coalition makes no claim that it has capacity under state law.

21 A telephone service cooperative association had the capacity to be sued for alleged Fair
F.2d 13, 14 (8th Cir. 1943). A college athletic association had the capacity to be sued for
alleged Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Sherman Antitrust Act
association had the capacity to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional
Rule 17 “allow[s] voluntary unincorporated associations to be sued in their own name in
federal court for the purpose of enforcing a federal right” (emphasis added)). The Palestine
Liberation Organization had the capacity to be sued for tort liability under federal maritime
on other grounds, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).

22 “Nonstatutory review” has been defined as “the type of review of administrative action
which is available, not by virtue of those explicit review provisions contained in most
modern statutes which create administrative agencies, but rather through the use of
traditional common-law remedies . . . against the officer who is allegedly misapplying his
no cause of action against the Coalition under the APA, which provides that “the action for judicial review [of agency action] may be brought against the United States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate officer.” 5 U.S.C. § 703. “If the party in question is not an ‘agency,’ its actions are not subject to review under the APA.” Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 385, 413 (E.D. Pa. 2008). Nor do Plaintiffs have any nonstatutory review claims against the Coalition, because the Coalition has no role in enforcing or administering Proclamation 9980. Because Plaintiffs have no cause of action or claim of any sort against the Coalition under federal law, the Coalition has no capacity to be sued and, hence, no capacity to intervene as a defendant.23

IV. Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)

The Coalition first seeks to intervene as of right under our Rule 24(a). That rule, taken verbatim in relevant part from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, provides for intervention as of right by anyone who “on timely motion . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” USCIT R. 24(a)(2).

Rule 24(a) “sets out a four-part test.” Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 695 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir.

23 The Coalition does not make, and therefore has waived, any argument that it has capacity to be sued because it seeks to intervene to “be sued in its common name to enforce” its “substantive right existing under” federal law to defend Proclamation 9980. USCIT R. 17(b)(3)(A). Even if the Coalition had not waived this argument, it would fail because the Coalition—which did not participate in administrative proceedings at Commerce in connection with Proclamation 9980 because there were none—has no such substantive right under federal law. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(B) (allowing “interested party[ies]” who were parties to antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings at Commerce and/or the International Trade Commission to intervene as a matter of right in CIT actions challenging antidumping and countervailing duty determinations); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(F), (C) (defining “interested party” for purposes of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings as including “an association, a majority of whose members is composed of . . . manufacturer[s], producer[s], or wholesaler[s] in the United States of a domestic like product.”).

Section 232 allows government officials and “interested party[ies]” to request that the Secretary of Commerce undertake an investigation into the effects of imports on national security, see 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A), but does not define “interested party.” Even assuming the Coalition could be an “interested party” for purposes of Section 232 if it had requested that the Secretary initiate a Section 232 investigation and participated in subsequent administrative proceedings, the Coalition neither made such a request nor participated in subsequent administrative proceedings, as there were none. As a result, the Coalition is not an “interested party” for purposes of Section 232. And even if it were, no federal statute gives it a “substantive right” to intervene to defend Proclamation 9980.
2012) (citing Am. Mar. Transp., Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 1559, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). That test is: (1) “the motion must be timely,” id.; (2) “the movant must claim some interest in the property [or transaction]” at issue that is “ ‘legally protectable’—merely economic interests will not suffice,” id. (quoting Am. Mar., 870 F.2d at 1562); (3) “that interest’s relationship to the litigation must be ‘of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’ ”id. (quoting Am. Mar., 870 F.2d at 1561) (emphasis in Am. Mar.); and (4) “the movant must demonstrate that said interest is not adequately addressed by the government’s participation,” id. (quoting Am. Mar., 870 F.2d at 1560).

There is no serious dispute that the Coalition’s motions were timely, so I will examine whether the Coalition satisfies the other three parts of this test.

A. The Coalition’s interest

The Coalition’s motions assert that its members have an “economic interest” in continued enforcement of Proclamation 9980’s import duties, as its members (domestic producers of steel nails) compete with the importers subject to the duties, see ECF 47, at 3–5. But “mere[] economic interests will not suffice” under Rule 24 to establish a legally protectable interest. Wolfsen, 695 F.3d at 1315.

Here, the Coalition does not, nor could it, claim that Section 232 confers any legally protectable interest upon the Coalition or its members. Unlike the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, which provide specific rights to domestic producers to participate in administrative proceedings culminating in final agency action imposing such duties, the Coalition and its members played no role in the issuance of Proclamation 9980, as there were no underlying administrative proceedings, and it had no statutory right to participate in any. Although the Coalition’s members may indirectly

24 Both Wolfsen and American Maritime involved Court of Federal Claims Rule 24, but in interpreting that rule the Federal Circuit looked to authorities applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. See Wolfsen, 695 F.3d at 1315–16; Am. Mar., 870 F.2d at 1561. As Court of Federal Claims Rule 24, like our own Rule 24, is taken in relevant part from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, the holding and reasoning of Wolfsen and American Maritime apply with equal force to motions to intervene in our Court.

25 In each of these cases, the Coalition moved to intervene within a matter of days or a few weeks after the applicable plaintiff filed its complaint.

26 I understand that my colleagues merely assume that the Coalition has such an interest rather than affirmatively deciding the question. See ante at 9.

27 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (allowing an “interested party” to petition for commencement of a countervailing duty investigation); 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (allowing an “interested party” to petition for commencement of an antidumping proceeding).
benefit from actions taken by the President under Section 232, they have no "interest . . . which the substantive law [Section 232] recognizes as belonging to or being owned by [them]." Am. Mar., 870 F.2d at 1562.

B. Directness of any injury to the Coalition’s interest

Even if the Coalition had a legally protected interest of some kind here, it would still not qualify as an “interest” under Rule 24(a)(2) for a second and independent reason. Any relief granted by this Court will only operate directly and immediately against the government; any competitive injury to the Coalition’s members resulting from the invalidation of Proclamation 9980 will be indirect—a result of market forces. That is not enough.

In American Maritime, the putative intervenor sought to intervene as a defendant in the Court of Federal Claims in a contract dispute over a government shipping subsidy. The putative intervenor, a competitor of the plaintiff, argued that it would suffer competitive injury if the plaintiff prevailed and was awarded the disputed subsidy. American Maritime held that “[f]ear of future . . . competition” that might result from a court judgment in favor of a competitor “does not reflect an interest in the property or transaction” within the meaning of Rule 24(a). See id. at 1561. That holding squarely applies here; any competitive injury to the Coalition’s members resulting from invalidation of Proclamation 9980 is too indirect to qualify as an “interest” for Rule 24(a).

C. Adequacy of the government’s participation

Even if the Coalition asserted a cognizable interest within the meaning of Rule 24(a) that was directly threatened by a judgment invalidating Proclamation 9980, the Coalition would still have to demonstrate that its interest “is not adequately addressed by the government’s participation.” Wolfsen, 695 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Am. Mar., 870 F.2d at 1560).28 To do that, the Coalition has the burden of establishing two elements.

First, it “must make a compelling showing that its interests may not be adequately protected by the government insofar as there are aspects of the case that the government might not—or might not be able to—pursue to their fullest.” Id. at 1316. Second, the Coalition “must overcome the presumption that the government as sovereign adequately represents the interest of citizens concerning matters that

28 My colleagues conclude, as I do, that any interest of the Coalition is adequately represented by the government. Ante at 9–12. The difference between us is that I think the Federal Circuit’s Wolfsen /American Maritime framework is the prism through which we should analyze the question.
invoke ‘sovereign interests.’” *Id.* (quoting *Standard Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. City of Minneapolis*, 137 F.3d 567, 572 (8th Cir. 1998)).

As to the first element, the Coalition complains that, prior to its motion to intervene, the government consented to preliminary injunctive relief in eight of these cases barring the collection of Proclamation 9980’s duties and that in so doing the government undermined Proclamation 9980’s effectiveness. ECF 47, at 5–6. The Coalition’s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.

To begin with, I read the Coalition’s complaints about the consent injunctions as make-weight grumbling to put some distance between it and the government for purposes of satisfying Rule 24(a). The Coalition does not put its money where its brief is—the Coalition refrains from requesting vacatur of the injunctions, and as a result, any objection by the Coalition to these injunctions is moot because the government consented to their entry before the Coalition sought to intervene.

In any event, the Coalition’s facts are wrong; without admitting to liability, the government consented to entry of preliminary injunctions against the collection of estimated duties in three of these cases, not eight, and in those cases the plaintiffs were required to post a bond to protect the government’s interests.29 If the government prevails in this litigation, it will collect the duties in question, so those importers are not by any stretch out of the Proclamation 9980 woods.

Most importantly, the government’s consent to entry of these preliminary injunctions for its own tactical litigation reasons does not detract from its vigorous defense of Proclamation 9980 on the merits. Reasonable differences in litigation strategy between the government and the Coalition do not demonstrate an inability or unwillingness on the government’s part to defend any aspect of Proclamation 9980. *See Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania*, 674 F.2d 970, 974 (3d Cir. 1982).

Even if the Coalition could demonstrate that the government is not defending some aspect of Proclamation 9980, the Coalition would still have to establish the second element of the test for demonstrating the inadequacy of the government’s representation—it must “overcome

29 This Court entered consent orders enjoining the collection of Proclamation 9980 estimated duties at entry during the pendency of litigation in three cases. *See PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–32, ECF 40 (Feb. 13, 2020); *Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–37, ECF 35 (Feb. 21, 2020); *Huttig Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–45, ECF 30 (Mar. 4, 2020). The latter two cases were subsequently consolidated. In the five other cases referred to by the Coalition, the government agreed to consent orders enjoining liquidation of entries. For an explanation of the distinction between the payment of estimated duties at entry and liquidation, *see J. Conrad LTD v. United States*, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1370 (CIT 2020).
the presumption that the government as sovereign adequately represents the interest of citizens concerning matters that invoke ‘sovereign interests.’” *Wolfsen*, 695 F.3d at 1316 (quoting *Standard Heating*, 137 F.3d at 572).

To overcome this presumption, the Coalition cites *Vivitar Corp. v. United States*, 585 F. Supp. 1415 (CIT 1984), and argues that the government necessarily does not adequately represent its private interests. See *id.* at 1418 (“[T]his court is reluctant to view the Government’s and [the putative intervenor’s] interests as coincident, where [the putative intervenor’s] interests are purely private . . . and where the Government’s interests are public and enforcement oriented.”).

I think the Coalition places more weight on *Vivitar* than it can bear, as in that case the government also took a legal position adverse to that of the putative intervenor’s. *See id.* at 1418. More importantly, insofar as *Vivitar* is susceptible of the reading that the Coalition gives it, I think *Vivitar* is no longer persuasive authority. *Wolfsen* requires us to presume that the government’s sovereign interests and the Coalition’s private interests are coincident. The Coalition fails to carry its burden of demonstrating otherwise.

**V. Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)**

Alternatively, the Coalition contends that it qualifies for permissive intervention under both prongs of USCIT Rule 24(b)(1), which provides that upon “timely motion,” we “may permit anyone to intervene who (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute,” or “(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” USCIT R. 24(b)(1).

In exercising our discretion under Rule 24(b), we must also consider “whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” USCIT R. 24(b)(3). I first consider whether the Coalition is even eligible for permissive intervention under either prong of Rule 24(b)(1), and then consider the effect that intervention might have on the original parties’ rights.

**A. Permissive intervention by statute**

Rule 24(b)(1)(A) provides that we “may permit anyone to intervene who (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” USCIT R. 24(b)(1)(A). The Coalition contends that it possesses a conditional right to intervene by operation of our Court’s jurisdictional statute, which provides that “any person who would be ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by a decision in a civil action” pending in this Court “may, by leave of court, intervene in such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1).31

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1)(A) has been criticized as incoherent,32 this Court has repeatedly held that 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1) provides a “conditional right to intervene” for purposes of our Rule 24(b)(1)(A). See, e.g., Ontario Forest Indus. Ass’n v. United States, 30 CIT 1117, 1130 (2006). I see no reason to depart from that precedent.

1. “Adversely affected or aggrieved”

Here, the Coalition asserts that its members will be “adversely affected or aggrieved” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1) if Plaintiffs’ challenge to Proclamation 9980 is successful. The phrase “adversely affected or aggrieved” in § 2631(j)(1) is taken from Section 10 of the APA, which confers a private right of action for persons injured by final agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).


2. Associational standing

Here, the Coalition makes no claim that it has constitutional standing to defend Proclamation 9980, but it contends in its supplemental

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31 Like permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1), see USCIT R. 24(b)(3), intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1) is qualified by a requirement that this Court “consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(2).

32 See, e.g., 6 Moore’s Fed. Practice—Civil § 24.12 (2020) (“The concept of a federal statute’s conferring a conditional right to intervene is highly problematic and needlessly confusing.”); cf. United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 563 F. Supp. 642, 648 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that a statute that says “may” and doesn’t specify the conditions for intervention does not give any right to intervene, conditional or otherwise).
brief that it has associational standing to represent its members that do. See ECF 69, at 13–17. “To establish standing based upon harm to one or more of its members (associational standing),” Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 689 (Fed. Cir. 2000), an association must demonstrate that (1) “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right”; (2) “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose”; and (3) “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

The Coalition easily satisfies the third element of the Hunt test here, as neither its asserted defense nor the relief it seeks—a judgment upholding Proclamation 9980—requires the participation of its individual members. See Reid v. Dep’t of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (distinguishing between “declaration, injunction[,] or some other form of prospective relief” requiring no participation of association members and “particularized relief dependent on the individual circumstances of each” association member). The Coalition, however, does not so easily navigate past the first and second Hunt shoals. I consider each in turn.

a. The members’ standing

To satisfy the first Hunt element, the Coalition must demonstrate that “its members would otherwise have standing to [defend Proclamation 9980] in their own right.” Gober, 234 F.3d at 689. That is, the Coalition must show that if Proclamation 9980 is invalidated, its members would suffer “injury in fact, that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Coalition submitted declarations of senior executives of its members—all domestic nail manufacturers—stating that their respective companies fear competitive injury if Proclamation 9980’s duties on their competitors—importers of steel nails—are invalidated. See ECF 69, at 20–36. Such competitive injury by operation of normal market forces ordinarily qualifies as injury in fact for Article III purposes. See AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., 923 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[C]ompetitive injury to a challenger is highly likely where the government action has a natural price-lowering or sales-limiting effect on the challenger’s sales (compared to what prices or sales would be in the absence of the government action),” including by “directly lowering competitors’ prices for com-
peting goods”); see also Canadian Lumber Trade All. v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that under the doctrine of competitor standing, it “is presumed (i.e., without affirmative findings of fact) that a boon to some market participants is a detriment to their competitors”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Coalition has demonstrated injury in fact and hence constitutional standing, insofar as Lujan’s “invasion of a legally protected interest” requirement is characterized as prudential rather than constitutional.33

“Beyond the constitutional requirements” of an Article III case or controversy, “the federal judiciary . . . also adhere[s] to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982). In assessing claims of associational standing based on injury to an association’s members, courts also consider whether the association’s members have prudential standing. See, e.g., Reid, 793 F.2d at 280.34

One prudential consideration bearing on standing is that “a party ‘generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third

33 One of the unsolved mysteries of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence is whether “the term ‘legally protected interest’ do[es] some work in the [constitutional] standing analysis.” Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (McConnell, J.). “The modifier ‘legally protected’ has appeared episodically in Supreme Court opinions since its introduction in Lujan,” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J., concurring), and where the Court has used the term it has “not defined” its meaning. Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2017). Insofar as I can determine, the Federal Circuit has not directly addressed this question.

Among other things, does Article III require “that the legally protected interest be the plaintiffs” or, as in this case, the putative defendant-intervenor’s? Guilds, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1863, 1871 n.58 (1996). I think not, as otherwise it “would contradict third party standing jurisprudence.” Id. I therefore agree with Judge Williams that “[t]he requirement that the injury be to a legally protected interest is grounded on prudential considerations” rather than Article III. Jud. Watch, 432 F.3d at 366 (cleaned up). For present purposes, the upshot is that the absence of any “protected legal interest” of the Coalition’s members in defending Proclamation 9980 is not fatal to their constitutional standing; for Article III purposes, it suffices that the Coalition’s members will likely suffer concrete and particularized economic injury if Proclamation 9980 is invalidated. But as discussed below, the absence of any such “protected legal interest” is fatal to their prudential standing.

34 Consideration of the Coalition’s prudential standing to intervene as a defendant is appropriate here for at least two other reasons. First, as discussed above, the statute under which the Coalition claims a conditional right to intervene—28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)—requires that a putative intervenor demonstrate constitutional standing. Prudential standing principles necessarily apply as well, because Congress has not expressly negated their application. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (“Congress legislates against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.”). Second, the statute—by requiring that a putative intervenor obtain “leave of court” to intervene, 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)—necessarily invests us with discretion to consider prudential standing. See FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Determining whether to give leave of court requires an exercise of discretion by the trial court.”).

Here, the Coalition seeks to intervene to defend Proclamation 9980, which is a sovereign legal interest of the government, not the Coalition’s members. Cf. *Diamond v. Charles*, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (physician that intervened to defend state abortion law had no cognizable interest for standing purposes “because the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal[,] is one of the quintessential functions of a State”) (cleaned up).35 Thus, to have prudential standing to defend Proclamation 9980, the Coalition’s members must demonstrate a “ ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right,” i.e., the government, and a “ ‘hindrance’ to [the government’s] ability to protect [its] own interests.” *Id.* at 966 (quoting *Kowalski*, 543 U.S. at 130).

The Coalition’s members do not satisfy this test. First, they have no relationship with the government. Cf. *Kowalski*, 543 U.S. at 130–31 (noting that in some cases the attorney-client relationship can confer third-party standing on the part of an attorney to assert the interests of a client). Nor does any impediment prevent the government from fully defending Proclamation 9980.

In short, even though the Coalition’s members possess constitutional standing because of their competitive injury that will likely result from Proclamation 9980’s invalidation, they lack third-party standing because they have no “legally protected interest” in defending Proclamation 9980. As its members lack prudential standing, the

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35 Although the Supreme Court’s decision in *Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components*, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), upended several decades of standing law by recasting the “zone of interests” inquiry as non-prudential, *see id.* at 127–28, *Lexmark* expressly declined to reconsider third-party standing. *See id.* at 127 n.3 (“This case does not present any issue of third-party standing, and consideration of that doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament can await another day.”). The Federal Circuit’s decisions applying third-party standing principles therefore remain fully binding on us.

36 Of course, Congress “has the power to create new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing.” *Diamond*, 476 U.S. at 66 n.17 (citing *Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.*, 426 U.S. 26, 41, n.22 (1976)). Two examples familiar to regular readers of our Court’s opinions are the countervailing duty and antidumping statutes, which allow interested parties to petition Commerce to initiate administrative proceedings to impose such duties. *See* 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1); 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1). Such parties can later intervene in this Court as a matter of right to defend any such duties that Commerce imposed, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(B), and have prudential standing to do so because the statutory scheme vests them with a legally cognizable interest in defending such duties.
Coalition founders on the rock of the first Hunt associational standing element.

b. Germaneness

To establish associational standing, the Coalition must also demonstrate the second Hunt element, i.e., that “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose.” Disabled Am. Veterans, 234 F.3d at 689. Neither the Coalition’s intervention motions nor its proposed answers accompanying them contained any allegations regarding the nature of the Coalition and its purposes, much less whether the interests it seeks to protect are germane to those purposes. We therefore ordered the Coalition to address, inter alia, its associational standing, and to submit any supporting evidence.

As noted above, the Coalition’s response included no declaration or affidavit from any person purporting to speak on behalf of the Coalition. As a result, we have no evidence in this record addressing whether the Coalition’s members’ interests in Proclamation 9980 “are germane to the organization’s purpose.” Id. at 689. Indeed, as discussed above at length, the Coalition submitted no evidence of any kind regarding the “organization” that the Coalition purports to be, much less its purposes.

The Coalition therefore fails to carry its burden of demonstrating that it satisfies the germaneness requirement of associational standing. See McKinney v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (public interest law firm did not have associational standing because it “failed to demonstrate a nexus between its organizational purpose and the economic interests of the producers and workers it purportedly represents”); NHH Inv’r Grp. v. DFH Watford, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-027, 2015 WL 12867309, at *3 (D.N.D. Oct. 8, 2015) (associational standing did not exist because “[a]n exhaustive review of the record leaves the Court with no understanding as to the interest or purpose of [purported association] as an organization”) (emphasis added); see also Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (germaneness requirement of associational standing screens out lawsuits “filed by organizations on issues on which they as a practical matter lack expertise or resources”).

Because the Coalition here has provided no evidence of its interests, purposes, resources, or expertise as an organization, the Coalition’s attempt to intervene is functionally equivalent to “a law firm seeking to sue in its own name on behalf of a client . . . alleging injury from governmental action wholly unrelated to the firm,” Hodel, 840 F.2d at 57–58 (emphasis added), except here the proposed defendant-
intervenor’s counsel has created a name (the “Coalition”) to sue under rather than using the law firm name. That is a distinction without a difference, and the Coalition fails to satisfy the germaneness requirement of associational standing under Hunt.

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In sum, I conclude that the Coalition is ineligible for permissive intervention under the first prong of Rule 24(b)(1) because it lacks associational standing as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1). The Coalition lacks associational standing because (1) its members lack third-party standing to defend Proclamation 9980 and (2) the Coalition has failed to put forth any evidence establishing that this litigation is germane to the purposes of the Coalition as an organization. Because the Coalition lacks associational standing, it does not have a conditional right to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1).

B. Permissive intervention based on a shared defense

The second prong of Rule 24(b)(1) allows permissive intervention if the putative intervenor “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” USCIT R. 24(b)(1)(B). Without explanation, the Coalition asserts that it has a “‘defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact,’ USCIT R. 24(b)(1), specifically defenses regarding the lawfulness of the Proclamation and the duties on derivative articles.” ECF 47, at 7. That the Coalition simply makes this assertion in passing without further development is reason alone to reject it out of hand.

In my view, the Coalition has no “defense that shares . . . a common question of law or fact,” USCIT R. 24(b)(1)(B), with the government’s defense. The words “claims or defenses” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1)(B) “manifestly refer to the kinds of claims or defenses that can be raised in courts of law as part of an actual or impending law suit.” Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76–77 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a pleading “that states a claim for relief” to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); USCIT R. 8(a)(2) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(A) (requiring a party “responding to a pleading” to “state . . . its defenses to each claim asserted against it”) (emphasis added); USCIT R. 8(c)(1)(B) (same).

In Diamond, the district court allowed a physician to intervene to defend a challenged state abortion law. After the district court declared the law unconstitutional and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, the physician—but not the state—appealed. The Supreme Court dis-
missed the appeal, reasoning that the physician had no constitutional standing to defend the challenged statute because he had no direct stake in upholding the statute. See 476 U.S. at 68. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment on the basis that the district court should never have allowed the physician’s intervention in the first instance. See id. at 71.

With respect to permissive intervention, Justice O’Connor explained that Rule 24(b)(1)(B) “plainly does require an interest sufficient to support a legal claim or defense which is founded upon that interest and which satisfies the Rule’s commonality requirement.” Id. at 77 (cleaned up). The physician had no such interest “because he assert[ed] no actual, present interest that would permit him to sue or be sued by appellees, or the State of Illinois, or anyone else, in an action sharing common questions of law or fact with those at issue in this litigation.” Id.

A district court in Texas recently adopted Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Diamond and held that the State of Nevada could not intervene in a suit against the federal government asserting a challenge to certain aspects of the Affordable Care Act. The court explained that Nevada did not qualify for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) because the plaintiffs had no claim for relief against Nevada. See DeOtte v. Azar, 332 F.R.D. 173, 186 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (“[A]n outsider cannot use Rule 24(b) to become a party to a case simply because the outsider has a practical stake in the outcome. Instead, the outsider needs to be a proper party to a claim for relief.”) (quoting Nelson, 106 Va. L. Rev. at 274–75).

In the absence of any controlling authority from the Federal Circuit, I agree with and would adopt the reasoning of Justice O’Connor in Diamond and the Texas district court in DeOtte. Here, at least for purposes of Rule 24(b)(1)(B), the Coalition is not a proper party in any sense in this litigation. Just as the Diamond plaintiffs challenging a state abortion law had no cognizable claim against the intervening physician, and just as the DeOtte plaintiffs had no cognizable claim against Nevada, the plaintiffs here challenging Proclamation 9980 have no cognizable “claim” against the Coalition within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and our rules. Because the plaintiffs seek no relief against the Coalition, in this suit or any other, the Coalition has no “defense” within the meaning of our

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37 Professor Nelson observes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1)(B)—and by extension our own Rule 24(b)(1)(B)—“is a mechanism for consolidating in a single action claims or defenses that might otherwise be litigated separately.” Nelson, 106 Va. L. Rev. at 386. Thus, “intervention offers a streamlined mechanism for an outside party to join pending litigation rather than filing a separate lawsuit and seeking consolidation.” Id. at 386 n.572; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2); USCIT R. 42(a)(2).
Rules 8(c)(1)(B) and 24(b)(1)(B). The Coalition is therefore ineligible for permissive intervention under the second prong of Rule 24(b)(1). See USCIT R. 24(b)(1)(B).

C. Prejudice to the original parties

Even if the Coalition were otherwise eligible for permissive intervention under either prong of Rule 24(b)(1), the rule also requires us to consider “whether [permissive] intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” USCIT R. 24(b)(1)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(2) (same for statutory provision allowing intervention with “leave of court”).

This discretion should not be exercised lightly, as a new party has “substantial power to direct the flow of litigation and affect settlement negotiation[s].” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring); see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“Increasing the number of parties to a suit can make the suit unwieldy.”).

Here, in exercising our discretion under Rule 24(b)(1)(3) and § 2631(j)(2), I agree with my colleagues that allowing intervention and thereby granting the Coalition full party status would prejudice the plaintiffs through delay and by requiring additional briefing. Ante at 12–13.

As to delay, I note that allowing the Coalition to intervene would have disrupted the briefing schedules agreed to by the parties in two of the four cases before us in active litigation. This problem is of the Coalition’s own making; in moving to intervene, it did not address its associational standing to represent its members, even though, as I explain above, the statute it invoked for permissive intervention—28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)—required it to do so. As a result, we ordered the Coalition to file supplemental papers demonstrating its associational standing and gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to respond. By the time this supplemental briefing was completed, substantive merits briefing was well underway in two of these non-stayed cases. It would have been prejudicial to the parties to establish new briefing schedules to allow the Coalition’s participation as a party, with the right to oppose Plaintiffs’ dispositive motions as well.

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38 See ECF 42 and 57; Oman Fasteners LLC v. United States, Consol. Ct. No. 20–37, ECF 46 and 52.
39 See ECF 62.
as file its own such motions (insofar as it has not already presumed to do so) and replies. 40

Finally, I note that the Coalition claims, at most, an indirect economic interest in the outcome of this litigation. The Coalition’s members, however, are not the only outsiders with such an interest. I am not prepared to turn on that tap, “for the effects of a judgment in or a settlement of a lawsuit can ramify throughout the economy, inflicting hurt difficult to prove on countless strangers to the litigation.” *Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen*, 578 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.). There is a long line of potential intervenors for every case in this Court if a mere indirect economic interest is enough to justify permissive intervention.

**VI. The amicus curiae alternative to intervention**

Because of our national jurisdiction, our rules expressly provide for *amicus curiae* participation with leave of court. See USCIT R. 76. Such participation is several orders of magnitude less burdensome on the court and the parties than outright intervention. It’s also far less expensive for would-be intervenors.

Outsiders with anything less than an indisputable right of intervention should think hard about whether they can accomplish their purposes more efficiently—for all involved—by seeking leave to participate as *amicus curiae* rather than by taking the comparatively drastic step of seeking intervention. “[E]xperienced litigators note that many of those benefits [of intervention] could be achieved simply by . . . outsiders . . . present[ing] their views as *amicus*.” *Nelson*, 106 Va. L. Rev. at 391. In my view, we should freely give leave to outsiders with indirect economic interests to present their views through *amici curiae* briefs.

/s/ M. Miller Baker

M. MILLER BAKER, JUDGE

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40 In the two other non-stayed cases, *J. Conrad LTD v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–52, and *Metropolitan Staple Corp. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–53, intervention would not have disrupted the merits briefing schedule, which was delayed because plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions. Nevertheless, because the substantive issues in those cases overlap with the issues in *PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. v. United States*, Ct. No. 20–32, and *Oman Fasteners, LLC v. United States*, Consol. Ct. No. 20–37, the two cases where merits briefing was well underway by the time the supplemental intervention briefing was completed, allowing intervention in *J. Conrad* and *Metropolitan Staple* would still have prejudiced the *PrimeSource* and *Oman Fasteners* plaintiffs by allowing the Coalition to make arguments applicable to all four cases. Fairness to the *PrimeSource* and *Oman Fasteners* plaintiffs would have required reopening or extending the briefing schedule in those cases.
Slip Op. 21–07

MIDWEST FASTENER CORP., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, and MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE, INC., Defendant-Intervenor.

Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge

Court No. 17–00231

[Remanding the U.S. Department of Commerce’s second remand redetermination that strike pin anchors are within the scope of the antidumping duty order covering certain steel nails from the People’s Republic of China.]

Dated: January 21, 2021

Robert Kevin Williams and Mark Rett Ludwikowski, Clark Hill PLC, of Chicago, IL, for plaintiff, Midwest Fastener Corp.

Sosun Bae, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant. Also on the briefs were Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General. Of Counsel were Vania Y. Wang and Jared Cynamon, Attorneys, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.

Adam Henry Gordon and Ping Gong, The Bristol Group PLLC, of Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor, Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

Kelly, Judge:

Before the court is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) second remand redetermination filed pursuant to the court’s order in Midwest Fastener Corp. v. United States, 44 CIT __, 435 F. Supp. 3d 1262 (2020) (“Midwest II”). See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand [in Midwest II], June 17, 2020, ECF No. 87–1 (“Second Remand Results”). In Midwest II, the court remanded for a second time Commerce’s determination that Midwest Fastener Corp.’s (“Midwest” or “Plaintiff”) strike pin anchors are within the scope of the antidumping duty (“ADD”) order covering certain steel nails from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See Midwest II, 44 CIT at __, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1272; see also Midwest Fastener Corp. v. United States, 42 CIT __, __, 348 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1302 (2018) (“Midwest I”); [ADD] Order on Certain Steel Nails from the [PRC]: Final Ruling on Midwest Fastener Strike Pin Anchors, (Aug. 2, 2017), ECF No. 21–3 (“Final Scope Ruling”); Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand, Apr. 25, 2019, ECF No. 61 (“Remand Results”); Certain Steel Nails from the [PRC], 73 Fed. Reg. 44,961 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 1, 2008) (notice of
[ADD] order) ("PRC Nails Order"). Commerce, under respectful protest, continued to find that Midwest’s strike pin anchors fall within the scope of the PRC Nails Order. See generally Second Remand Results. On August 28, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Court of Appeals") decided OMG, Inc. v. United States, 972 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020), aff’g 43 CIT __, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (2019) ("OMG"), interpreting nearly identical language in the ADD and countervailing duty ("CVD") orders covering certain steel nails from, in pertinent part, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ("Vietnam"). For the following reasons, the court reconsider its ruling in Midwest I, and remands Commerce’s Second Remand Results with instructions to render its determination in conformity with OMG.

BACKGROUND

The court assumes familiarity with the facts as set forth in its previous opinion and recounts the facts relevant to the issues currently before the court. See Midwest II, 44 CIT at __, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1265–66. On August 1, 2008, Commerce issued the PRC Nails Order, which covers, in pertinent part, “nails . . . constructed of two or more pieces.” See PRC Nails Order, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,961. Midwest is an importer of strike pin anchors.2 On August 2, 2017, Commerce, at Midwest’s request, issued a final scope ruling determining that Midwest’s strike pin anchors are unambiguously covered by the scope of the PRC Nails Order based on the plain language of the order, as well as its analysis of sources enumerated under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) (2017).3 See Final Scope Ruling at 10–13. As such, Commerce did not perform an analysis of factors enumerated under § 351.225(k)(2) (“(k)(2) analysis”). Id.

In Midwest I, the court remanded Commerce’s determination, holding that neither the plain language of the PRC Nails Order, nor Commerce’s analysis under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) “explain what it means for a product to be a nail constructed of two or more pieces.”

1 By adopting a position “under protest,” Commerce preserves its right to appeal. See Viraj Grp., Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
2 As explained in the previous opinion:
 Midwest’s strike pin anchors have four components—a steel pin, a threaded body, a nut and a flat washer. Midwest avers that the pin component is not meant to be removed from the anchor and can only be removed with the aid of a claw hammer or pliers. The strike pin anchor is prepared for use by first drilling a hole through an object, and then drilling another hole into the masonry upon which the object is to be attached. After the two holes are aligned, the anchor is pushed through the hole in the object and into the hole in the masonry. The nut and washer components are then tightened to orient and position the anchor, and the pin component is subsequently struck with a hammer. The action of striking the pin component expands the anchor body and results in the fastening of the desired item against the masonry.

Midwest II, 44 CIT at __, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1265–66 (citations omitted).
3 Further citations to the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2017 edition.
Midwest I, 42 CIT at __, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1302 (discussing Commerce’s reliance on prior scope determinations and a report of the U.S. International Trade Commission). After consulting dictionary definitions of the terms “nails” and “constructed”, the court concluded that Commerce’s determination that the PRC Nails Order unambiguously covers strike pin anchors is unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded for Commerce to conduct a formal scope inquiry and (k)(2) analysis. Midwest I, 42 CIT at __, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1306.

On remand, Commerce continued to assert that the PRC Nails Order unambiguously covers Midwest’s strike pin anchors, Remand Results at 7–11, but conducted a (k)(2) analysis under protest. Id. at 11–19. In Midwest II, the court held Commerce’s position that the scope of the order unambiguously covers Midwest’s strike pins anchors was unsupported by substantial evidence because Commerce’s analysis did not reasonably demonstrate how the phrase “nails . . . constructed of two or more pieces” encompasses the strike pin anchors. See Midwest II, 44 CIT at __, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1267–71; see also PRC Nails Order, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,961. The court also held that Commerce’s (k)(2) analysis erred in several respects, see Midwest II, 44 CIT at __, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1271–72, and rejected Commerce’s attempt to find only the pin component dutiable. See id. at __, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1273.

For its second remand redetermination, Commerce again maintained that the PRC Nails Order is unambiguous, but conducted a revised (k)(2) analysis in light of Midwest II. See Second Remand Results at 6–28. However, after briefing on the Second Remand Results before this court concluded, the Court of Appeals issued OMG. See generally 972 F.3d 1358. In OMG, the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of this Court disposing of an appeal from Commerce’s final ruling clarifying the scope of ADD and CVD orders covering certain steel nails from, in pertinent part, Vietnam. See generally id.; see also Certain Steel Nails from [Vietnam], 80 Fed. Reg. 41,006 (Dep’t Commerce July 14, 2015) ([CVD] order) (“Vietnam CVD Order”); Certain Steel Nails from the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Taiwan, and [Vietnam], 80 Fed. Reg. 39,994 (Dep’t Commerce July 13, 2015) ([ADD] orders) (“Vietnam ADD Order”) (collectively, “Vietnam Orders”).

As with the PRC Nails Order, the pertinent language from the Vietnam Orders states that the orders cover “[c]ertain steel nails . . . of one piece construction or constructed of two or more pieces.” Compare Vietnam CVD Order, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,006 (citations omitted), and Vietnam ADD Order, 80 Fed. Reg. at 39,995 (citations omitted),
with PRC Nails Order, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,961. As such, the court requested the parties brief their respective positions on the relevance of OMG to the disposition of this action. See Letter Req. Suppl. Briefing, Sept. 8, 2020, ECF No. 93.

In their responses, all parties indicated that whether Midwest’s anchors fall within the scope of the order should be reconsidered in light of OMG. See Def.’s Resp. Ct.’s Order on Suppl. Briefing, Nov. 3, 2020, ECF No. 97; Def.-Intervenor’s Resp. Ct.’s Order on Suppl. Briefing, Nov. 3, 2020, ECF No. 98; Pl.’s Resp. Ct.’s Order on Suppl. Briefing, Nov. 4, 2020, ECF No. 99.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge to Commerce’s scope determination pursuant to section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2012), and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012), which grant the court authority to review actions contesting scope determinations that find certain merchandise to be within the class or kind of merchandise described in an

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4 The scope language with respect to the Vietnam Orders and PRC Nails Order are nearly identical. In pertinent part, the Vietnam Orders cover: certain steel nails having a nominal shaft length not exceeding 12 inches. Certain steel nails include, but are not limited to, nails made from round wire and nails that are cut from flat-rolled steel. Certain steel nails may be of one piece construction or constructed of two or more pieces. Certain steel nails may be produced from any type of steel, and may have any type of surface finish, head type, shank, point type and shaft diameter. Finishes include, but are not limited to, coating in vinyl, zinc (galvanized, including but not limited to electroplating or hot dipping one or more times), phosphate, cement, and paint. Certain steel nails may have one or more surface finishes. Head styles include, but are not limited to, flat, projection, cupped, oval, brad, headless, double, countersunk, and sinker. Shank styles include, but are not limited to, smooth, barbed, screw threaded, ring shank and fluted. Screw-threaded nails subject to this proceeding are driven using direct force and not by turning the nail using a tool that engages with the head. Point styles include, but are not limited to, diamond, needle, chisel and blunt or no point. Vietnam CVD Order, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,006 (citations omitted); Vietnam ADD Order, 80 Fed. Reg. at 39,995 (citations omitted). The PRC Nails Order covers: certain steel nails having a shaft length up to 12 inches. Certain steel nails include, but are not limited to, nails made of round wire and nails that are cut. Certain steel nails may be of one piece construction or constructed of two or more pieces. Certain steel nails may be produced from any type of steel, and have a variety of finishes, heads, shanks, point types, shank lengths and shaft diameters. Finishes include, but are not limited to, coating in vinyl, zinc (galvanized, whether by electroplating or hot dipping one or more times), phosphate cement, and paint. Head styles include, but are not limited to, flat, projection, cupped, oval, brad, headless, double, countersunk, and sinker. Shank styles include, but are not limited to, smooth, barbed, screw threaded, ring shank and fluted shank styles. Screw-threaded nails subject to this proceeding are driven using direct force and not by turning the nail using a tool that engages with the head. Point styles include, but are not limited to, diamond, blunt, needle, chisel and blunt or no point.

5 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition.

DISCUSSION

The language of an antidumping duty order dictates its scope. See Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Duferco”) (citing Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed Cir. 1995) (“Ericsson GE Mobile’’)). Commerce’s regulations authorize it to issue scope rulings to clarify whether a particular product is within the scope of an order. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a). To determine whether a product is within the scope of an ADD order, Commerce looks at the plain language of that order. See Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1097. When considering the scope language, Commerce will take into account descriptions of the merchandise contained in: (1) the petition; (2) the initial investigation; and (3) past determinations by the Commission and by Commerce, including prior scope determinations (collectively “(k)(1) sources”). 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(d). When the (k)(1) sources are not dispositive, Commerce will initiate a formal scope inquiry and further consider:

(i) The physical characteristics of the product;
(ii) The expectations of the ultimate purchasers;
(iii) The ultimate use of the product;
(iv) The channels of trade in which the product is sold; and
(v) The manner in which the product is advertised and displayed.

19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).

Commerce has broad authority “to interpret and clarify its antidumping duty orders.” Ericsson GE Mobile, 60 F.3d at 782; see also King Supply Co., LLC v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that “Commerce is entitled to substantial deference with regard to its interpretations of its own antidumping orders.”). However, Commerce may not interpret an order “so as to change the scope of that order, nor can Commerce interpret an order in a manner contrary to its terms.” Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
In *OMG* the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “the language of the [Vietnam Orders] may not unambiguously define the universe of ‘nails . . . constructed of two or more pieces’ in every context.” *OMG*, 972 F.3d at 1364. However, the Court of Appeals held that the Vietnam Orders were unambiguous with respect to the importer’s anchors, that the anchors are not nails regardless of whether they are comprised of two-pieces, and that Commerce erred in focusing its analysis on the pin-component of the anchor. *See id.* at 1364–66.

In light of the Court of Appeals’ ruling in *OMG*, the court reconsiders its ruling in *Midwest I*. The court retains the general power to reconsider non-final orders. *See, e.g., Union Steel v. United States*, 35 CIT 1647, 1659, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1367 (2011). U.S. Court of International Trade Rule 54(b) allows the court to revisit non-final determinations, as justice requires, meaning when necessary under the relevant circumstances. *See Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. United States*, 41 CIT __, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1300–01 (2017). The court may consider “whether there has been a controlling or significant change in the law or whether the court previously ‘patently’ misunderstood the parties, decided issues beyond those presented, or failed to consider controlling decisions or data.” *Id.* at __, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1301 (citations omitted). *OMG* constitutes a controlling or significant change in the law that warrants reconsideration of the court’s ruling in *Midwest I*.

The court reconsiders its ruling that the language of the PRC Nails Order is ambiguous as well as the court’s consequent instruction to Commerce to perform a (k)(2) analysis. Although *Midwest I* observed that neither the words of the PRC Nails Order, prior scope rulings, nor the ITC report clarified what it meant for a product to be a nail constructed of two or more pieces, *see Midwest I*, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1302, Commerce should now make its determination in accordance with the Court of Appeals’ product-specific analysis of the scope of the Vietnam Orders. *See OMG*, 972 F.3d at 1364; *compare Vietnam CVD Order*, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,006 (citations omitted), and *Vietnam ADD Order*, 80 Fed. Reg. at 39,994 (citations omitted), *with PRC Nails Order*, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,961.6 As such, the court remands the Second Remand Results for reconsideration in conformity with *OMG*.

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6 For the same reasons set forth in *OMG*, the Court of Appeals also affirmed this Court’s decision in *Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. United States*, 43 CIT __, 393 F. Supp. 3d 1251 (2019), *aff’d*, 818 Fed. Appx. 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2020), which concluded that certain zinc and nylon anchors were outside the scope of ADD and CVD orders covering steel nails from the PRC.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that Commerce’s redetermination is remanded for reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and it is further

ORDERED that Commerce shall file its remand redetermination with the court within 60 days of this date; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days thereafter to file comments on the remand redetermination; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days to file their replies to comments on the remand redetermination; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall have 14 days thereafter to file the Joint Appendix; and it is further

ORDERED that Commerce shall file the administrative record within 14 days of the date of filing of its remand redetermination.

Dated: January 21, 2021
New York, New York

/s/ Claire R. Kelly

CLAIRE R. KELLY, JUDGE
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