

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal No. 2016–1024

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:07-cv-00318-GWC, Judge Gregory W. Carman.

Dated: December 15, 2016

GREGORY HUGH TEUFEL, OGC Law, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, argued for plaintiff-appellee.

CLAUDIA BURKE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON; AMY RUBIN, EDWARD FRANCIS KENNY, New York, NY; YELENA SLEPAK, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, New York, NY.

Before REYNA, LINN, and WALLACH, *Circuit Judges*.

WALLACH, *Circuit Judge*.

Appellant United States (“the Government”) appeals the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) awarding attorney fees to Appellee International Custom Products, Inc. (“ICP”) pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)(2012). *See Int’l Customs Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP VII)*, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015). We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The facts and procedural history of this appeal are extensive, and a brief explanation of the nature of the action is warranted. ICP’s request for attorney fees stems from litigation

regarding the classification of certain white sauce imports under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). Following a request from [ICP], the United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) issued New York Ruling Letter D86228 (“the Ruling Letter”) classifying ICP’s white sauce as “sauces and preparations therefor” under HTSUS 2103.90.9060 (1999). Years later, Customs issued a notice of action reclassifying all pending and future entries of white sauce

as “[b]utter and . . . dairy spreads” under HTSUS 0405.20.3000 (2005) (“the Notice of Action”), which increased the tariff by approximately 2400%.

After protesting and paying duties on a single entry, ICP filed a claim in the CIT, alleging the Notice of Action improperly revoked the Ruling Letter without following the procedures required by 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2006).

Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP VI), 748 F.3d 1182, 1182–83 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Since ICP filed its first action in 2005, the CIT has issued five separate opinions on the matter, two of which were appealed to us. *See generally Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP I)*, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 617 (2005) (exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (2000) and finding the Notice of Action null and void); *Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP II)*, 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reversing the CIT’s exercise of jurisdiction in *ICP I*, vacating on the merits, and remanding with instructions to dismiss); *Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP III)*, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 302 (2008) (granting-in-part and denying-in-part the Government’s motion to dismiss ICP’s Complaint in a new action); *Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP IV)*, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 79 (2009) (denying the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment); *Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States (ICP V)*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012) (finding the Notice of Action null and void pursuant to § 1625(c)(1) and ordering Customs to reliquidate pursuant to the Ruling Letter); *ICP VI*, 748 F.3d 1182 (affirming *ICP V*); *ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (awarding attorney fees to ICP pursuant to the EAJA). The case now returns to us for the third time.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard and Standard of Review

The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Government’s position is substantially justified if it is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person” and has a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.” *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 565–66 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Government’s position includes the pre-litigation actions of the relevant administrative agency, as well as the

U.S. Department of Justice's litigation arguments. See *Smith v. Principi*, 343 F.3d 1358, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although the Government's position involves both prelitigation and litigation conduct, "only one threshold determination for the entire civil action is to be made." *INS v. Jean*, 496 U.S. 154, 159 (1990) (footnote omitted).

We review the CIT's determination to award attorney fees under the EAJA for abuse of discretion. See *Chiu v. United States*, 948 F.2d 711, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1991). "[O]nly if the [CIT] erred in interpreting the law or exercised its judgment on clearly erroneous findings of material fact, or its decision represents an irrational judgment in weighing the relevant factors can its decision be overturned." *Id.* (citations omitted).

II. The CIT Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Attorney Fees to ICP

The CIT found that the Government's position was not substantially justified and, consequently, awarded attorney fees to ICP. *ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1329–31, 1335. The CIT determined that "[t]he record, considered as a whole, establishe[d] that the [G]overnment position was rooted in a desire to avoid the timely revocation process" by using the Notice of Action, rather than following the procedures of § 1625(c)(1), to improperly revoke the Ruling Letter. *Id.* at 1331. Thus, the CIT held that "the [G]overnment's position was not founded on 'a reasonable basis both in law and fact,' 'justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.'" *Id.* (quoting *Pierce*, 487 U.S. at 565).

The Government argues that the CIT abused its discretion by committing five legal errors: (1) "using an improperly heightened legal standard," Appellant's Br. 9; (2) "reject[ing] the notion that surviving a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment indicates that the surviving party has presented significant evidence that its position is substantially justified," *id.* at 11–12; (3) "improperly minimiz[ing] the significance of [the Government's] trial evidence because of [the Government's] post-trial decision not to appeal adverse factual findings," *id.* at 16; (4) "rejecting the Government's position that an EAJA award was not warranted in light of the novel or unsettled area of law upon which one of the Government's defenses was based," *id.* at 18; and (5) "find[ing] that [Customs] was not substantially justified in its actions during the administrative phase of the matter," *id.* at 21. We address these arguments in turn.

A. The CIT Did Not Apply a Heightened Legal Standard

The Government first argues that the CIT misapplied the "substantially justified" standard when it stated that "the substantial justifi-

cation standard is ‘slightly more stringent than a simple reasonableness standard,’ and requires that the Government show that its position ‘was clearly reasonable,’” because the Supreme Court rejected the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards in *Pierce*. *Id.* at 10–11 (quoting *ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1324–25). According to the Government, the recitation of the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards “undermines the [CIT]’s entire substantial justification review” and, thus, “the fee award should be vacated and the matter remanded . . . with instructions to apply the proper legal standard.” *Id.* at 11. We disagree.

The Government is correct that the CIT erred by reciting in the standard of review section of its opinion the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards, which the Supreme Court rejected in *Pierce*. *See* 487 U.S. at 567–68 (rejecting the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, a single *reference* to an incorrect legal standard does not undermine a final decision, only its *application* does. Although the CIT *referenced* the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards once, *ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1324–25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it repeatedly *applied* the correct “substantially justified” standard, evaluating whether the Government’s position was “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person” and had a “reasonable basis both in law and fact,” *Pierce*, 487 U.S. at 565–66 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, the CIT repeated the word “reasonable” or its variants no less than nine times when evaluating the Government’s position. *See ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1324 n.1, 1329 n.3, 1330–31.

In contrast, there are no instances where the CIT actually applied the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards, as the Government acknowledged during oral argument. *See* Oral Argument at 1:33–2:11, <http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2016-1024.mp3> (stating that “it’s true that when the [CIT] made its actual findings, it used the word ‘reasonableness’ and didn’t restate the ‘clearly reasonable[]’ standard or restate the ‘slightly more stringent’ standard”). The Government nevertheless argues that the CIT’s recitation of the heightened standards “infected” the CIT’s *entire* analysis. *Id.* at 2:38. However, the Government cites no affirmative evidence in support of its argument, and speculation does not demonstrate reversible error. *See Rogers v. United States*, 877 F.2d 1550, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that speculation cannot demonstrate an abuse of discretion). As a result, the CIT’s lone recitation of

the “slightly more” and “clearly” standards, when viewed against the remainder of the CIT’s analysis, did not constitute an abuse of its discretion.

B. Surviving Summary Judgment Alone Does Not Prove that the Government’s Position Was Substantially Justified

The Government next contends that “surviving a motion for summary judgment strongly suggests that the Government’s position [was] substantially justified for EAJA purposes” and that, consequently, the CIT erred by holding otherwise. Appellant’s Br. 12. In particular, the Government alleges that the CIT “committed legal error” because it presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, which it alleges demonstrates that the Government’s position during trial was substantially justified. *Id.* at 16. In support, the Government cites to the summary judgment standards of proof articulated by the Supreme Court in *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, *id.* at 12 (citing 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986)), and to precedent from the Seventh Circuit indicating that surviving a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment *may* indicate that a position was substantially justified, *id.* at 13–14 (citing *United States v. Pecore*, 664 F.3d 1125, 1135 (7th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Thouvenot, Wade & Moerschen, Inc.*, 596 F.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2010)).

As an initial matter, the Government “bears the burden of proving its position was substantially justified” to avoid the award of attorney fees under the EAJA, *Libas, Ltd. v. United States*, 314 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and *Anderson* does not hold or otherwise suggest that this burden shifts if the Government survives summary judgment. Rather, *Anderson* concerns standards of proof at the summary judgment stage, not the award of attorney fees under the EAJA. *See* 477 U.S. at 247–57.

As the Government acknowledges, we have not yet directly considered whether surviving summary judgment *ipso facto* demonstrates that the Government’s position was substantially justified. When our precedent is silent on a particular question, “we may look to another circuit for guidance and may be persuaded by its analysis,” though “decisions from other circuits are not binding on this court.” *Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. United States*, 899 F.2d 1210, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

We first turn to the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, which the Government cites. Under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, surviving summary judgment *may* weigh in favor of finding that the Government’s position was “substantially justified,” but it is not dispositive. *See Pecore*, 664 F.3d at 1135 (stating that surviving summary

judgment is “objective, *although not necessarily conclusive*, evidence” of a substantially justified position (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted)).¹ Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that, while surviving summary judgment creates a “presumption” of a substantially justified position under the EAJA,² “something might emerge at trial that showed that the [G]overnment really had no case at all[,] [o]r the [trial] judge might on reflection decide that he had erred grievously in refusing to grant the . . . motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.” *Thouvenot*, 596 F.3d at 382. Thus, even if the CIT were bound by the Seventh Circuit’s standard, the CIT did not abuse its discretion by determining that the Government’s position was not substantially justified. Instead, the CIT properly considered “the entirety of the record . . . and the positions taken by the [G]overnment as a whole,” including evidence and arguments presented after the CIT denied ICP’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, and determined that “the [G]overnment’s position was not substantially justified.” *ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1329.

Our discussion of Seventh Circuit case law does not mean that we have adopted the “presumption” articulated in those decisions. Indeed, avoiding summary judgment does not necessarily mean that the position taken at that stage has a reasonable basis in law and fact. For example, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), “the court may . . . defer consider[ation of] the motion or deny it” when “a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Such circumstances may arise because, inter alia, the party asserting Rule 56(d) did not possess all of the requisite information, necessitating discovery, or the party moving for summary judgment presented temporarily unverifiable or otherwise unusable evidence. The circumstances also may arise simply because final resolution may require the trier of fact to observe witnesses and determine their credibility. Thus, rather than attach a presumption to the Government’s conduct based on a single action taken, we find it more appropriate to assess the Government’s conduct in light of the entire record, as the Supreme Court has instructed. See *Jean*, 496 U.S. at 159 (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) does not refer “to separate

¹ The Seventh Circuit’s statement in *Pecore* about surviving motions to dismiss and for summary judgment was dicta. See 664 F.3d at 1135 (stating that the comment was a “final point[] . . . [that] bear[s] mentioning” after having determined that “the intense nature of th[e] debate suggests . . . that either party’s position could be accepted as true by a reasonable person”).

² The Seventh Circuit cited the Eighth Circuit’s decision in *EEOC v. Liberal R-II School District* to support the application of a presumption. *Thouvenot*, 596 F.3d at 382 (citing 314 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2002)). We are not aware of any other circuits having applied a presumption similar to the Seventh and Eighth Circuits.

parts of the litigation” and that courts should consider all stages of the dispute before making a single determination about the Government’s conduct).

C. The Government’s Remaining Arguments Are Unpersuasive

The Government’s remaining arguments similarly do not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. The Government argues that the CIT incorrectly determined that the Government conceded a factual issue (i.e., that white sauce conformed to the Ruling Letter) by deciding not to appeal this adverse factual finding. Appellant’s Br. 16–18. And the Government correctly asserts that courts should not consider the Government’s decision not to appeal an issue as a concession on the issue’s merits. *See* Oral Argument at 3:52–5:26, <http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2016–1024.mp3>; *see also United States v. Mendoza*, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984) (“Unlike a private litigant . . . , the Solicitor General considers a variety of factors, such as the limited resources of the [G]overnment and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal.”). However, the issue was one of many reasons the CIT determined that the Government’s position was not “substantially justified” for purposes of the EAJA, and the CIT provided numerous other reasons why Customs “not only knew that it was effectively revoking the Ruling Letter, but it unreasonably ignored the requirement that a ruling letter governs liquidations until revoked.” *ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1330; *see id.* at 1329 (noting that “[m]ultiple officials at [Customs] saw an obvious nexus between a rate advance of the white sauce entries in a Notice of Action and revocation of the Ruling Letter and raised warnings about doing that” and that the decision “was based not on complying with the legal restraints identified by others, but on expedience” (footnote omitted)).

The Government next contends that the CIT improperly found the Government’s position unjustified because “it was unsettled whether a Customs Form 29, Notice of Action, could be characterized as an ‘interpretive ruling or decision’ under . . . § 1625(c) such that its issuance could trigger notice and comment procedures required for the revocation of a ruling letter.” Appellant’s Br. 19. According to the Government, the CIT also improperly relied on the vacated decision in *ICP I* in finding the Government’s position unjustified. *Id.* at 19–20. However, the CIT’s decision primarily relied on Customs officials’ statements—made before the Notice of Action issued—that notice and comment was required. *See ICP VII*, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1332 (“But *more importantly* for the question of special circumstances, the purely legal arguments about the nature of a Notice of Action, pur-

sued to final decision by the [G]overnment’s attorneys, do not appear to have been a basis for the [G]overnment’s position at the time [Customs] issued the Notice of Action. The Court thus finds that the [G]overnment’s position here was a *post-hoc attempt to justify a rate advance* [Customs] *knew to be contrary to the governing legal framework. . . .*” (emphases added).

Finally, the Government contends that the CIT abused its discretion by finding that Customs’s decision to issue the Notice of Action was not “substantially justified.” Appellant’s Br. 21–23. This argument is meritless. Customs was aware that notice and comment was required but, despite the legal ramifications, deliberately decided to forego it. *See, e.g., ICP VI*, 748 F.3d at 1188–89 (discussing Customs’s deliberations and affirming the CIT’s finding that Customs was required to comply with § 1625(c)(1)); *ICP III*, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade at 309 (explaining the “months-long deliberative process” during which many Customs officials stated that the Notice of Action must comply with § 1625(c)(1)). Therefore, the CIT was well within its discretion to make this finding.

CONCLUSION

We review the CIT’s determinations on whether the Government’s position was “substantially justified” for abuse of discretion, *see Chiu*, 948 F.2d at 713, and the CIT did not abuse its discretion. We have considered the Government’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For these reasons, the final decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs to ICP.

KYOCERA SOLAR, INC., KYOCERA MEXICANA S.A. DE C.V., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC., Defendants-Appellees

Appeal No. 2016–1348

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:15-cv-00084-NT, Senior Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas.

Dated: December 15, 2016

JAMES KEVIN HORGAN, DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by JOHN J. KENKEL, GREGORY S. MENEGAZ, ALEXANDRA H. SALZMAN.

MARY JANE ALVES, Office of the General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States International Trade Commission. Also represented by ANDREA C. CASSON, DOMINIC L. BIANCHI.

TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee SolarWorld Americas, Inc. Also represented by STEPHANIE MANAKER BELL, TESSA V. CAPELOTO, LAURA EL-SABAAWI, DERICK HOLT, USHA NEELAKANTAN, MAUREEN E. THORSON.

Before DYK, O'MALLEY, and STOLL, *Circuit Judges*.

STOLL, *Circuit Judge*.

Kyocera Solar Inc. and Kyocera Mexicana S.A. de C.V. (collectively, “Kyocera”) appeal a final determination by the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”). The CIT reviewed and affirmed the International Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) determination that the statutory text did not support Kyocera’s proposed interpretation of the statute. Because we agree that the plain meaning of the statute forecloses Kyocera’s proposed interpretation, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns solar modules (i.e., solar panels) that incorporate crystalline silicon photovoltaic (“CSPV”) cells from Taiwan. CSPV cells convert sunlight into electricity using mono-or multi-crystalline silicon cells. The CSPV cells are strung together, sealed, laminated, and framed to make solar modules, also known as CSPV modules. CSPV cells are the main electricity-generating component of solar modules.

Kyocera produces and manufactures solar modules abroad and imports them for sale in the United States. The solar modules at issue in this case are ultimately assembled in and imported from Mexico but incorporate Taiwanese CSPV cells. These solar modules were subject to an antidumping duty investigation into CSPV products from China and Taiwan. SolarWorld Industries America, Inc., an American producer of CSPV cells and modules, had filed antidumping

and countervailing duty petitions alleging material injury and threat of material injury to a domestic industry by CSPV product imports from China and Taiwan.

The Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) defined the investigation’s scope to include cells and modules produced in Taiwan and certain modules “completed or partially manufactured” in other countries. The relevant portion of Commerce’s scope definition is reproduced below:

The merchandise covered by these investigations is crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, and modules, laminates and/or panels consisting of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not partially or fully assembled into other products, including building integrated materials. For purposes of these investigations, subject merchandise also includes modules, laminates and/or panels assembled in the subject country consisting of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells that are completed or partially manufactured within a customs territory other than that subject country, using ingots that are manufactured in the subject country, wafers that are manufactured in the subject country, or cells where the manufacturing process begins in the subject country and is completed in a non-subject country.

Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products From the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, 79 Fed. Reg. 4661, 4667 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 29, 2014) (initiating antidumping duty investigations).

Kyocera later challenged Commerce’s scope determination and requested that it exclude solar modules produced in Mexico from the investigation’s scope, including modules produced in Mexico using CSPV cells manufactured in Taiwan. Commerce declined Kyocera’s request. It determined that the investigation would include solar modules produced in Mexico that incorporated Taiwanese CSPV cells. Commerce explained that “[m]odules, laminates, and panels produced in a third-country from cells produced in Taiwan are covered by this investigation.” *Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from Taiwan*, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,966, 76,968 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 23, 2014) (final determination). Kyocera challenged this scope determination in a separate civil action; Commerce’s scope determination is not at issue in this case. See *Kyocera Solar, Inc. v. United States*, CIT Ct. No. 15–00081 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed Mar. 20, 2015).

Using Commerce’s scope determination, the Commission determined that an industry within the United States had been materially injured by imports of CSPV products from Taiwan. The Commission

explained that it “must defer to Commerce’s determination of the scope of the merchandise subject to these investigations, and Commerce has determined that U.S. imports of CSPV modules assembled in third countries such as Mexico from CSPV cells made in Taiwan are U.S. imports of subject merchandise from Taiwan.” *Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Prods. from China & Taiwan*, Inv. No. 701TA-511, USITC Pub. 4519 (Feb. 1, 2015) (Final), 2015 WL10553313, at *13 n.110.

Kyocera nevertheless argued that the Commission had to conduct a separate negligibility analysis regarding Mexican solar panels incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells. Section 1677(24) of Title 19 of the United States Code defines “[n]egligible imports” as “imports from a country of merchandise corresponding to a domestic like product identified by the Commission . . . account[ing] for less than 3 percent of the volume of all such merchandise imported into the United States in the most recent 12-month period for which data are available that precedes” the filing of the petition or the initiation of the investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24). Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1)(B), “[i]f the Commission determines that imports of the subject merchandise are negligible, the investigation shall be terminated.” Kyocera argued that this statutory scheme required the Commission to conduct a separate negligibility analysis for its solar modules assembled in Mexico incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells in contrast to solar modules assembled in Taiwan incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells. In particular, Kyocera argued that § 1677(24) requires a negligibility analysis for imports from “a country,” and that its Mexican imports were from “a country,” so the Commission should separately conduct a negligibility analysis to determine whether solar modules imported from Mexico “account for less than 3 percent of the volume” of solar modules imported into the United States. *See* 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24).

The Commission rejected Kyocera’s argument, explaining that it reflected both an improper attempt to circumvent Commerce’s scope determination and an incorrect reading of the statute:

Kyocera’s arguments are based on two flawed premises. First, Kyocera overlooks that the Commission must defer to Commerce’s definition of the scope of the merchandise subject to these investigations, and Commerce has determined that U.S. imports of CSPV modules assembled in third countries such as Mexico from CSPV cells made in Taiwan are U.S. imports of subject merchandise from Taiwan, as discussed earlier. Moreover, Kyocera does not read the negligible imports language in tandem with 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b), which direct the

Commission to determine whether a domestic industry is materially injured “by reason of imports, or sales (or the likelihood of sales) for importation, of the merchandise *with respect to which the administering authority has made an affirmative determination under subsection (a)(1) of this section*. If the Commission determines that *imports of the subject merchandise are negligible*, the investigation shall be terminated.” (emphasis added). It is not reasonable to read “any country” into the definition of negligible imports without taking into account that the statute centers the negligibility analysis on the imports of the subject merchandise with respect to which Commerce has made an affirmative determination.

Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Prods. from China & Taiwan, 2015 WL 10553313, at *13 n.110.

Kyocera appealed the Commission’s determination to the CIT, which affirmed the Commission’s refusal to conduct a separate negligibility analysis for Kyocera’s solar modules incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells in Mexican manufacturing plants. It explained that “Kyocera ignores the fact that Commerce’s investigation defines the scope of the [Commission’s] analysis.” J.A. 10. It explained that “[h]ere, Commerce determined that the solar modules produced by Kyocera in Mexico using Taiwanese cells are considered Taiwanese in origin, and are within the scope of this Taiwanese investigation.” *Id.* (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The CIT concluded that “the [Commission] was bound by Commerce’s determination and tasked with examining whether imports from Taiwan, including modules from Mexico, were negligible. Accordingly, the [Commission] correctly declined to conduct a separate negligibility analysis with Mexico as the country of origin.” J.A. 11 (citation omitted).

Kyocera appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

We review the CIT’s assessment of the Commission’s final determination by reapplying the CIT’s standard of review. Specifically, we ask whether the Commission’s determination is unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not in accordance with the law. *Siemens Energy, Inc. v. United States*, 806 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “In undertaking this review, we give great weight to ‘the informed opinion of the [CIT].’” *Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States*, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting *Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States*, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).

Kyocera’s appeal raises an issue of statutory construction. We review issues of statutory construction under the two-prong analysis announced in *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). We first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” *Id.* at 842. If it has, our inquiry ends, for we “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” *Id.* at 843. If, however, the statute does not answer the question at hand because it is “silent or ambiguous,” then, under *Chevron’s* second prong, we determine whether the agency provided “a permissible construction of the statute.” *Id.* “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.” *Id.* at 843–44. “Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” *Id.* at 844 (footnote omitted).

We find that this dispute is resolved by the plain meaning of the statute. “In order to determine whether a statute clearly shows the intent of Congress in a *Chevron* step-one analysis, we employ traditional tools of statutory construction and examine ‘the statute’s text, structure, and legislative history, and apply the relevant canons of interpretation.’” *Heino v. Shinseki*, 683 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting *Delverde, SrL v. United States*, 202 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting *Davis v. Mich. Dep’t. of Treasury*, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). That principle rings particularly true here. The statutory structure before us offers important context that guides our understanding of the disputed text’s meaning.

We begin with 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b) and 1673d(b), which outline the Commission’s final determination inquiry in countervailing duties and antidumping investigations, respectively. These sections task the Commission with finally determining whether certain imports, those that fall within the scope of a final affirmative antidumping or countervailing duty determination made by Commerce, are harming an industry within the United States. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d. Section 1671d(b), which is mirrored by § 1673d(b), reads as follows:

(b) Final determination by Commission

(1) In general

The Commission shall make a final determination of whether—

- (A) an industry in the United States—
 - (i) is materially injured, or
 - (ii) is threatened with material injury, or
- (B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports, or sales (or the likelihood of sales) for importation, of the merchandise with respect to which the administering authority has made an affirmative determination under subsection (a) of this section. If the Commission determines that imports of the subject merchandise are negligible, the investigation shall be terminated.

These sections also require the Commission to conduct an negligibility determination and to terminate the investigation if it “determines that imports of the *subject merchandise* are negligible.” *Id.* (emphasis added). This negligibility determination is further defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24), which explains that “imports from a country of merchandise corresponding to a domestic like product identified by the Commission are ‘negligible’ if such imports account for less than 3 percent of the volume of all such merchandise imported into the United States” in a specified time period.

It is § 1677(24)’s definition of negligible merchandise that Kyocera reads as “direct[ing] the Commission to consider whether ‘imports from a country’ are negligible.” Appellant Br. 20. Kyocera argues that “[t]he language of the statute is not ambiguous. ‘A country’ means exactly that—a country. Mexico is a country.” *Id.* It follows, Kyocera argues, that its imports of solar modules assembled in Mexico incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells are from Mexico, and thus the Commission should have conducted a separate negligibility analysis for these modules.

We disagree. Kyocera’s statutory reading improperly wrests a line of statutory text from its context. *See Brown & Williamson*, 529 U.S. at 133. Here, the statute plainly requires that the Commission make its determinations with regard to subject merchandise. And the statute vests Commerce with the role of determining the scope of the merchandise subject to investigation. *See* 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b); *see also* 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a)(2), 1673e(a)(2) (explaining that Commerce shall include in antidumping and countervailing duty orders “a description of the subject merchandise, in such detail as [Commerce] deems necessary”). Indeed, the negligibility determination requires an inquiry into whether “imports of the *subject merchandise* are negligible.” 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(1), 1673d(b)(1). And the statute defines “subject merchandise” as “the class or kind of merchandise that is within the scope of an investigation.” 19 U.S.C. §

1677(25). Thus, the Commission's determinations of domestic injury and negligibility are made with respect to the subject merchandise—i.e., the merchandise within the scope of Commerce's investigation. We therefore agree with the Commission's observation that "[i]t is not reasonable to read 'any country' into the definition of negligible imports without taking into account that the statute centers the negligibility analysis on the imports of the subject merchandise with respect to which Commerce has made an affirmative determination." *Certain Crystal-line Silicon Photovoltaic Prods. from China & Taiwan*, 2015 WL 10553313, at *13 n.110.

Moreover, Kyocera cannot challenge Commerce's determination that the solar modules finally assembled in Mexico are Taiwanese in origin. Indeed, Kyocera "does not dispute" that "[t]he Commerce Department determined that solar products produced in Mexico from Taiwanese origin cells[] are subject merchandise and Taiwanese in origin." Appellant Reply Br. 4. In fact, that very determination is the subject of a separate civil proceeding in the CIT, *see* CIT Ct. No. 15-00081, filed by Kyocera. And both parties agree that Commerce's scope determination is not before us today. Kyocera argues, however, that "the Commission is required to examine then egligibility of subject merchandise (in this case, Taiwanese origin solar products produced in Mexico) *imported from Mexico*." Appellant Br. 4. We disagree. The statute does not support Kyocera's proposed distinction between Commerce's determination of origin and the origin of goods referred to in the negligibility statute. As we explained above, the statute centers the negligibility determination on subject merchandise. In this case, Commerce determined that the solar modules that Kyocera claims are "from Mexico" are Taiwanese in origin. Following the statutory structure, the Commission properly treated the cells as Taiwanese in origin, and thus correctly refused to conduct a separate negligibility determination for Kyocera's solar cells.

We have considered Kyocera's remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

Because we find Kyocera's position unambiguously refuted by the plain meaning of the statute, we conclude our analysis under the first prong of *Chevron* and do not reach its second prong. As Kyocera does not otherwise challenge the Commission's determination, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS.

No Costs.